In this paper, I study technological change as a candidate for the observed increase in consumption inequality in the United States. I build an incomplete market model with educational choice combined with a task-based model on the production side. I consider two channels through which technology affects inequality: the skill that an agent can supply in the labor market and the level of capital she owns. In a quantitative analysis, I show that (i) the model replicates the increase in consumption inequality between 1981 and 2008 in the US (ii) educational choice and the return to wealth are quantitatively important in explaining the increase in consumption inequality.

Based on New Zealand’s administrative court charges data, we document child gender-specific differences in future criminal behavior of young fathers. The deterrent impact of having a son on the future likelihood of receiving convictions persists for as long as ten years post-childbirth. Utilizing population-wide monthly tax registers and Census data, we provide key insights into the role model hypothesis. We show that young fathers with a son have (i) a higher likelihood of being in employment, (ii) higher wages and salaries, (iii) lower benefit dependency, (iv) better qualification, and (v) a higher likelihood of being in a partnered relationship.

In her 2021 State of the Union address, European Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen announced that “[the EU] will invest in 5G and fiber. But equally important is the investment in digital skills.” Indeed, the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility, which runs until 2026, has earmarked substantial funds to tackle the digital divide, in acknowledgment of the fact that the EU is not only missing ICT specialists but also that many Europeans do not have sufficient digital skills to thrive in today’s society and labor market. Many observers argue that older workers in particular lack digital skills, suffering more often from computer anxiety and showing lower computer self-efficacy (Czaja et al. 2006). This lack of skills hampers their employability and productivity in a technologically fast-changing world.

The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms’ governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution’s limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States.

This dissertation is about questions on how German institutions of industrial relations shape plant-level outcomes, and how this influences employer wage differentials. Employer wage differentials point toward imperfect labor markets in which both, employers and employees, benefit from employment rents. It puts the employer at the center of explaining wage differences and how employer characteristics influence these, over which individual employees have only limited control. Arguably, how employers and employees split these rents depend on industrial relations. The German dual model of industrial relations consists of collective bargaining at the industry level and worker co-determination through works councils at the plant level. This dissertation illuminates different aspects of industrial relations and how rent-sharing mechanisms can explain wage inequality in Germany. It does not only focus on how industrial relations shape labor market power and whether labor market power translates into the level and dispersion of employer wage premia. It also contributes to questions that explain differences in plant-level outcomes relating to industrial relations. These include the role of worker co-determination on assortative matching. It is further investigated how works councils affect plant-level reactions during economy-wide shocks. In addition, it offers new causal evidence of rent-sharing mechanisms in Germany. The insights of this dissertation are relevant for policy and economic research alike. It contributes to a better understanding of the role of organized labor in imperfect labor markets and its determinants of employer wage differentials. It approaches the role of worker co-determination from different angles that are important at times of erosion of formal organized labor but gaining interest in worker representation.

We argue that automation may make workers and firms more selective in matching their specialized skills and tasks. We call this phenomenon “core-biased technological change”, and wonder whether something similar could be relevant also for offshoring. Looking for evidence in occupational data for European industries, we find that automation increases workers’ and firms’ selectivity as captured by longer unemployment duration, less skill-task mismatch, and more concentration of specialized knowledge in specific tasks. This does not happen in the case of offshoring, though offshoring reinforces the effects of automation. We show that a labor market model with two-sided heterogeneity and search frictions can rationalize these empirical findings if automation strengthens while offshoring weakens the assortativity between workers’ skills and firms’ tasks in the production process, and automation and offshoring complement each other. Under these conditions, automation decreases employment and increases wage inequality whereas offshoring has opposite effects.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht Deutschland in der ersten Globalisierung in den Jahrzehnten vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Damals erlebte das Deutsche Reich eine massive Zunahme von Getreideimporten aus Amerika. Wir vergleichen Landkreise, die auf die importierten Getreidesorten spezialisiert waren, mit Kreisen, die andere landwirtschaftliche Güter hergestellt haben. Unsere Resultate zeigen, dass viele Arbeitskräfte die Kreise verlassen, in denen vom Handelsschock betroffene Produkte hergestellt wurden. Allerdings bleiben die in modernen Volkswirtschaften beobachteten negativen Effekte auf Einkommen pro Kopf und Sterblichkeit aus, auch eine politische Radikalisierung findet nicht statt. Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass die Migrationsbewegungen negative wirtschaftliche und in der Folge auch politische Auswirkungen abfedern. Damals verließen etwa viermal so viele Einwohner ihren Landkreis nach einem Handelsschock wie in vergleichbaren Situationen in den heutigen USA.

I propose a financial channel of wage rigidity. In recessions, rigid average wages squeeze cash flows, forcing firms to cut hiring due to financial constraints. Indeed, empirical cash flows and profits would turn acyclical if wages were only moderately more procyclical. I study this channel in a search and matching model with financial constraints and wage rigidity among incumbent workers (but flexible new hires’ wages). While neither feature generates amplification individually, their interaction can account for much of the empirical labor market fluctuations—breaking the neutrality of incumbents’ wages for hiring, and showing that financial amplification of business cycles requires wage rigidity.

Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from greater competition in denser labor markets. We show that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. We further document that an important part of the observed urban wage premia can be explained by greater competition in denser labor markets.

Using representative linked employer-employee data for Germany, this paper analyzes short- and long-run differences in labor market performance of workers joining start-ups instead of incumbent firms. Applying entropy balancing and following individuals over ten years, we find huge and long-lasting drawbacks from entering a start-up in terms of wages, yearly income, and (un)employment. These disadvantages hold for all groups of workers and types of start-ups analyzed. Although our analysis of different subsequent career paths highlights important heterogeneities, it does not reveal any strategy through which workers joining start-ups can catch up with the income of similar workers entering incumbent firms.