On September 25th, financial economists from all over the world travelled for the 11th time to Halle (Saale) to attend the annual FIN-FIRE Workshop at IWH. During two days, authors of ten papers covered a comprehensive overview of contemporary issues that pose potential challenges to the financial system, including data privacy in mortgage markets, climate risks in bond markets, synthetic risk transfers, the effects of geopolitical risks for lending, as well as granular perspectives on the transmission of monetary policy. An intense exchange of thoughts between authors, discussants, and the audience yielded genuinely new insights into the resilience and fragility of financial systems. 

Die „kleine“ Bankenkrise in den USA scheint vorbeizusein, und auch die Credit-Suisse-Krise ist beigelegt. Es stellt sich die Frage, was wir aus der Pleite der Silicon Valley Bank lernen können, um eine ähnliche Situation in Deutschland oder Europa zu vermeiden.

Capital inflow surges destabilize the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.

This study examines whether the flow volatility experienced by institutional investors affects firms’ financing costs. Using Greenwood and Thesmar’s (2011) stock price fragility measure, we find that there is a positive relationship between fragility and firms’ costs of bank loans. This effect is most pronounced when lenders rely more on institutional shareholders to discipline corporate management, or when loans are made by relationship lenders, suggesting that unstable flows could weaken institutional investors’ monitoring effectiveness and strengthen relationship banks’ bargaining power.

While the sovereign-bank loop literature has demonstrated the amplification between sovereign and bank risks in the Euro Area, its econometric identification is vulnerable to reverse causality and omitted variable biases. We address the loop's endogenous nature and isolate the direct bank-to-sovereign distress channel by exploiting the global, non-Eurozone related variation in banks’ stock prices. We instrument banking sector stock returns in the Eurozone with exposure-weighted stock market returns from non-Eurozone countries and take further precautions to remove Eurozone-related variation. We find that the transmission of instrumented bank distress to sovereign distress is around 50% smaller than the corresponding coefficient in the unadjusted OLS framework, confirming concerns on endogeneity. Despite the smaller relative magnitude, increasing instrumented bank distress is found to be an economically and statistically significant cause for rising sovereign fragility in the Eurozone.

Capital inflow surges destabilise the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.

Im Jahr 2020 zieht die Weltwirtschaft wieder etwas an, weil der Gegenwind von den Handelskonflikten nachlässt. Die jüngsten Produktionsdaten deuten allerdings noch nicht auf eine durchgreifende Besserung der internationalen Konjunktur hin. Auch wegen der niedrigen Preisdynamik ist die Geldpolitik im Lauf des Jahres vielerorts noch einmal expansiver geworden. Wenn weitere Zollerhebungen im Wesentlichen ausbleiben, dürfte der Abschwung im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe um die Jahreswende 2019/2020 zu Ende gehen. Allerdings bleibt die Zukunft der politischen Rahmenbedingungen für den internationalen Handel unsicher. Das ist ein wichtiger Grund, warum mit einem kräftigen weltwirtschaftlichen Aufschwung für den Prognosezeitraum nicht zu rechnen ist. Zudem dürfte die Expansion der Nachfrage aus China weiter nachlassen.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich weiter im Abschwung. Ursache ist im Wesentlichen die schwache Auslandsnachfrage nach Produkten des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes, bedingt durch die von den USA ausgehenden protektionistischen Tendenzen und den bevorstehenden Brexit. Als weiterer Faktor kommen die Probleme im Automobilbau hinzu, denn die Branche steht mit am Beginn eines drastischen Strukturwandels. Im Jahr 2020 dürfte eine leichte Belebung der internationalen Konjunktur den deutschen Export wieder anziehen lassen. Der Anstieg wird aber nicht allzu hoch ausfallen, nicht zuletzt, weil die Lohnstückkosten seit einiger Zeit deutlich zugenommen haben. Auf der anderen Seite stabilisieren die recht deutlichen Lohnzuwächse die binnenwirtschaftliche Nachfrage. Zudem wirkt die Finanzpolitik expansiv, und die günstigen Finanzierungsbedingungen werden zusammen mit der Wohnungsknappheit in Ballungsräumen den Bauboom am Leben halten. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird im Jahr 2020 wohl um 1,1% zunehmen, auch dank einer hohen Zahl an Arbeitstagen. Der Produktionszuwachs in Ostdeutschland dürfte mit 1,3% höher ausfallen als in Gesamtdeutschland. Die Verbraucherpreisinflation bleibt moderat, die Beschäftigung nimmt nur noch wenig zu.

This paper examines the effects of bank alliance network on bonds issued by European banks during the period 1990–2009. We construct six measures capturing different dimensions of banks’ network characteristics. In opposition to the results obtained for non-financial firms, our findings indicate that being part of a network does not create value for bank’s bondholders, indicating a dark side effect of strategic alliances in the banking sector. While being part of a network is perceived as a risk-increasing event by market participants, this negative perception is significantly lower for the larger banks, and, to a lesser extent, for the more profitable banks. Moreover, during crisis times, the positive impact on bond spread of a bank’s higher centrality or of a bank’s higher connectedness in the network is stronger, indicating that market participants may fear spillover effects within the network during periods of banks’ heightened financial fragility.