This paper argues that outward direct investment (ODI) is replacing international trade as the new way China integrates into the world. Based on two complementary datasets, we document the pattern of Chinese ODI. We argue that the rapid growth of China’s ODI is the result of strong economic development, increasing domestic constraints, and supportive government policies. Compared with trade integration, investment integration involves China more deeply in global business. As a new global investor, China’s ODI in the future is full of opportunities, risks, and challenges. The Chinese government should improve bureaucracy coordination and participate more in designing and maintaining international rules to protect ODI interests.

Die deutsche Konjunktur bleibt aufgrund der starken Binnennachfrage recht kräftig. Im Jahr 2017 wird die Zuwachsrate des Bruttoinlandsprodukts nach der neuen IWH-Prognose 1,3% betragen. Sie fällt damit etwa einen halben Prozentpunkt geringer aus als im Jahr 2016, dies liegt an einer geringeren Anzahl an Arbeitstagen und an einem negativen Wachstumsbeitrag des Außenhandels. Die Verbraucherpreisinflation bleibt mit 1,3% mäßig. Die Arbeitslosigkeit nimmt wohl etwas zu, dazu trägt bei, dass die Integration Geflüchteter in den Arbeitsmarkt langwierig ist.

This study examines income convergence in regional GDP per capita for a sample of 269 regions within the European Union (EU) between 2003 and 2010. We use an endogenous broad capital model based on foreign direct investment (FDI) induced agglomeration economies and human capital. By applying a Markov chain approach to a new dataset that exploits micro-aggregated sub-national FDI statistics, the analysis provides insights into regional income growth dynamics within the EU. Our results indicate a weak process of overall income convergence across EU regions. This does not apply to the dynamics within Central and East European countries (CEECs), where we find indications of a poverty trap. In contrast to FDI, regional human capital seems to be associated with higher income levels. However, we identify a positive interaction of FDI and human capital in their relation with income growth dynamics.

On 23 June 2016, there will be a referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) on the stay of the country in the European Union (EU). Based on recent poll data, the share of supporters and opponents of an exit varies around 50%. Opponents of the UK breaking up with Brussels („Brexit“) refer to high costs in terms of stagnating economic growth if the UK leaves the EU. The risk of reduced trade, declining foreign direct investment, and a lower degree of financial market integration is high following an exit of the “single market”.

We construct a novel dataset to measure banks’ business and geographical complexity. Using these measures of complexity, we evaluate how they relate to banks’ idiosyncratic and systemic riskiness. The sample covers stock listed banks in the euro area from 2007 to 2014. Our results show that banks have increased their total number of subsidiaries while business and geographical complexity have declined. Bank stability is significantly affected by our complexity measures, whereas the direction of the effect differs across the complexity measures: Banks with a higher degree of geographical complexity and a higher share of foreign subsidiaries seem to be less stable. In contrast, a higher share of non-bank subsidiaries significantly decreases the probability for a state aid request during the recent crisis period. This heterogeneity advises against the use of a single complexity measure when evaluating the implications of bank complexity.

Nahezu alle entwickelten Volkswirtschaften haben Programme zur Förderung von Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) eingeführt. Allerdings ist sehr wenig darüber bekannt, welche Programme eigentlich genau zur Anwendung kommen, welche finanziellen Mittel dafür aufgebracht werden und ob die Programme in der Art und Weise wirken, wie sie ursprünglich intendiert waren. Evaluationsstudien, die auf kausalen Untersuchungsdesigns basieren, können einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Beantwortung der Frage leisten, ob ein Programm tatsächlich Wirkungen entfaltet und welcher der verschiedenen Ansätze am erfolgversprechendsten ist.

This paper analyzes how firm-specific uncertainty affects firms’ propensity to invest. We measure firm-specific uncertainty as firms’ absolute forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011. In line with the literature, our empirical findings reveal a negative impact of firm-specific uncertainty on investment. However, further results show that the investment response is asymmetric, depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines significantly if the realized situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust their investment if the realized situation is better than expected, which suggests that the uncertainty effect counteracts the positive effect due to unexpectedly favorable business conditions. This can be one explanation behind the phenomenon of slow recovery in the aftermath of financial crises. Additional results show that the forecast error is highly concurrent with an ex-ante measure of firm-specific uncertainty we obtain from the survey data. Furthermore, the effect of firm-specific uncertainty is enforced for firms that face a tighter financing situation.