The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms’ governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution’s limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States.

This dissertation is about questions on how German institutions of industrial relations shape plant-level outcomes, and how this influences employer wage differentials. Employer wage differentials point toward imperfect labor markets in which both, employers and employees, benefit from employment rents. It puts the employer at the center of explaining wage differences and how employer characteristics influence these, over which individual employees have only limited control. Arguably, how employers and employees split these rents depend on industrial relations. The German dual model of industrial relations consists of collective bargaining at the industry level and worker co-determination through works councils at the plant level. This dissertation illuminates different aspects of industrial relations and how rent-sharing mechanisms can explain wage inequality in Germany. It does not only focus on how industrial relations shape labor market power and whether labor market power translates into the level and dispersion of employer wage premia. It also contributes to questions that explain differences in plant-level outcomes relating to industrial relations. These include the role of worker co-determination on assortative matching. It is further investigated how works councils affect plant-level reactions during economy-wide shocks. In addition, it offers new causal evidence of rent-sharing mechanisms in Germany. The insights of this dissertation are relevant for policy and economic research alike. It contributes to a better understanding of the role of organized labor in imperfect labor markets and its determinants of employer wage differentials. It approaches the role of worker co-determination from different angles that are important at times of erosion of formal organized labor but gaining interest in worker representation.

We evaluate alternative indicators of global economic activity and other market funda-mentals in terms of their usefulness for forecasting real oil prices and global petroleum consumption. World industrial production is one of the most useful indicators. However, by combining measures from several different sources we can do even better. Our analysis results in a new index of global economic conditions and measures for assessing future energy demand and oil price pressures. We illustrate their usefulness for quantifying the main factors behind the severe contraction of the global economy and the price risks faced by shale oil producers in early 2020.

In economic theory, entrepreneurship is perceived as a driving force behind the process of creative destruction by introducing innovation to the market, crowding out inefficient businesses, and paving the way for economic growth. One central channel through which entrepreneurial activity can be realized is the founding a new firm (Carree & Thurik, 2003). Numerous empirical studies have investigated the causes of firm entry, the subsequent fate of these young businesses, and their impact on the economy (Geroski, 1995; Wagner, 2006). When assessing the importance of start-ups for economic development, their role in the creation and destruction of jobs is a key component. This thesis argues that start-ups’ role as employers should be evaluated not only by the quantity of jobs they create, but also by the quality of these jobs. If new firms differ from incumbents in terms of hiring patterns or employment conditions, this could have serious and long-lasting implications for the careers and personal lives of their employees. Against this background, the four essays of this thesis present new evidence on the hiring behavior of newly founded establishments, as well as on remuneration and employment prospects of workers joining a start-up.

This paper offers a novel framework, combining firm operational risk, IPO pricing risk, and market risk, to model IPO failure risk. By analyzing nearly a thousand variables, we observe that prior IPO failure risk models have suffered from a major missing-variable problem. Evidence reveals several key new firm-level determinants, e.g., the volatility operating performance, the size of its accounts payable, pretax income to common equity, total short-term debt, and a few macroeconomic variables such as treasury bill rate, and book-to-market of the DJIA index. These findings have major economic implications. The total value loss from not predicting the imminent failure of an IPO is significantly lower with this proposed model compared to other established models. The IPO investors could have saved around $18billion over the period between 1994 and 2016 by using this model.

My dissertation consists of three studies, all viewing aggregate productivity as driven by the individual decisions of firms and the inventors that work for them. I use microeconometric analysis to study why firms innovate and economic theory to link these decisions to macroeconomic outcomes. The first paper in this dissertation studies how German manufacturing firms adjust their productivity in response to an increase in competition from foreign markets. German firms only increase their productivity if their new competitors come from other industrialized economies. This productivity increase is not driven by innovation. Instead, firms cut input expenses and prices while maintaining their output. The second paper traces the matching decisions of firms and inventors on the labor markets of developed economies. It adapts empirical techniques used in labor economics to this special segment of the labor market and shows that assortative matching has been increasing from 1974 to 2012: High quality inventors go to high quality firms more often than was the case in previous decades. This cannot be explained by changes in the patent invention function: The productivity of a match between a firm and an inventor of constant quality remains roughly unchanged. The third paper develops an endogenous growth model with inventor labor markets and two types of innovation: disruptive inventions that change the underlying technology of firms’ products and incremental improvements over existing products. Firms acquire expertise in certain technologies by hiring the inventors who are experts in these fields. This gives them a strong incentive to prevent disruptive inventions: If the underlying technology changes, their investment in these inventors becomes worthless. Large firms inhibit aggregate growth by poaching inventors from firms engaged in disruptive innovation.