Finanzmarktkrisen verursachen in der Regel hohe Kosten. Banken müssen stabilisiert werden, um einen Zusammenbruch des Bankensystems zu verhindern, was immense Kosten für den Staat bedeuten kann. Ebenso kommt es im Zuge von Finanzmarktkrisen zu einem starken Rückgang der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität, der im Vergleich zu gewöhnlichen Rezessionen länger anhält. Die Finanzmarktkrise hat dies ein weiteres Mal verdeutlicht und eine Phase der signifikanten Verschärfung der Regulierung und Aufsicht von Banken eingeleitet. Die Legislative hat das »Window of Opportunity« gut genutzt, und sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf europäischer Ebene wurden neue gesetzliche Grundlagen für eine stärkere Regulierung des Bankensystems erfolgreich eingeführt. Ein erster Erfolg des neuen regulatorischen Umfelds zeigte sich während der Corona-Pandemie, in der das Bankensystem stabil blieb. Dies wird auch durch die aktuell steigenden Eigenkapitalquoten und vergleichsweise niedrigen Ausfallraten im Kreditportfolio der Banken deutlich. Hervorzuheben ist außerdem, dass nicht nur auf nationaler Ebene Anstrengungen unternommen wurden, das regulatorische Umfeld für Banken zu verbessern, sondern dass es auch auf Ebene der Europäischen Union (EU) gelungen ist, mit dem »Single Rulebook« einen einheitlichen regulatorischen Rahmen zu schaffen. Dies wirkt Verschiebungen von Risiken innerhalb der EU entgegen. Trotz dieser Erfolge und positiven Entwicklungen darf nicht übersehen werden, dass sich durch staatliches Eingreifen und die Einführung neuer Regulierungsvorschriften nicht nur der betroffene Sektor, also die Banken, anpassen. Es kann auch zu Auswirkungen auf verschiedenste Akteure kommen, die direkt oder indirekt mit dem Bankensystem interagieren. Zudem kann es im Anpassungsprozess zu dynamischen Effekten kommen. Im Beitrag gehen wir auf zwei ausgewählte Aspekte ein, welche in diesem Zusammenhang von der Legislative zu beachten sind. 

Der Beitrag ist Teil des Artikels “Die Zukunft des europäischen Finanzsystems – zwischen Risiken und mangelnder Wettbewerbsfähigkeit?“, erschienen in: ifo Schnelldienst, 2024, 77, Nr. 07, 03-36.

There is growing evidence on the role of economic conditions in the recent successes of populist and extremist parties. However, little is known about the role of over-indebtedness, even though debtor distress has grown in Europe following the financial crisis. We study the unique case of the Czech Republic, where by 2017, nearly one in ten citizens had been served at least one debtor distress warrant even though the country consistently features low unemployment. Our municipality-level difference-in-differences analysis asks about the voting consequences of a rise in debtor distress following a 2001 deregulation of consumer-debt collection. We find that debtor distress has a positive effect on support for (new) extreme right and populist parties, but a negative effect on a (traditional) extreme-left party. The effects of debtor distress we uncover are robust to whether and how we control for economic hardship; the effects of debtor distress and economic hardship are of similar magnitude, but operate in opposing directions across the political spectrum.

We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.

This paper contributes to a better understanding of the important role that credit demand plays for credit markets and aggregate macroeconomic developments as both a source and transmitter of economic shocks. I am the first to identify a structural credit demand equation together with credit supply, aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy in a Bayesian structural VAR. The model combines informative priors on structural coefficients and multiple external instruments to achieve identification. In order to improve identification of the credit demand shocks, I construct a new granular instrument from regional mortgage origination.
I find that credit demand is quite elastic with respect to contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions, while credit supply is relatively inelastic. I show that credit supply and demand shocks matter for aggregate fluctuations, albeit at different times: credit demand shocks mostly drove the boom prior to the financial crisis, while credit supply shocks were responsible during and after the crisis itself. In an out-of-sample exercise, I find that the Covid pandemic induced a large expansion of credit demand in 2020Q2, which pushed the US economy towards a sustained recovery and helped to avoid a stagflationary scenario in 2022.

This paper assesses the progress made towards the creation of the European Banking Union (EBU) and the evolution of the banking industry in the European Union since the financial crisis of 2007. We review major regulatory changes pertaining to the three pillars of the EBU and the effects of new legislation on both banks and the real economy. Whereas farreaching reforms pertaining to the EBU pillars of supervision and resolution regimes have been implemented, the absence of a European Deposit Scheme remains a crucial deficiency. We discuss how European banks coped with recent challenges, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, a high inflation environment, and digitalization needs, followed by an outlook on selected major challenges lying ahead of this incomplete EBU, notably the transition towards a green economy.

Competition in the U.S. appears to have declined. One contributing factor may have been heterogeneity in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. I examine the impact of product market peer credit constraints on long-run competitive outcomes and behavior among non-financial firms. I use measures of lender exposure to the financial crisis to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for product market credit availability. I find that credit constraints of product market peers positively predict growth in sales, market share, profitability, and markups. This is consistent with the notion that firms gained at the expense of their credit constrained peers. The relationship is robust to accounting for other sources of inter-firm spillovers, namely credit access of technology network and supply chain peers. Further, I find evidence of strategic investment, i.e. the idea that firms increase investment in response to peer credit constraints to commit to deter entry mobility. This behavior may explain why temporary heterogeneity in the availability of credit appears to have resulted in a persistent redistribution of output across firms.