Weakening bargaining power of unions and the increasing integration of the world economy may affect the volatility of capital and labor incomes. This paper documents and explains changes in income volatility. Using a theoretical framework which builds distribution risk into a real business cycle model, hypotheses on the determinants of the relative volatility of capital and labor are derived. The model is tested using industry-level data. The data cover 11 industrialized countries, 22 manufacturing and services industries, and a maximum of 35 years. The paper has four main findings. First, the unconditional volatility of labor and capital incomes has declined, reflecting the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Second, the idiosyncratic component of income volatility has hardly changed over time. Third, crosssectional heterogeneity in the evolution of relative income volatilities is substantial. If anything, the labor incomes of high- and low-skilled workers have become more volatile in relative terms. Fourth, income volatility is related to variables measuring the bargaining power of workers. Trade openness has no significant impact.

At present, oil markets appear to be behaving in a fashion similar to that in the late 1970s and early 1980s when oil prices rose sharply over an extended period. Furthermore, like at that time, analysts are split on whether such increases will persist or reverse, and if so by how much. The present paper argues that the similarities between the two episodes are not as strong as they might appear at first sight, and that the likelihood of sharp reversals in prices is not particularly great. There are a number of reasons in support of the view that it is unlikely that the first two decades of this century will mimic the last two decades of the previous century. First, oil demand is likely to grow significantly in line with strong economic growth in non-OECD countries. Second, on the supply side, OPEC is likely to enhance its control over markets over the next two decades, as supply increases in newly opened areas will only partially offset declining rates of production in other geologically mature non-OPEC oil regions. Moreover, while concerns about climate change will spur global efforts to reduce carbon emissions, these efforts are not expected to reduce oil demand. Finally, although there is much talk about alternative fuels, few of these are economically viable at the prices currently envisioned, and given the structural impediments, there is a reduced likelihood that the market will be able to generate sufficient quantities of these alternative fuels over the forecast horizon. The above factors imply that oil prices are likely to continue to exceed the USD 70 to USD 90 range over the long term.

Changes in exchange rates affect countries through their impact on cross-border activities such as trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). With increasing activities of multinational firms, the FDI channel is likely to gain in importance. Economic theory provides two main explanations why changes in exchange rates can affect FDI. According to the first explanation, FDI reacts to exchange rate changes if there are information frictions on capital markets and if investment depends on firms’ net worth (capital market friction hypothesis). According to the second explanation, FDI reacts to exchange rate changes if output and factor markets are segmented, and if firm-specific assets are important (goods market friction hypothesis). We provide a unified theoretical framework of these two explanations. We analyse the implications of the model empirically using a dataset based on detailed German firm-level data. We find greater support for the goods market than for the capital market friction hypothesis.

In addition to its direct effects on the global trading and production structure, the ongoing process of globalisation may have important implications for the interaction of exchange rates and the overall economy. This paper presents evidence regarding possible changes in the role of exchange rates in a more globalised economy. First, it analyses the link between exchange rates and prices, showing that there is at most a moderate decline in exchange rate pass-through for the euro area. Next, it turns to the effect of exchange rate changes on trade flows. The findings indicate that the responsiveness of euro area exports to exchange rate changes may have declined somewhat as a result of globalisation, reflecting mainly shifts in the geographical and sectoral composition of trade flows. The paper also provides a firm-level analysis of the impact of exchange rate changes on corporate profits, which suggests that overall this relationship appears to be relatively stable over time, although there are important cross-country differences. In addition, it studies the overall impact of exchange rates on GDP and the potential role of valuation effects as a transmission channel in the case of the euro area. JEL Classification: E3, F15, F31

In 2004, European competition law had been faced with considerable changes due to the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform on the agreements firms implement. In contrast to previous research we focus on the reform’s impact on especially welfare enhancing, namely innovative agreements. We show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached. However, by the same mechanism, also highly innovative cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended effect, we conclude that only fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased in order to deter illegal but not innovative agreements.

Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.

Robust (cross-border) interbank markets are important for the proper functioning of modern financial systems. However, a network of interbank exposures may lead to domino effects following the event of an initial bank failure. We investigate the evolution and determinants of contagion risk for the Belgian banking system over the period 1993–2002 using detailed information on aggregate interbank exposures of individual banks, large bilateral interbank exposures, and cross-border interbank exposures. The "structure" of the interbank market affects contagion risk. We find that a change from a complete structure (where all banks have symmetric links) toward a "multiplemoney-center" structure (where money centers are symmetrically linked to otherwise disconnected banks) has decreased the risk and impact of contagion. In addition, an increase in the relative importance of cross-border interbank exposures has lowered local contagion risk. However, this reduction may have been compensated by an increase in contagion risk stemming from foreign banks.

We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.

Energiesparmaßnahmen im Wohnungsbau tragen erheblich zur Reduzierung von Treibhausgasen bei. Trotz der Potenziale sind die Emissionen der Haushalte in den vergangenen Jahren weiter gestiegen. Die Wirkung von Energiesparvorschriften und Förderprogrammenwurde überschätzt und wichtige marktspezifische Hemmnisse blieben unbeachtet.

Da die Risiken des Treibhauseffekts in den gegenwärtigen Heizenergiepreisen kaum Niederschlag finden, reichen die preislichen Energiesparanreize für einen wirksamen Klimaschutz nicht aus. Wohnungsmarktspezifische Wirkungsbrüche verstärken dieses Defizit, mit der Folge, dass wirtschaftlich vertretbare Energiesparmaßnahmen unterbleiben. Das beschränkt die Wirksamkeit von Wärmeschutzstandards und Förderprogrammen.

Notwendig sind daher Maßnahmen, die bei Anbietern und Nachfragern gleichermaßen Energiesparanreize setzen. Eine schrittweise Erhöhung der Ökosteuer auf Heizenergieträger, eine geringere Wohnungsmarktreglementierung und Maßnahmen zur Erhöhung der Energieverbrauchstransparenz vergrößern die Energiesparanreize für beide Marktseiten.