Competition in the U.S. appears to have declined. One contributing factor may have been heterogeneity in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. I examine the impact of product market peer credit constraints on long-run competitive outcomes and behavior among non-financial firms. I use measures of lender exposure to the financial crisis to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for product market credit availability. I find that credit constraints of product market peers positively predict growth in sales, market share, profitability, and markups. This is consistent with the notion that firms gained at the expense of their credit constrained peers. The relationship is robust to accounting for other sources of inter-firm spillovers, namely credit access of technology network and supply chain peers. Further, I find evidence of strategic investment, i.e. the idea that firms increase investment in response to peer credit constraints to commit to deter entry mobility. This behavior may explain why temporary heterogeneity in the availability of credit appears to have resulted in a persistent redistribution of output across firms.

Competition in the U.S. appears to have declined. One contributing factor may have been heterogeneity in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. I examine the impact of product market peer credit constraints on long-run competitive outcomes and behavior among non-financial firms. I use measures of lender exposure to the financial crisis to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for product market credit availability. I find that credit constraints of product market peers positively predict growth in sales, market share, profitability, and markups. This is consistent with the notion that firms gained at the expense of their credit constrained peers. The relationship is robust to accounting for other sources of inter-firm spillovers, namely credit access of technology network and supply chain peers. Further, I find evidence of strategic investment, i.e. the idea that firms increase investment in response to peer credit constraints to commit to deter entry mobility. This behavior may explain why temporary heterogeneity in the availability of credit appears to have resulted in a persistent redistribution of output across firms.

Research has shown that firms with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) tend to overinvest and are exposed to high risks due to unrealistically optimistic estimates of their firms’ future performance. This study finds evidence that overconfident CEOs also affect suppliers’ risk taking. Specifically, serving overconfident customers can lead to high supplier risks, measured by stock volatility, idiosyncratic risk, and market risk. The effects are pronounced when customers aggressively invest in research and development (R&D). Our results are robust after addressing self-selection bias and using different CEO overconfidence measures. We also document some real effects of customer CEO overconfidence on suppliers.

In this paper, I study the consequences of globalisation, as measured by the involvement of firms in GVC, on the business environment. In particular, I focus on concentration and productivity, firstly by estimating robust elasticities and then isolating the exogenous component of the variation in the participation in GVC. To this aim, I exploit the distance between industries in terms of upstreamness and downstreamness along the supply chain. The evidences suggest that involvement in international supply chains is positively related to concentration at the sector level and positively associated with aggregate productivity, an effect that is driven by the firms at the top of the productivity distribution. Finally, I relate these findings to the current pandemic, going beyond the lack of official statistics and estimating GVC participation for 2020 at the country-level through real time world-seaborne trade data, providing evidences on the re-absorption of the Covid shock in several European economies.

Containment measures of COVID-19 have generated a chain of supply and demand shocks around the globe with heterogeneous fallout across industries and countries. We quantify their transmission via foreign trade with a focus on the euro area where deep firms integration within regional supply chains and strong demand linkages act as a magnification mechanism. We estimate that spillover effects in the euro area from suppression measures in one of the five main euro area countries range between 15-28% the size of the original shock; negative foreign demand shocks depress euro area aggregate activity by about a fifth the size of the external shock and a fourth of the total effect is due to indirect propagation through euro area supply chain. Last, reopening to regional tourism softened the contraction of aggregate activity due to travel and tourism bans by about a third in the euro area. Our findings suggest that enhanced coordination of recovery plans would magnify their beneficial effects.