The economy is a complex system because market participants do not act independently but adjust their behavior to other agents and to the outcome which emerges from their joint actions (Arthur, 2014). Dependencies among participants can impede policy makers capabilities to influence or steer the course of the economy. Kambhu et al. (2007) argue that to influence developments in financial markets, for instance to prevent crises from spreading, there are only “coarse or indirect options” available for policy makers. Similar to crises which propagate through a complex system, interventions might result in unintended side effects which can also disseminate through the system. Thus, in a complex system, unintended consequences of policy efforts may well be the rule. Policy makers try to ward off or mitigate negative consequences for the economy and society during periods of crisis. For instance, during the Covid crisis large scale support programs for firms in Western economies were set up to avoid bankruptcies. Similarly, during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) set up large scale asset purchase programs as well as additionally longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) which provided immediate support to financial market participants’ liquidity positions and thereby prevented a melt-down of the financial system. During these periods, immediate and abundant liquidity supply is of utmost importance. Meanwhile, crisis measures, due to their massive scale and non-specific target group, may entail unknown or unintended side effects for instance on competition among market participants, firms’ investment behavior, or changes in lending strategies and risk taking behavior of banks. Likewise, new regulatory frameworks such as the introduction of new markets can have consequences previously not thought of. For policy makers it is important to know direct effects of policy interventions but also to be aware of the possibility and impact of indirect or unexpected side effects in order to evaluate measures taken and to learn for future design of regulation or intervention.

I analyze the impact of the formation of universal banks on corporate investment by looking at the gradual dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act’s separation between commercial and investment banking. Using a sample of US firms and their relationship banks, I show that firms curtail debt issuance and investment after positive shocks to the underwriting capacity of their main bank. This result is driven by unrated firms and is strongest immediately after a shock. These findings suggest that universal banks may pay more attention to large firms providing more underwriting opportunities while exacerbating financial constraints of opaque firms, in line with a shift to a banking model based on transactional lending.

We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.

We investigate U.S. monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a regime-switching model of monetary and fiscal policy rules where policy mixes are determined by a latent bivariate autoregressive process consisting of monetary and fiscal policy regime factors, each determining a respective policy regime. Both policy regime factors receive feedback from past policy disturbances, and interact contemporaneously and dynamically to determine policy regimes. We find strong feedback and dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities. The most salient features of these interactions are that past monetary policy disturbance strongly influences both monetary and fiscal policy regimes, and that monetary authority responds to past fiscal policy regime. We also find substantial evidence that the U.S. monetary and fiscal authorities have been interacting: central bank responds less aggressively to inflation when fiscal authority puts less attention on debt stabilisation, and vice versa.

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.

Career-concerned analysts are averse to firm risk. Not only does higher firm risk require more effort to analyze the firm, thus constraining analysts' ability to earn more remuneration through covering more firms, but it also jeopardizes their research quality and career advancement. As such, career concerns incentivize analysts to pressure firms to undertake risk-management activities, thus leading to a lower cost of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a negative association between analyst career concerns and bank loan spreads. In addition, our mediation analysis suggests that this association is achieved through the channel of reducing firm risk. Additional tests suggest that the effect of analyst career concerns on loan spreads is more pronounced for firms with higher analyst coverage. Our study is the first to identify the demand for risk management as a key channel through which analysts help reduce the cost of debt.

The thesis examines the interactions between the micro and macro levels by considering the effects of information at the micro level on the dynamics of aggregated investments. Another contribution examines the extent to which stress at the level of government refinancing and bank stress contributed to the rise in both the level and the heterogeneity of the refinancing costs of non-financial companies in the euro area during the European debt crisis and how they influenced the monetary transmission mechanism. The 3rd research paper analyzes how investments at company level are influenced by interactions between the company and the euro area as a whole.

This study examines whether and to what extend global equity offerings at the IPO stage may affect issuing firms' ability to borrow in the domestic debt market. Tracking bank loans taken by U.S. IPO firms in the domestic syndicated loan market, we observe that global equity offering firms experience more favorable loan price than that offered to their domestic counterparts. This finding holds for a set of robustness tests of endogeneity issues. We also find that, compared with their domestic counterparts, global equity offering firms are less likely to have financial distress, engage more in international diversification, and are more likely to wait a longer time to apply for syndicated loans.

This paper examines the economic effects of a firm's approach to developing and maintaining political connections. Specifically, we investigate whether lenders favor transactional connection as opposed to relational connection. By tracing firms in a politically volatile emerging democracy in Indonesia, we find that firms following a transactional political connection strategy experience a relatively lower cost of debt than those with a relational strategy. The effect is more pronounced for firms facing high financial distress. The finding is robust to cost of bank loans and a variety of regression methods. Overall, the evidence suggests that in times of frequently changing political regimes, firms benefit from a transactional relationship with politicians as it enables to update connection with the government in power. Relational connection is valuable for a firm only when the political regime connected with it gains power.

Capital inflow surges destabilise the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.