The economy is a complex system because market participants do not act independently but adjust their behavior to other agents and to the outcome which emerges from their joint actions (Arthur, 2014). Dependencies among participants can impede policy makers capabilities to influence or steer the course of the economy. Kambhu et al. (2007) argue that to influence developments in financial markets, for instance to prevent crises from spreading, there are only “coarse or indirect options” available for policy makers. Similar to crises which propagate through a complex system, interventions might result in unintended side effects which can also disseminate through the system. Thus, in a complex system, unintended consequences of policy efforts may well be the rule. Policy makers try to ward off or mitigate negative consequences for the economy and society during periods of crisis. For instance, during the Covid crisis large scale support programs for firms in Western economies were set up to avoid bankruptcies. Similarly, during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) set up large scale asset purchase programs as well as additionally longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) which provided immediate support to financial market participants’ liquidity positions and thereby prevented a melt-down of the financial system. During these periods, immediate and abundant liquidity supply is of utmost importance. Meanwhile, crisis measures, due to their massive scale and non-specific target group, may entail unknown or unintended side effects for instance on competition among market participants, firms’ investment behavior, or changes in lending strategies and risk taking behavior of banks. Likewise, new regulatory frameworks such as the introduction of new markets can have consequences previously not thought of. For policy makers it is important to know direct effects of policy interventions but also to be aware of the possibility and impact of indirect or unexpected side effects in order to evaluate measures taken and to learn for future design of regulation or intervention.

Productivity varies widely between industries and countries, but even more so across individual firms within the same sectors. The challenge for governments is to strike the right balance between policies designed to increase overall productivity and policies designed to promote the reallocation of resources towards firms that could use them more effectively. The aim of this book is to provide the empirical evidence necessary in order to strike this policy balance. The authors do so by using a micro-aggregated dataset for 20 EU economies produced by CompNet, the Competitiveness Research Network, established some 10 years ago among major European institutions and a number of EU productivity boards, National Central Banks, National Statistical institutes, as well as academic Institutions. They call for pan-EU initiatives involving statistical offices and scholars to achieve a truly complete EU market for firm-level information on which to build solidly founded economic policies.

The drastic banking reform within Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union provides an ideal quasi-experimental design to examine the causal effects of institutional development on accounting quality (AQ). We find that banking reform spurs significant improvement in predictive power of earnings and reductions in earnings smoothing, earnings-inflating discretionary provisions, and avoidance of reporting losses. These effects hold under alternative model specifications and after considering concurrent institutional developments. In contrast, corporate reform shows no such effects, refuting the alternative explanation that unobserved factors affect both reform speed in general and the quality of financial reporting. We further identify four specific reformative actions that are integral to the drastic banking reform process where prudential regulation contributes the most to the observed AQ improvement. It supports the conjecture that banking reform improves AQ by reducing banks' risk-taking behaviors and, as a result, their motive behind accounting manipulation.

Most European Union countries have made good progress with vaccinating their populations against COVID-19 and are now seeing a rebound in economic activity. While the scarring effects of the crisis and the long-term implications of the pandemic are only partially understood, the effects of support given to firms can be evaluated in order to help plan the removal of crisis support. An analysis of France, Germany and Italy shows the potential for ‘cleansing effects’ in that it was the least-productive firms that have been affected most by the crisis. While support was generally not targeted at protecting good firms only, financial support went by and large to those with the capacity to survive and succeed. Labour schemes have been effective in protecting employment.

The regulatory architecture of the financial system has significantly changed after the global financial crisis of 2008/09. In Europe, the introduction of the Single Rulebook has been a major change and provides the legal foundation for the European Banking Union (EBU). The Single Rulebook consists of a regulation, the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), and three main directives targeting capital regulation and compensation of managers, harmonization of deposit insurance schemes, as well as resolution and restructuring rules (Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD), Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)).

We use the World Input–Output Database (WIOD) combined with regional sectoral employment data to estimate the potential regional employment effects of international trade barriers. We study the case of a no-deal Brexit in which imports to the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) would be subject to tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. First, we derive the decline in UK final goods imports from the EU from industry-specific international trade elasticities, tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. Using input–output analysis, we estimate the potential output and employment effects for 56 industries and 43 countries on the national level. The absolute effects would be largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK, such as Germany and France. However, there would also be large countries outside the EU which would be heavily affected via global value chains, such as China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) would be largest in Ireland followed by Belgium. In a second step, we split up the national effects on the NUTS-2 level for EU member states and additionally on the county (NUTS-3) level for Germany. The share of affected workers varies between 0.03% and 3.4% among European NUTS-2 regions and between 0.15% and 0.4% among German counties. A general result is that indirect effects via global value chains, i.e., trade in intermediate inputs, are more important than direct effects via final demand.

In Reaktion auf die Erfahrungen aus der letzten Finanzmarktkrise veröffentlichte die Europäische Kommission im Mai 2014 die Richtlinie zur Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, BRRD). Die Richtlinie legt Regeln zur Abwicklung und Restrukturierung von Banken einschließlich eines Bail-in-Mechanismus fest, der das Verlustrisiko beim Scheitern einer Bank vorrangig deren Anteilseignern und Gläubigern aufbürdet.

Using data from the European Central Bank‘s Survey of Professional Forecasters, we analyse the role of ex-ante conditioning variables for macroeconomic forecasts. In particular, we test to which extent the heterogeneity, updating and ex-post performance of predictions for inflation, real GDP growth and the unemployment rate are related to assumptions about future oil prices, exchange rates, interest rates and wage growth. Our findings indicate that inflation forecasts are closely associated with oil price expectations, whereas expected interest rates are used primarily to predict output growth and unemployment. Expectations about exchange rates and wage growth also matter for macroeconomic forecasts, albeit less so than oil prices and interest rates. We show that survey participants can considerably improve forecast accuracy for macroeconomic outcomes by reducing prediction errors for external conditions. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the expectation formation process of experts.

In May 2014, the European Commission published the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The directive introduces rules on bank resolution and restructuring including a bailin tool. It constitutes the legal foundation underlying the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Member countries of the European Union (EU) had to transpose this directive into national law by 31 December 2014 and implement the rules on resolution and restructuring of failing banks from 1 January 2015 onwards. However, many countries delayed the implementation. We assemble a dataset on national transposition dates of the BRRD across the EU-27 countries.

When banks expand abroad, their riskiness decreases if foreign expansion happens in destination countries that are more competitive than their origin countries. We reach this conclusion in three steps. First, we develop a flexible dynamic model of global banking with endogenous competition and endogenous risk-taking. Second, we calibrate and simulate the model to generate empirically relevant predictions. Third, we validate these predictions by testing them on an original dataset covering the activities of the 15 European global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Our results hold across alternative measures of individual and systemic bank risk.