Banks play a special role in the financial system. According to classical banking theory, they help reduce informational asymmetries and serve as liquidity providers. Banks can, at least partially, lower transaction costs that result from information frictions between investors and firms and thereby alleviate firms’ funding constraints (Diamond, 1984). Moreover, banks create liquidity on their balance sheets by financing comparably illiquid assets with relatively liquid liabilities (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Integrating credit and liquidity provision functions, banks have been the object of numerous studies on financial intermediation. A particular focus in recent years has been on banks’ behavior as well as on the con- sequences of their actions for the real economy when hit by adverse shocks. Following the global financial crisis, financial shocks that originate from within the financial sec- tor have received wide attention (Cingano et al., 2016; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Paravisini, 2008; Paravisini et al., 2015; Schnabl, 2012). However, banks are also subject to numerous non-financial shocks, which are the focus of this thesis.

Real estate markets are pivotal to financial stability given their dual role as the underlying asset of crucial financial products in financial systems, such as mortgage loans and asset-backed securities, and the primary source of household wealth alike. As such, they also play traditionally a crucial role for the transmission of monetary policy. Imbalances and sudden corrections in real estate markets have been the root cause of many financial crises over the last decades. But whereas some national, often survey-based indicators of real estate prices are provided by central banks and statistical offices, a comprehensive collection of purchase prices, rents, and proxies for the liquidity of European real estate markets is lacking. The IWH European Real Estate Index (EREI) seeks to fill this void for residential property. This technical report describes the gathering and processing of sale and rental prices for properties in 18 European countries. We provide the general scrapeing step in the section before describing country-specific details for each country in separated sub-sections.

Capital inflow surges destabilize the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.

The economy is a complex system because market participants do not act independently but adjust their behavior to other agents and to the outcome which emerges from their joint actions (Arthur, 2014). Dependencies among participants can impede policy makers capabilities to influence or steer the course of the economy. Kambhu et al. (2007) argue that to influence developments in financial markets, for instance to prevent crises from spreading, there are only “coarse or indirect options” available for policy makers. Similar to crises which propagate through a complex system, interventions might result in unintended side effects which can also disseminate through the system. Thus, in a complex system, unintended consequences of policy efforts may well be the rule. Policy makers try to ward off or mitigate negative consequences for the economy and society during periods of crisis. For instance, during the Covid crisis large scale support programs for firms in Western economies were set up to avoid bankruptcies. Similarly, during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) set up large scale asset purchase programs as well as additionally longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) which provided immediate support to financial market participants’ liquidity positions and thereby prevented a melt-down of the financial system. During these periods, immediate and abundant liquidity supply is of utmost importance. Meanwhile, crisis measures, due to their massive scale and non-specific target group, may entail unknown or unintended side effects for instance on competition among market participants, firms’ investment behavior, or changes in lending strategies and risk taking behavior of banks. Likewise, new regulatory frameworks such as the introduction of new markets can have consequences previously not thought of. For policy makers it is important to know direct effects of policy interventions but also to be aware of the possibility and impact of indirect or unexpected side effects in order to evaluate measures taken and to learn for future design of regulation or intervention.

This paper generates a technical optimum of bank liquidity creation benchmark by tracing an efficient frontier in liquidity creation (bank intermediation) and questions why some banks are more efficient than others in such activities. Evidence reveals that medium size banks are most correlated to efficient frontier. Small (large) banks—focused on traditional banking activities—are found to be the most (least) efficient in creating liquidity in on-balance sheet items whereas large banks—involved in non-traditional activities—are found to be most efficient in off-balance sheet liquidity creation. Additionally, the liquidity efficiency of small banks is more resilient during the 2007-2008 financial crisis relative to other banks.

We examine whether liquidity dynamics within banking groups matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using matched bank headquarters-branch data for identification, we find a lending channel of reserve requirements for municipal branches whose headquarters are more exposed to the policy tool. The result is driven by the 2008–2009 crisis and is stronger for state-owned branches, especially when being less profitable and liquidity constrained. These findings suggest the presence of cross-regional distributional effects of macroprudential policies operating via internal capital markets.

We use administrative and supervisory data at the bank and loan level to investigate the impact of the introduction of covered bonds on the composition of bank balance sheets and bank risk. Covered bonds, despite being collateralized by mortgages, lead to a shift in bank lending from mortgages to corporate loans. Young and low-rated firms in particular receive more credit, suggesting that overall credit risk increases. At the same time, we find that total balance sheet liquidity increases. We identify the channel in a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence: Banks with low initial liquidity and banks with sufficiently high risk-adjusted return on firm lending drive the results.

A safe and healthy banking system is a central pillar of financial stability and even political stability. Systemic banking crises lead to political instability and extremism while the same cannot be said of macroeconomic downturns unrelated to banking crises (see e.g. Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2016). Several factors have been identified as potential culprits for the recent financial crisis, among them insufficient bank liquidity, insufficient bank capitalization, risk-taking incentives induced by compensation struc- tures, and moral hazard emanating from government safety nets. My dissertation aims to enhance our understanding of two of these factors: capitalization and compensation, or put differently, (equity) capital and human capital.

Between 2010 and 2012, the European Central Bank absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Detailed security holdings data at the bank level affirms an effective lending stimulus due to the SMP. Exposed banks contract household lending, but increase commercial lending substantially. Holding non-SMP securities from stressed EMU countries amplifies the commercial lending response. The SMP also improved liquidity buffers and profitability without compromising credit quality.

Capital inflow surges destabilise the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.