While the long-run relation between money and inflation as predicted by the quantity theory is well established, empirical studies of the short-run adjustment process have been inconclusive at best. The literature regarding the validity of the quantity theory within a given economy is mixed. Previous research has found support for quantity theory within a given economy by combining the P-Star, the structural VAR and the monetary aggregation literature. However, these models lack precise modelling of the short-run dynamics by ignoring interest rates as the main policy instrument. Contrarily, most New Keynesian approaches, while excellently modeling the short-run dynamics transmitted through interest rates, ignore the role of money and thus the potential mid-and long-run effects of monetary policy. We propose a parsimonious and fairly unrestrictive econometric model that allows a detailed look into the dynamics of a monetary policy shock by accounting for changes in economic equilibria, such as potential output and money demand, in a framework that allows for both monetarist and New Keynesian transmission mechanisms, while also considering the Barnett critique. While we confirm most New Keynesian findings concerning the short-run dynamics, we also find strong evidence for a substantial role of the quantity of money for price movements.

While the long run relation between money and inflation is well established, empirical evidence on the adjustment to the long run equilibrium is very heterogeneous. In this paper we show, that the development of US consumer price inflation between 1960Q1 and 2005Q4 is strongly driven by money overhang. To this end, we use a multivariate state space framework that substantially expands the traditional vector error correction approach. This approach allows us to estimate the persistent components of velocity and GDP. A sign restriction approach is subsequently used to identify the structural shocks to the signal equations of the state space model, that explain money growth, inflation and GDP growth. We also account for the possibility that measurement error exhibited by simple-sum monetary aggregates causes the consequences of monetary shocks to be improperly identified by using a Divisia monetary aggregate. Our findings suggest that when the money is measured using a reputable index number, the quantity theory holds for the United States.

We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to estimate banking crisis risk for the United States based on market data on bank stocks on a daily frequency. We contribute to the literature by providing separate information on short-term, long-term and total crisis risk instead of a single-maturity risk measure usually inferred by Merton-type models or barrier models. We estimate the model by applying the Duan (1994) maximum-likelihood approach. A strongly increasing total crisis risk estimated from early July 2007 onwards is driven mainly by short-term crisis risk. Banks that defaulted or were overtaken during the crisis have a considerably higher crisis risk (especially higher long-term risk) than banks that survived the crisis.

I show that the price discounts of Chinese cross-listed stocks (American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and H-shares) to their underlying A-shares indicate the expected yuan/US dollar exchange rate. The forecasting models reveal that ADR and H-share discounts predict exchange rate changes more accurately than the random walk and forward exchange rates, particularly at long forecast horizons. Using panel estimations, I find that ADR and H-share investors form their exchange rate expectations according to standard exchange rate theories such as the Harrod–Balassa–Samuelson effect, the risk of competitive devaluations, relative purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate parity, and the risk of currency crisis.

Takeover bids provide an option right to the target's shareholders; they guarantee the offered price but maintain the chance of higher offers. Using Option Pricing Theory (OPT) we estimate the probability and expected value of higher bids from target stock prices.

During capital control episodes, large price deviations between American Depositary Receipts (ADR) and their underlying stocks signal that a currency crisis is about to occur. We interpret this price spread as the price of a call option. Using option pricing theory we derive detailed information about both the probability of a currency crisis and the expected magnitude of devaluation. Analyzing daily ADR market data preceding the Venezuelan crisis (1996), our approach predicts crisis probabilities of almost 100% and forecasts the exchange rate after floating quite accurately. During the Argentine crisis (2002), the estimated exchange rates are similar to the actual ones.

We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to infer a term structure of banking crisis risk from market data on bank stocks in daily frequency. Considering debt service payments with different maturities this term structure assigns a separate estimator for short- and long-term default risk to each maturity. Applying the Duan (1994) maximum likelihood approach, we find for Kazakhstan that the overall crisis probability was mainly driven by short-term risk, which increased from 25% in March 2007 to 80% in December 2008. Concurrently, the long-term default risk increased from 20% to only 25% during the same period.

We develop an indicator for currency crisis risk using price spreads between American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and their underlyings. This risk measure represents the mean exchange rate ADR investors expect after a potential currency crisis or realignment. It makes crisis prediction possible on a daily basis as depreciation expectations are reflected in ADR market prices. Using daily data, we analyze the impact of several risk drivers related to standard currency crisis theories and find that ADR investors perceive higher currency crisis risk when export commodity prices fall, trading partners’ currencies depreciate, sovereign yield spreads increase, or interest rate spreads widen.

German urban renewal programs are favoring the cities in the Eastern part since the re-unification in 1990. This was accompanied additionally by attractive tax incentives, designed as an accelerated declining balance method of depreciation for housing investments during the late 1990s. The accumulated needs for comfortable housing after 40 years of a disastrous housing policy of the GDR era were generally accepted as justification for the subvention policy. But various subsidies and tax incentives caused a construction boom, false allocations, and a price bubble in Eastern Germany. After recognizing that the expansion of housing supply was not in line with the demographic development and that high vacancy rates were jeopardizing housing companies and their financial backers, policy changed in 2001. Up to now, the government provides demolition grants to reduce the vast oversupply. By means of a real option approach, it is ex-plained how different available forms of subsidies and economic incentives for landlords lift real estate values. The option value representing growth expectations and opportunities is calculated as an observable market value less an estimated fundamental value. Empirical results disclose higher option premiums for cities in Eastern Germany and a strong correlation of the option premium with urban renewal spending.

The last decades were characterized by large increases in world trade, not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to world GDP. This was in large parts caused by increasing exchanges of parts and components between countries as a consequence of international fragmentation of production. Apparently, greater competition especially from the Newly Industrializing and Post-Communist Economies prompted firms in ‘high-wage’ countries to exploit international factor price differences in order to increase their international competitiveness. However, theory predicts that, beside factor price differences, vertical disintegration of production should be driven by a multitude of additional factors. Against this background, the present paper reveals empirical evidence on parts and components trade as an indicator for international fragmentation of production in the European Union. On the basis of a panel data approach, the main explanatory factors for international fragmentation of production are determined. The results show that, although their influence can not be neglected, factor price differences are only one out of many causes for shifting production to or sourcing components from foreign countries.