Ostdeutschland weist auch mehr als 25 Jahre nach der deutschen Vereinigung eine um circa ein Viertel geringere Arbeitsproduktivität als Westdeutschland auf. Wesentlich geringer ist der Rückstand jedoch bei der Ertragslage. Vor elf Jahren machten etwa 70% der westdeutschen Betriebe und 65% der ostdeutschen Betriebe Gewinne. Nach einem kurzen Knick um die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise 2009 ist dieser Anteil kontinuierlich auf 80% im Westen und 76% im Osten angestiegen. Das bedeutet, dass sich beide Landesteile bei dieser Kennzahl seit geraumer Zeit mit recht geringem Abstand im Gleichschritt bewegen.

Die Daten zum Wirtschaftswachstum des Arbeitskreises Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder für das Jahr 2016 zeigen erneut, dass Sachsen-Anhalt von der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im übrigen Ostdeutschland abgekoppelt ist. Während das Wirtschaftswachstum in Ostdeutschland im Jahr 2016 insgesamt 2,1% betrug, stellte Sachsen-Anhalt mit nur 1,0% wieder einmal das ostdeutsche Schlusslicht dar. Im gesamtdeutschen Vergleich schnitt lediglich das Saarland noch schlechter ab. Berlin und Sachsen waren mit jeweils 2,7% bundesweit die Spitzenreiter beim Wirtschaftswachstum, Thüringen lag mit 1,8% gleichauf mit Westdeutschland (vgl. Abbildung a).

We estimate dynamic effects of works councils on labour productivity using newly available information from West German establishment panel data. Conditioning on plant fixed effects and control variables, we find negative productivity effects during the first five years after council introduction but a steady and substantial increase in the councils’ productivity effect thereafter. Our findings support a causal interpretation for the positive correlation between council existence and plant productivity that has been frequently reported in previous studies.

A large literature documents declining measures of business dynamism including high-growth young firm activity and job reallocation. A distinct literature describes a slowdown in the pace of aggregate labor productivity growth. We relate these patterns by studying changes in productivity growth from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s using firm-level data. We find that diminished allocative efficiency gains can account for the productivity slowdown in a manner that interacts with the within-firm productivity growth distribution. The evidence suggests that the decline in dynamism is reason for concern and sheds light on debates about the causes of slowing productivity growth.

We build on the analysis in Akcigit, Grigsby, and Nicholas (2017) by using US patent and census data to examine the relationship between immigration and innovation. We construct a measure of foreign born expertise and show that technology areas where immigrant inventors were prevalent between 1880 and 1940 experienced more patenting and citations between 1940 and 2000. The contribution of immigrant inventors to US innovation was substantial. We also show that immigrant inventors were more productive than native born inventors; however, they received significantly lower levels of labor income. The immigrant inventor wage-gap cannot be explained by differentials in productivity.

There are pronounced and persistent wage differences between men and women in all parts of the world. A significant element of these wage disparities can be attributed to differences in worker and workplace characteristics, which are likely to mirror differences in worker productivity. However, a large part of these differences remains unexplained, and it is common to attribute them to discrimination by the employer that is rooted in prejudice against female workers. Yet recent empirical evidence suggests that, to a large extent, the gaps reflect “monopsonistic” wage discrimination—that is, employers exploiting their wage-setting power over women—rather than any sort of prejudice.

A growing body of evidence indicates that the U.S. economy has become less dynamic in recent years. This trend is evident in declining rates of gross job and worker flows as well as declining rates of entrepreneurship and young firm activity, and the trend is pervasive across industries, regions, and firm size classes. We describe the evidence on these changes in the U.S. economy by reviewing existing research. We then describe new empirical facts about the relationship between establishment-level productivity and employment growth, framing our results in terms of canonical models of firm dynamics and suggesting empirically testable potential explanations.

This paper looks at the surprisingly different labor market performance of the United States, Canada, Germany, and several other OECD countries during and after the Great Recession of 2008–9. A first important finding is that the large employment swings in the construction sector linked to the boom and bust in US housing markets is an important factor behind the different labor market performances of the three countries. We also find that cross-country differences among OECD countries are consistent with a conventional Okun relationship linking gross domestic product growth to employment performance.

We estimate dynamic effects of works councils on labor productivity using newly available information from West German establishment panel data. Conditioning on plant fixed effects and control variables, we find negative productivity effects during the first five years after council introduction, but a steady and substantial increase in the councils’ productivity effect thereafter. Given the frequently reported positive correlation between council existence and plant productivity, this finding supports causal interpretations.