The thesis examines the interactions between the micro and macro levels by considering the effects of information at the micro level on the dynamics of aggregated investments. Another contribution examines the extent to which stress at the level of government refinancing and bank stress contributed to the rise in both the level and the heterogeneity of the refinancing costs of non-financial companies in the euro area during the European debt crisis and how they influenced the monetary transmission mechanism. The 3rd research paper analyzes how investments at company level are influenced by interactions between the company and the euro area as a whole.

In this study, we assess capabilities of different types of banks to cater to the financial needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Using a comprehensive dataset from an emerging economy, including the information on local banks’ corrective programs, we find that local banks remain difficult-to-replace lenders for SMEs. We show that presence of healthy local banks in an SME's vicinity immunizes the SME against the deterioration of access to bank financing linked to other local banks’ corrective programs. In contrast, large banks are unable to replace the lost lending from local competitors under corrective programs.

Firms face a trade-off between patenting, thereby disclosing innovation, and secrecy. We show that this trade-off interacts with firms’ financing choices. As a shock to innovation disclosure, we study the American Inventor’s Protection Act that made firms’ patent applications public 18 months after filing, rather than when granted. We find that such increased innovation disclosure helps firms switch lenders, resulting in lower cost of debt, and facilitates their access to syndicated-loan and public capital markets. Our evidence lends support to the idea that public-information provision through patents and private information in financial relationships are substitutes, and that innovation disclosure makes credit markets more contestable.

Exploiting the heteroscedasticity of the changes in short-term and long-term interest rates and exchange rates around the FOMC announcement, we identify three structural monetary policy shocks. We eliminate the predictable part of the shocks and study their effects on financial variables and macro variables. The first shock resembles a conventional monetary policy shock, and the second resembles an unconventional monetary shock. The third shock leads to an increase in interest rates, stock prices, industrial production, consumer prices, and commodity prices. At the same time, the excess bond premium and uncertainty decrease, and the U.S. dollar depreciates. Therefore, this third shock combines all the characteristics of a central bank information shock.

Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE-backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested ("dry powder"), could increase the resilience of PE-backed companies. In their study of PE-backed buyouts in the U.K. - which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S. - the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE-backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non-PE firms. Moreover, such PE-backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE-backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.

We evaluate if lenders price or securitise mortgages to mitigate credit risk. Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk created by differences in foreclosure law along US state borders, we find that financial institutions respond to the law in heterogeneous ways. In the agency market where Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) provide implicit loan guarantees, lenders transfer credit risk using securitisation and do not price credit risk into mortgage contracts. In the non-agency market, where there is no such guarantee, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate about the design of loan guarantees, the common interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk leads to an increase in the GSEs‘ debt holdings by $79.5 billion per annum, exposing taxpayers to preventable losses in the housing market.

This paper investigates the consequences of shutdowns during the Corona crisis on the risk of bankruptcy for firms in Germany and United Kingdom. We use financial statements from the period 2014 to 2018 to predict how pervasive risk of bankruptcy becomes for micro, small, medium, and large firms due to shutdown measures. We estimate distress for firms using their capacity to service their debt. Our results indicate that under three months of shutdown almost all firms in shutdown industries face high risk of bankruptcy. In Germany, about 99% of firms in shutdown industries and in the UK about 98% of firms in shutdown industries are predicted to be under distress. The furlough schemes reduce the risk of bankruptcy only marginally to 97% of firms in shutdown industries in Germany and 95% of firms in shutdown industries in the United Kingdom in case of a three-month shutdown. In sectors that are not shutdown under conservative estimates of contagion of sales losses, our results indicate considerable risk of widespread bankruptcies ranging from 76% of firms in Germany to 69% of firms in the United Kingdom. These early findings suggest that the impact of corona crisis on corporate sector via shutdowns can be severe and subsequent policy should be designed accordingly.

We process the natural language of verbal firm disclosures in order to study the use of context specific language or jargon and its impact on financial performance. We observe that, within the Q&A of earnings conference calls, managers use less jargon in responses to tougher questions, and after a quarter of bad economic success. Moreover, markets interpret the lack of precise information as a bad signal: we find lower cumulative abnormal returns and a higher implied volatility following earnings calls where managers use less jargon. These results support the argument that context specific language or jargon helps to efficiently and precisely transfer information.

We construct measures of accounting regulations and enforcement mechanisms that are specific to a country's banking industry. Using a sample of major banks in 37 economies, we find that the informativeness of banks’ financial statements, measured by the value relevance of earnings and common equity, is higher in countries with stricter bank accounting regulations and countries with stronger enforcement. These findings suggest that superior bank accounting and enforcement mechanisms enhance the informativeness of banks’ financial statements. In addition, we find that the effects of bank accounting regulations are more pronounced in countries with stronger enforcement in the banking industry, suggesting that enforcement is complementary to bank accounting regulations in achieving higher value relevance of financial statements. Our study has important policy implications for bank regulators.