We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.

Noncompete agreements (also known as covenants not to compete [CNCs]) are frequently used by many businesses in an attempt to maintain their competitive advantage by safeguarding their human capital and the associated business secrets. Although the choice of whether to include CNCs in employment contracts is made by firms, the real extent of their restrictiveness is determined by the state laws. In this article, we explore the effect of state‐level CNC enforceability on firm productivity. We assert that an increase in state level CNC enforceability is detrimental to firm productivity, and this relationship becomes stronger as comparable job opportunities become more concentrated in a firm's home state. On the other hand, this negative relationship is weakened as employee compensation tends to become more long‐term oriented. Results based on hierarchical linear modeling analysis of 21,134 firm‐year observations for 3,027 unique firms supported all three hypotheses.

The three papers reprinted in chapters 3 to 5 of this cumulative dissertation thesis investigate the effectiveness of European competition law and whether its main objective – to ensure a fair competition between companies – can be reached. Yet, competition is expected to maximize welfare as it forces companies to reduce prices or to improve their quality or service. However, competition can be distorted if companies agree with each other to fix prices, or if a company with a dominant market position uses its dominance to distort competition. Another possible threat to competition might come to the fore if a merger among large companies reduces competition or if governmental support to a specific company leads to an advantage over its competitors. Therefore, in order to ensure a fair competition among companies governments normally do not intervene in the process but set only the framework in which businesses operate. European competition policy as part of this regulatory policy includes all measures aimed at preserving competition and comprises four main pillars: Cartel law, Antitrust law, Mergers and Acquisitions and State Aid. The papers of this thesis focus on two of these four areas: Cartels and State Aid.

Jurisdictions that engage in inter-regional tax competition usually try to attenuate competitive pressures by substituting salient tax instruments with hidden ones. On this effect, we investigate the efficiency consequences of inter-regional tax competition and fiscal equalization in a federal system when taxpayers fail to optimally react on shrouded attributes of local tax policy. If the statuary tax rate is a relatively salient instrument and taxpayers pay low attention to the quality and the frequency of tax enforcement, the underlying substitution of tax instruments with the aim of reducing the perceived tax price may suppress the under-exploitation of tax bases that is typically triggered by fiscal equalization.

Does the mere presence of big banks affect macroeconomic outcomes? In this paper, we develop a theory of granularity (Gabaix, 2011) for the banking sector, introducing Bertrand competition and heterogeneous banks charging variable markups. Using this framework, we show conditions under which idiosyncratic shocks to bank lending can generate aggregate fluctuations in the credit supply when the banking sector is highly concentrated. We empirically assess the relevance of these granular effects in banking using a linked micro-macro dataset of more than 80 countries for the years 1995-2009. The banking sector for many countries is indeed granular, as the right tail of the bank size distribution follows a power law. We then demonstrate granular effects in the banking sector on macroeconomic outcomes. The presence of big banks measured by high market concentration is associated with a positive and significant relationship between bank-level credit growth and aggregate growth of credit or gross domestic product.

I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.

In 2004, European competition law had been considerable changed by the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform and its arising uncertainty on the agreements firms implement, especially on innovative agreements like vertical R&D agreements. By means of a decision theoretic approach, we show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached but innovating cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended side effect, fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased.

Most observers have concluded that while money markets and government bond markets are rapidly integrating following the introduction of the common currency in the euro area, there is little evidence that a similar integration process is taking place for retail banking. Data on cross-border retail bank flows, cross-border bank mergers and the law of one price reveal no evidence of integration in retail banking. This paper shows that the previous tests of bank integration are weak in that they are not based on an equilibrium concept and are neither necessary nor sufficient statistics for bank integration. The paper proposes a new test of integration based on convergence in banks' profitability. The new test emphasises the role of an active market for corporate control and of competition in banking integration. European listed banks profitability appears to converge to a common level. There is weak evidence that competition eliminates high profits for these banks, and underperforming banks tend to show improved profitability. Unlisted European banks differ markedly. Their profits show no tendency to revert to a common target rate of profitability. Overall, the banking market in Europe appears far from being integrated. In contrast, in the U.S. both listed and unlisted commercial banks profits converge to the same target, and high profit banks see their profits driven down quickly.

In 2004, European competition law had been faced with considerable changes due to the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform on the agreements firms implement. In contrast to previous research we focus on the reform’s impact on especially welfare enhancing, namely innovative agreements. We show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached. However, by the same mechanism, also highly innovative cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended effect, we conclude that only fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased in order to deter illegal but not innovative agreements.

Die im Jahr 2006 reformierten und ab diesem Jahr zur Anwendung kommenden Leitlinien zur Bußgeldberechnung von Kartellverstößen im europäischen Wirtschaftsraum sollen den Anreiz zur Kartellbildung für Unternehmen senken und die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Kartellaufdeckung erhöhen. In diesem Artikel wird beleuchtet, wie die Entscheidung für oder wider eine Kartellbeteiligung seitens der Unternehmen durch diese Leitlinien beeinflußt wird. Es kann gezeigt werden, daß durch die Festlegung einer Bußgeldobergrenze eine wirksame Abschreckung nur für Unternehmen zu erwarten ist, die einen geringen Anteil ihres Umsatzes im kartellrechtlich relevanten Markt erzielen. Für diese steigt zunächst mit zunehmender Kartellebensdauer der Anreiz, das Kartell anzuzeigen. Das führt dazu, daß Kartelle mit mindestens einem Unternehmen, das einen geringen Anteil seines Gesamtumsatzes auf dem Kartellmarkt erzielt, bis zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt im Zeitverlauf instabiler werden. Unternehmen, die ihren Umsatz jedoch fast ausschließlich auf diesem Markt erzielen, werden durch die neue Leitlinie aufgrund der Bußgeldobergrenze hingegen kaum abgeschreckt. Der Artikel gibt einen kurzen Überblick über das „Kartellrechtsrisiko“, wie es sich für Unternehmen darstellt. Es wird erläutert, wie die mit einer möglichen Kartellstrafe verbundenen Aufwendungen ermittelt werden können. Darauf basierend werden die notwendigen Mindestumsatzrenditen bestimmt, die von Unternehmen im Kartell erwirtschaftet werden müssen, damit sich aus Unternehmenssicht eine Kartellbildung rechnen könnte. Es wird gezeigt, daß für bestimmte Kartelle bereits Renditen von wenigen Prozentpunkten genügen, um eine Kartellteilnahme attraktiv werden zu lassen.