We explore the sources of household balance sheet adjustment following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use microdata from the Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that banks cumulatively tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a house price boom in the mid-2000s than in non-boom counties. We then use the idea that renters, unlike homeowners, did not experience an adverse wealth shock when the housing market collapsed to examine the relative importance of two explanations for the observed deleveraging and the sluggish pickup in consumption after 2008. First, households may have optimally adjusted to lower wealth by reducing their demand for debt and implicitly, their demand for consumption. Alternatively, banks may have been more reluctant to lend in areas with pronounced real estate declines. Our evidence is consistent with the second explanation. Renters with low risk scores, compared to homeowners in the same markets, reduced their levels of nonmortgage debt and credit card debt more in counties where house prices fell more. The contrast suggests that the observed reductions in aggregate borrowing were more driven by cutbacks in the provision of credit than by a demand-based response to lower housing wealth.

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.

In the tradition of Romer and Romer (2000), this paper compares staff forecasts of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) for inflation and output with corresponding private forecasts. Standard tests show that the Fed and less so the ECB have a considerable information advantage about inflation and output. Using novel tests for conditional predictive ability and forecast stability for the US, we identify the driving forces of the narrowing of the information advantage of Greenbook forecasts coinciding with the Great Moderation.

There is growing consensus that the conduct of monetary policy can have an impact on financial and economic stability through the risk-taking incentives of banks. Falling interest rates might induce a “search for yield” and generate incentives to invest into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and commercial property prices and the risk-taking incentives of banks. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the U.S. for the years 1997-2008. We include standard macroeconomic indicators and factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending. These data allow modeling the reactions of banks’ new lending volumes and the riskiness of new loans. We do not find evidence for a risk-taking channel for the entire banking system after a monetary policy loosening or an unexpected increase in property prices. This masks, however, important differences across banking groups. Small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk, foreign banks lower risk, and large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure.

Dieser Beitrag begründet, warum die Schwere der gegenwärtigen globalen Finanzkrise von der ständigen Verlegung internationaler Liquidität auf verschiedene Anlagemärkte beeinflusst wird. Dieser Prozess kann als „wandernde“ spekulative Vermögensblase bezeichnet werden. Nachdem sie durch den Niedergang des amerikanischen Subprime-Hypothekenmarkts und der hypothekengedeckten Wertpapiere ausgelöst worden war, hat sie sich auf andere Kreditfelder, auf strukturierte Finanzprodukte und globale Finanzinstitutionen ausgebreitet. Die Reaktionen der Wirtschaftspolitik, insbesondere der Geldpolitik, sind bisher nicht angemessen ausgefallen, da sie sich auf eine unsystematische Re-Kapitalisierung der betroffenen und auch verantwortlichen Investitionsbanken konzentrierten. Stattdessen sollte die Geldpolitik darauf abzielen, die weltweite Überschussliquidität in produktive Investitionen zu lenken. Eine sinnvolle Maßnahme wäre die Einführung eines Inflationsziels im Rahmen einer vorwärts-blickenden geldpolitischen Strategie durch die amerikanische Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) und andere Zentralbanken. Damit könnten die inflationären Effekte der gegenwärtigen Liquiditätsinjektionen und der steigenden Preise für Warenfutures reduziert werden. Entscheidend ist auch, dass sich die Inflationsbekämpfung nicht an der Kerninflationsrate, sondern an der tatsächlichen Inflationsrate orientiert, da insbesondere die Preissteigerungen auf den Futuremärkten demnächst in die Kerninflationsrate durchschlagen werden.

A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.