This study examines the institutional demand for mispriced stocks with incongruent expectations implied by the book-to-market (BM) ratio and financial strength. Institutional trading (or institutional demand) is calculated by both changes in institutional ownership (percentage of shares held) and the number of institutional investors from the previous to the current quarter. Market mispricing and expectation errors in value/glamour stocks can be identified by analysing firms’ recent financial strength (measured by FSCORE). Firms are sorted into value stocks (top 30%), middle stocks (between 30% and 70%) and glamour stocks (bottom 30%) by distribution of BM ratios at the end of the previous fiscal year. Firms in the sample are then double sorted by FSCORE and BM: in each BM portfolio, firms are further classified into high-, mid- and low-FSCORE groups. Consistent with the argument of expectation errors in value/glamour stocks (Piotroski and So, 2012), institutional investors buy value stocks with strong fundamentals (underpriced) and sell glamour stocks with weak fundamentals (overpriced). Independent institutions are more likely to take advantage of the mispricing in value/glamour firms than passive institutions. Institutional trading on expectation errors could reduce the abnormal returns to mispriced stocks. Institutional trading patterns on mispriced value/glamour stocks are also documented in global markets. Our research provides new evidence that the institutional investors do exploit the BM anomalies if the mispricing can be identified by both the BM and the recent financial strength. Our study differs from Caglayan, Celiker and Sonaer (2018) as we emphasise that financial institutions, in addition to relying on only the BM values, process information from financial statements to infer firms’ financial strength. This study is also the first to document that institutional demand on mispricing could attenuate the BM anomaly.

We investigate the relationship between county-level social capital in the U.S. and asymmetric earnings timeliness (accounting conservatism). We measure social capital by the strength of civic norms and the density of social networks in a community. We find that firms headquartered in regions with higher social capital have earnings that reflect bad news more quickly than good news. Two potential mechanisms driving this connection are evident in our findings. First, the positive link between social capital and asymmetric earnings timeliness is more pronounced in firms with weaker external oversight, suggesting that social capital compensates for weaknesses in these mechanisms by discouraging managers from delaying the recognition of bad news. Second, we illustrate that firms in high social capital regions are more likely to recruit senior executives with higher asymmetric earnings timeliness coefficients. This result implies a preference for managers who adopt more conservative accounting practices. We find similar results using an international sample of firms from 21 countries. Our findings offer new insights into how local social norms influence corporate financial reporting.

Cash- and stock-financed takeover bids induce strikingly different target revaluations. We exploit detailed data on unsuccessful takeover bids between 1980 and 2008, and we show that targets of cash offers are revalued on average by +15% after deal failure, whereas stock targets return to their pre-announcement levels. The differences in revaluation do not revert over longer horizons. We find no evidence that future takeover activities or operational changes explain these differences. While the targets of failed cash and stock offers are both more likely to be acquired over the following eight years than matched control firms, no differences exist between cash and stock targets, either in the timing or in the value of future offers. Similarly, we cannot detect differential operational policies following the failed bid. Our results are most consistent with cash bids revealing prior undervaluation of the target. We reconcile our findings with the opposite conclusion in earlier literature (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983) by identifying a look-ahead bias built into their sample construction.

A number of researchers have argued that men and women have different attitudes toward and behavioral responses to competition; that is, women are more likely to opt out of jobs in which performance pay is the norm and to under-perform in some competitive situations. Laboratory experiments suggest that these gender differences are rather large. To check these hypotheses and findings against differences in the field, the authors use performance pay as an indicator of competition in the workplace and compare the gender gap not only in incidence of performance pay but also in earnings and work effort under these contracts. They find that although women are less likely than men to work under performance pay contracts, the gender gap is small. Furthermore, the effect of performance pay on earnings is modest and does not differ markedly by gender. Consequently, the authors argue, the ability of these competition hypotheses to explain the gender pay gap seems very limited.

In labor markets, some individuals have, or believe to have, less data on the determinants of success than others, e.g., due to differential access to technology or role models. We provide experimental evidence on when and how informational differences translate into performance differences. In a laboratory tournament setting, we varied the degree to which individuals were informed about the effort-reward relationship, and whether their competitor received the same or a different amount of information. We find performance is adversely affected only by worse relative, but not absolute, informedness. This suggests that inequity aversion applies not only to outcomes but also to information that helps achieve them, and stresses the importance of inequality in initial information conditions for performance-dependent outcomes.

Firms face a trade-off between patenting, thereby disclosing innovation, and secrecy. We show that this trade-off interacts with firms’ financing choices. As a shock to innovation disclosure, we study the American Inventor’s Protection Act that made firms’ patent applications public 18 months after filing, rather than when granted. We find that such increased innovation disclosure helps firms switch lenders, resulting in lower cost of debt, and facilitates their access to syndicated-loan and public capital markets. Our evidence lends support to the idea that public-information provision through patents and private information in financial relationships are substitutes, and that innovation disclosure makes credit markets more contestable.

In this article, we review the nascent literature on the transmission of negative policy rates. We discuss the theory of how the transmission depends on bank balance sheets, and how this changes once policy rates become negative. We review the growing evidence that negative policy rates are special because the pass-through to banks’ retail deposit rates is hindered by a zero lower bound. We summarize existing research on the impact of negative rates on banks’ lending and securities portfolios as well as their consequences for the real economy. Finally, we discuss the role of different initial conditions when the policy rate becomes negative, and potential interactions between negative policy rates and other unconventional monetary policies.

We show that negative policy rates affect the supply of bank credit in a novel way. Banks are reluctant to pass on negative rates to depositors, which increases the funding cost of high-deposit banks, and reduces their net worth, relative to low-deposit banks. As a consequence, the introduction of negative policy rates by the European Central Bank in mid-2014 leads to more risk-taking and less lending by euro-area banks with a greater reliance on deposit funding. Our results suggest that negative rates are less accommodative and could pose a risk to financial stability, if lending is done by high-deposit banks.

Using variation in bank scope generated by the stepwise repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in the US, we show that the deregulation of universal banks allowed them to finance firms with 14% higher volatility. This increase in risk is compensated by lasting improvements in firms’ total factor productivity of 3%. Using bank scope-expanding mergers to identify shocks to universal banks’ private information about borrower firms, we provide evidence that informational economies of scope across loans and non-loan products account for the firm-level real effects of universal banking.

We explore whether lenders’ decisions to provide liquidity in periods of distress are affected by the extent to which they internalize the negative spillovers of industry downturns. We conjecture that high-market-share lenders are more likely to internalize negative spillovers and show that they provide liquidity to industries in distress when fire sales are likely to ensue. High-market-share lenders also provide liquidity to customers and suppliers of distressed industries when the disruption of supply chains is expected to be costly. Our results suggest a novel channel to explain why credit concentration may favor financial stability.