Die Berliner Mauer als das Symbol der deutschen Teilung ist mittlerweile länger verschwunden als sie gestanden hat, doch die Unterschiede innerhalb des Landes sind auch nach drei Jahrzehnten noch sichtbar. Jüngste Forschungsergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass die Bruchkante der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung nicht immer ausschließlich entlang der ehemaligen innerdeutschen Grenze verläuft, sondern neben dem West-Ost-Gefälle auch Süd-Nord- oder Stadt-Land-Unterschiede zutage treten.

Financial markets are eager for any signal of monetary policy from the People’s Bank of China (PBC). The importance of effective monetary policy communication will only increase as China continues to liberalize its financial system and open its economy. This paper discusses the country’s unique institutional setup and empirically analyzes the impact on financial markets of the PBC’s main communication channels, including a novel communication channel. The results suggest that there has been significant progress but that PBC communication is still evolving toward the level of other major economies. The paper recommends medium-term policy reforms and reforms that can be adopted quickly.

We introduce a novel currency risk measure based on American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Using an augmented ADR pricing model, we exploit investors’ exposure to potential devaluation losses to derive an indicator of currency risk. Using weekly data for a sample of 807 ADRs located in 21 emerging markets over the 1994–2014 period, we find that a deterioration in the fiscal balance and higher inflation increase currency risk. Interaction models reveal that the fiscal balance and inflation drive the determination of currency risk for countries with poor sovereign rating, low foreign reserves, low capital account openness and managed float regimes.

This paper is the first to study the effects of capital account liberalization on structural transformation and compare the contribution of within term and structural term to economic growth. We use a 10-sector-level productivity dataset to decomposes the effects of opening capital account on within-sector productivity growth and cross-sector structural transformation. We find that opening capital account is associated with labor productivity and employment share increment in sectors with higher human capital intensity and external financial dependence, as well as non-tradable sectors. But it results in a growth-reducing structural transformation by directing labor into sectors with lower productivity. Moreover, in the ten years after capital account liberalization, the contribution share of structural transformation decreases while that of within productivity growth increases. We conclude that the relationship between capital account liberalization and economic growth is within gain and structural pain.

In this study, we investigate whether and to what extent community managers in online collaborative communities can stimulate crowd activities through their engagement. Using a novel data set of 22 large online idea crowdsourcing campaigns, we find that active engagement of community managers positively affects crowd activities in an inverted U-shaped manner. Moreover, we evidence that intellectual stimulation by managers increases community participation, while individual consideration of users has no impact on user activities. Finally, the data reveal that community manager activities that require more effort, such as media file uploads instead of simple written comments, have a larger effect on crowd participation.

The outcome of any important macroeconomic policy change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central challenge facing policymakers is how to assess the relative strength of those forces. Economists have a range of tools that can be used to make such assessments. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are the leading tool for making such assessments in an open and transparent manner. We review the state of mainstream DSGE models before the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We then describe how DSGE models are estimated and evaluated. We address the question of why DSGE modelers—like most other economists and policymakers—failed to predict the financial crisis and the Great Recession, and how DSGE modelers responded to the financial crisis and its aftermath. We discuss how current DSGE models are actually used by policymakers. We then provide a brief response to some criticisms of DSGE models, with special emphasis on criticism by Joseph Stiglitz, and offer some concluding remarks.