Die von der Europäischen Kommission aufgrund von Kartellverstößen verhängten Bußgelder sind in den letzten Jahren erheblich angestiegen. Egal ob der Verstoß bewusst oder unbewusst erfolgt, ergeben sich erhebliche finanzielle Risiken für Unternehmen. Im Folgenden Beitrag wird dargestellt, wie die Verteilung der Bußgeldhöhe bei einem Kartellrechtsverstoß im Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum für ein Unternehmen hergeleitet werden kann. Das mögliche Bußgeld, welches ein Vielfaches eines Jahresumsatzes im betroffenen Markt betragen kann, sollte Unternehmer dafür sensibilisieren, das eigene Unternehmen auf mögliche Verstöße zu überprüfen.

The success of free market economies over the last 200 years supports the notion that competition increases individual and social wealth. Developing countries that have undergone the necessary reforms today are amongst the most driving “emerging” economies in the world.

Seit einigen Jahren hat sich im europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht ein Paradigmenwechsel vollzogen, der wesentlich durch die US-amerikanische Wettbewerbspolitik beeinflußt wurde. Während bislang vor allem das deutsche Wettbewerbsrecht Einfluß auf die Entwicklungen in Europa hatte, tritt nunmehr das amerikanische System an diese Stelle. So wird das Verhalten von Unternehmen stärker an ökonomischen Merkmalen und weniger an formaljuristischen Kriterien ausgerichtet. Diese Einbindung eines „more economic approach“ zeigt sich sowohl in der Gesetzgebung als auch in Rechtsanwendung und Rechtsprechung.

Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit den daraus resultierenden Reformen auf der Gesetzgebungsseite sowie deren Auswirkungen in Bezug auf zweiseitig wettbewerbsbeschränkende Handlungen, also Kartelle. So ist beispielsweise die Kronzeugenregelung zu einem der wichtigsten Instrumente der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik geworden. Doch auch die im vergangenen Jahr grundlegend reformierte Berechnungsmethode für Geldbußen wird die Sanktionsmöglichkeiten stärker als bisher ausschöpfen. Dennoch unterscheiden sich das amerikanische und das europäische Wettbewerbsrecht noch in wesentlichen Punkten. So existiert auf europäischer Ebene noch nicht die Möglichkeit zur strafrechtlichen Verfolgung von Kartellen und somit zur Verhängung von Gefängnisstrafen. Einzelne europäische Staaten, beispielsweise Großbritannien, sind diesen Weg aber bereits gegangen.

The paper explores what macroeconomic factors can tell us about the effectiveness of recently enacted national competition laws. Qualitative evidence suggests that numerous countries fall short in implementing competition law. Furthermore, there seems to be significant differences between countries. To examine what factors might contribute to the explanation of effectiveness of competition law panel regression analysis is used. The results indicate that the level of economic development matters, however the institutional learning curve is also relevant. Furthermore, larger countries should be more concerned with competition advocacy activities than smaller countries and it seems to be the case that the problem of capture of competition law is serious in countries with high levels of corruption.

The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.

The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.

The paper is concerned with documenting and assessing statements made by policy-makers, opinion formers, and other stakeholders in favour and against the adoption of competition laws with particular reference to transition and developing countries which have not yet enacted these kind of laws. For example, claims that competition enforcement might reduce the inflow of foreign direct investment, or that other policies are successfully used as substitutes for competition law, are assessed. In a first step, the method of generalized analysis structures the list of statements around core issues of common features to make them accessible to further interpretation and assessment.

The paper is concerned with the factors that account for decisions to enact a national competition law. In a first step, the paper updates and enlarges the existing data bases of countries that have enacted a competition law. The paper then identifies and discusses possible factors that influence the decision to enact a competition law. In a third step, the method of panel-data logit analysis is employed to test a set of hypothesis pertaining to the factors across the time dimension and across countries. The results of this analysis are interpreted in terms of significance and in terms of the sign of their influence on the probability of a country to enact. Given generality of the analysis, the results can shed light on the probability of individual countries, and in particular developing countries, to actually take the step of enactment.