Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings. 

The international co-movement of interest rates reflects correlated business-cycle fluctuations, largely driven by demand shocks. Monetary policy in advanced economies follows domestic mandates – inflation and the output gap – and does not respond to foreign policy shocks. We derive this result from a Bayesian structural panel vector autoregression with informative priors, homogeneity restrictions on contemporaneous relations, a hierarchical Minnesota prior with cross-sectional shrinkage, and a factor structure for structural shocks.

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.

Seit der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 und 2008 diskutiert die Wissenschaft darüber, wie Kreditgeber die Verbriefung von Hypotheken nutzen, um das Kreditrisiko an Dritte weiterzugeben, und wie dies zur Finanzkrise beigetragen hat. Eine aktuelle IWH-Studie betrachtet die Entscheidungssituation des Kreditgebers zwischen Risikoaufschlag und Risikoübertragung. Sie nutzt rechtliche Unterschiede in verschiedenen US-Bundesstaaten bei der Zwangsvollstreckung von Hypotheken, um daraus unterschiedliche regionale Kreditrisiken abzuleiten. Ist dieses regionale Risiko erhöht, reagieren Kreditgeber durch vermehrte Verbriefung, wenn Hypotheken zum Verkauf an halbstaatliche Agenturen (Government Sponsored Enterprises, GSE) wie Fannie Mae und Freddie Mac zugelassen sind und so gegen Ausfall versichert werden können. Bei Hypotheken, für die kein Rückkauf durch GSE infrage kommt, erhöhen die Kreditgeber dagegen die Zinsen, da sie das Kreditrisiko nicht an die Kreditkäufer weitergeben können.

This dissertation is about questions on how German institutions of industrial relations shape plant-level outcomes, and how this influences employer wage differentials. Employer wage differentials point toward imperfect labor markets in which both, employers and employees, benefit from employment rents. It puts the employer at the center of explaining wage differences and how employer characteristics influence these, over which individual employees have only limited control. Arguably, how employers and employees split these rents depend on industrial relations. The German dual model of industrial relations consists of collective bargaining at the industry level and worker co-determination through works councils at the plant level. This dissertation illuminates different aspects of industrial relations and how rent-sharing mechanisms can explain wage inequality in Germany. It does not only focus on how industrial relations shape labor market power and whether labor market power translates into the level and dispersion of employer wage premia. It also contributes to questions that explain differences in plant-level outcomes relating to industrial relations. These include the role of worker co-determination on assortative matching. It is further investigated how works councils affect plant-level reactions during economy-wide shocks. In addition, it offers new causal evidence of rent-sharing mechanisms in Germany. The insights of this dissertation are relevant for policy and economic research alike. It contributes to a better understanding of the role of organized labor in imperfect labor markets and its determinants of employer wage differentials. It approaches the role of worker co-determination from different angles that are important at times of erosion of formal organized labor but gaining interest in worker representation.

Two contradictory strands of the rating literature criticize that rating agencies merely follow the market on the one hand, and emphasizing that rating changes affect capital movements on the other hand. Both focus on explaining rating levels rather than the timing of rating announcements. Contrarily, we explicitly differentiate between a decision to assess a country and the actual rating decision. We show that this differentiation significantly improves the estimation of the rating function. The three major rating agencies treat economic fundamentals similarly, while differing in their response to other factors such as strategic considerations. This reconciles the conflicting literature.

Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.

The Swiss National Bank abolished the exchange rate floor versus the Euro in January 2015. Using a synthetic matching framework, we analyze the impact of this unexpected (and therefore exogenous) policy change on the stock market. The results reveal a significant level shift (decline) in asset prices following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. As a novel finding in the literature, we document that the exchange‐rate elasticity of Swiss asset prices is around −0.75. Differentiating between sectors of the Swiss economy, we find that the industrial, financial and consumer goods sectors are most strongly affected by the abolition of the minimum exchange rate.

By focusing on the episodes of substantial capital account liberalisation and adopting a new methodology, this paper provides new evidence on the dilemma and global financial cycle theory. I first identify the capital account liberalisation episodes for 95 countries from 1970 to 2016, and then employ an augmented inverse propensity score weighted (AIPW) estimator to calculate the average treatment effect (ATE) of opening capital account on the interest rate comovements with the core country. Results show that opening capital account causes a country to lose its monetary policy independence, and a floating exchange rate regime cannot shield this effect. Moreover, the impact is stronger when liberalising outward and banking flows.