The present paper gives an overview of the development of Corporate Governance of German banks since the 1950s. The focus will be on economic analysis. The most striking changes in Corporate Governance occurred with the ownership structure of commercial banks, in particular with the major joint-stock banks. In addition to that, the capital market has become a core element of Corporate Governance in all major German banks, which have replaced their prior concentration on the interests of a broadly defined circle of stakeholders by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, with savings banks and cooperative cooperative banks, Corporate Governance has remained unchanged for the most part. Exceptions to this are the regional state banks: in their case, after they had turned away from traditional business models and in particular following the discontinuation of the guarantee obligation, the problems of their Corporate Governance, which were already discernible beforehand, became quite obvious. If you include the financial crisis, beginning in 2007, in the analysis, it becomes evident that it was precisely a Corporate Governance unilaterally geared to shareholders’ interest and the efficiency of the capital market that materially contributed to the evolution and widening of the crisis.

Many situations in the history of the stock markets indicate that assets are not always efficiently priced. But why does it matter whether the stock market is efficiently priced? Because “well-functioning financial markets are a key factor to high economic growth”. (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006, pp. 3-4) In three essays, it is the aim of the author to shed some more light on the topic of market efficiency, which is far from being resolved. Since European equity markets have increased in importance globally, the author, instead of focusing on US markets, looks at a unified European equity market. By testing for a random walk in equity prices, revisiting Shiller’s claim of excess volatility through the means of a vector error correction model, and modifying the Gordon-Growth-Model, the book concludes that a small degree of inefficiency cannot be ruled out. While usually European equity markets are pricing assets correctly, some periods (e.g. the late 1990s and early 2000s) show clear signs of mispricing; the hypothesis of a world with two states (regime one, a normal efficient state, and regime two, a state in which markets are more momentum driven) presents a possible explanation.

This study evaluates the effects of further training on the individual unemployment duration of different groups of persons representing individual characteristics and some aspects of the economic environment. The Micro Census Saxony enables us to include additional information about a person's employment history to eliminate the bias resulting from unobservable characteristics and to avoid Ashenfelter's Dip. In order to solve the sample selection problem we employ an optimal full matching assignment, the Hungarian algorithm. The impact of participation in further training is evaluated by comparing the unemployment duration between participants and non-participants using the Kaplan-Meier-estimator. Overall, we find empirical evidence that participation in further training programmes results in even longer unemployment duration.