Many situations in the history of the stock markets indicate that assets are not always efficiently priced. But why does it matter whether the stock market is efficiently priced? Because “well-functioning financial markets are a key factor to high economic growth”. (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006, pp. 3-4) In three essays, it is the aim of the author to shed some more light on the topic of market efficiency, which is far from being resolved. Since European equity markets have increased in importance globally, the author, instead of focusing on US markets, looks at a unified European equity market. By testing for a random walk in equity prices, revisiting Shiller’s claim of excess volatility through the means of a vector error correction model, and modifying the Gordon-Growth-Model, the book concludes that a small degree of inefficiency cannot be ruled out. While usually European equity markets are pricing assets correctly, some periods (e.g. the late 1990s and early 2000s) show clear signs of mispricing; the hypothesis of a world with two states (regime one, a normal efficient state, and regime two, a state in which markets are more momentum driven) presents a possible explanation.

This paper examines the relationships between foreign ownership, managers’ independence in decision-making and exporting of foreign-invested firms in five European Union accession countries. Using a unique, hand-collected data set of 434 foreign-invested firms in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia, we show that foreign investors’ ownership and control over strategic decisions are positively associated with export intensity, measured as the proportion of exports to total sales. The study also analyzes specific governance and control configurations in foreign-invested firms, showing that foreign equity and foreign control over business functions are complementary in terms of their effects on export intensity.

Against the background of increasing competition and other significant structural changes implied by globalisation, maintaining and enhancing competitiveness has evolved into one of the prime concerns in most countries. Following up on previous work (see in particular ECB Occasional Papers No. 30 and No. 55), this Occasional Paper examines the latest developments and prospects for the competitiveness and trade performance of the euro area and the euro area countries. Starting from an analysis of most commonly used, traditional competitiveness indicators, the paper largely confirms the findings of previous studies that there have been substantial adjustments in euro area trade. Euro area firms have taken advantage of the new opportunities offered by globalisation, and have at the same time been increasingly challenged by emerging economies. This is primarily reflected in the loss of export market shares which have been recorded over the last decade. While these can partly be related to the losses in the euro area's price competitiveness, further adjustment also seems warranted with regard to the export specialisation. Compared with other advanced competitors, the euro area remains relatively more specialised in labour intensive categories of goods and has shown only a few signs of a stronger specialisation in research-intensive goods. Nevertheless, the paper generally calls for a more cautious approach when assessing the prospects for euro area competitiveness, as globalisation has made it increasingly difficult to define and measure competitiveness. Stressing the need to take a broader view on competitiveness, specifically with a stronger emphasis on productivity performance, the paper also introduces a more elaborate framework that takes into account the interactions between country-specific factors and firm-level productivity. It thus makes it possible to construct more broadly defined competitiveness measures. Pointing to four key factors determining the global competitiveness of euro area countries - market accessibility, market size, technological leadership of firms and institutional set-up - the analysis provides further arguments for continuing efforts to increase market integration and strengthen the competitive environment within Europe as a mean of enhancing resource allocation and coping with the challenges globalisation creates. 

At present, oil markets appear to be behaving in a fashion similar to that in the late 1970s and early 1980s when oil prices rose sharply over an extended period. Furthermore, like at that time, analysts are split on whether such increases will persist or reverse, and if so by how much. The present paper argues that the similarities between the two episodes are not as strong as they might appear at first sight, and that the likelihood of sharp reversals in prices is not particularly great. There are a number of reasons in support of the view that it is unlikely that the first two decades of this century will mimic the last two decades of the previous century. First, oil demand is likely to grow significantly in line with strong economic growth in non-OECD countries. Second, on the supply side, OPEC is likely to enhance its control over markets over the next two decades, as supply increases in newly opened areas will only partially offset declining rates of production in other geologically mature non-OPEC oil regions. Moreover, while concerns about climate change will spur global efforts to reduce carbon emissions, these efforts are not expected to reduce oil demand. Finally, although there is much talk about alternative fuels, few of these are economically viable at the prices currently envisioned, and given the structural impediments, there is a reduced likelihood that the market will be able to generate sufficient quantities of these alternative fuels over the forecast horizon. The above factors imply that oil prices are likely to continue to exceed the USD 70 to USD 90 range over the long term.

This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.

This paper is motivated by the European Union strategy to secure competitiveness for Europe in the globalising world by focussing on technological supremacy (the Lisbon - agenda). Parallel to that, the EU Commission is trying to take a more economic approach to competition policy in general and anti-trust policy in particular. Our analysis tries to establish the relationship between increasing knowledge intensity and the resulting market concentration: if the European Union economy is gradually shifting to a pattern of sectoral specialisation that features a bias on knowledge intensive sectors, then this may well have some influence on market concentration and competition policy would have to adjust not to counterfeit the Lisbon-agenda. Following a review of the available theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between knowledge intensity and market structure, we use a larger Eurostat database to test the shape of this relationship. Assuming a causality that runs from knowledge to concentration, we show that the relationship between knowledge intensity and market structures is in fact different for knowledge intensive industries and we establish a non-linear, inverted U-curve shape.

As a common feature in many federal states grants-in aid are payed to jurisdictions ex post, i.e. after local policy measures have chosen. We show that the central government cannot offer grants ex ante in a federal states with informational asymmetries as well as inter-temporal commitment problems. Local governments’ incentives to provide public goods are distorted if they rely on federal grants-in-aid offered ex post. Furthermore it becomes obvious that local governments are apt to substitute tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid if relevant local data are unobservable for the central government. To which extend ex post transfers mitigate local governments’ incentives crucially depends on the information structure predominant in the federation.

What determines a country’s ability to compete in international markets? What fosters the global competitiveness of its firms? And in the European context, have key elements of the EU strategy such as EMU and enlargement helped or hindered domestic firms’ competitiveness in local and global markets? We address these questions by calibrating and simulating a conceptual framework that, based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), predicts that tougher and more transparent international competition forces less productive firms out the market, thereby increasing average productivity as well as reducing average prices and mark-ups. The model also predicts a parallel reduction of price dispersion within sectors. Our conceptual framework allows us to disentangle the effects of technology and freeness of entry from those of accessibility. On the one hand, by controlling for the impact of trade frictions, we are able to construct an index of ‘revealed competitiveness’, which would drive the relative performance of countries in an ideal world in which all faced the same barriers to international transactions. On the other hand, by focusing on the role of accessibility while keeping ‘revealed competitiveness’ as given, we are able to evaluate the impacts of EMU and enlargement on the competitiveness of European firms. We find that EMU positively affects the competitiveness of firms located in participating economies. Enlargement has, instead, two contrasting effects. It improves the accessibility of EU members but it also increases substantially the relative importance of unproductive competitors from Eastern Europe. JEL Classification: F12, R13.

This paper assess determinants of productivity gaps between firms in the European transition countries and regions and firms in West Germany. The analysis is conducted at the firm level by use of a unique database constructed by field work. The determinants tested in a simple econometric regression model are focussed upon the issue of human capital and modern market-oriented management. The results are novel in as much as a solution was established for the puzzling results in related research with respect to a comparison of formal qualification between East and West. Furthermore, the analysis was able to establish that the kind of human capital and expertise mostly needed in the post-socialist firms are related to the particular requirements of a competitive marketbased economic environment. Finally, the analysis also finds empirical support for the role of capital deepening in productivity catch-up, as well as the case that the gaps in labour productivity are most importantly rooted in a more labour-intense production, which does not give rise to a competitive disadvantage.