Do economic incentives govern information diffusion in markets? Using international banks’ advisory activities in corporate takeovers as their source of private information, we show in supervisory data that banks with closer ties to the target, but not the acquirer, advisor trade profitably in the target’s stock prior to the deal announcement. This trading behavior is associated with a higher premium paid by the acquirer without compromising the deal success. As the incentives of informed traders are aligned only with those of the target shareholders, which are represented by the target advisor, our evidence suggests strategic information transmission among these banks.

Exploiting the heteroskedasticity of the changes in short-term and long-term interest rates and exchange rates around the FOMC announcement, we identify three structural monetary policy shocks. We eliminate the predictable part of the shocks and study their effects on financial variables and macro variables. The first shock resembles a conventional monetary policy shock, and the second resembles an unconventional monetary shock. The third shock leads to an increase in interest rates, stock prices, industrial production, consumer prices, and commodity prices. At the same time, the excess bond premium and uncertainty decrease, and the U.S. dollar depreciates. Therefore, this third shock combines all the characteristics of a central bank information shock.

This study employs synthetic control methods to estimate the effect of the Iberian exception mechanism on wholesale electricity prices and consumer inflation, for both Spain and Portugal. We find that the intervention led to an average reduction of approximately 40% in the spot price of electricity between July 2022 and June 2023 in both Spain and Portugal. Regarding overall inflation, we observe notable differences between the two countries. In Spain, the intervention has an immediate effect, and results in an average decrease of 3.5 percentage points over the twelve months under consideration. In Portugal, however, the impact is small and generally close to zero. Different electricity market structures in each country are a plausible explanation.

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.

We study how deposit competition affects a bank's decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in deposit costs and corresponding reductions in banks' deposit holdings. Our results are strongest among banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight a hitherto undocumented and unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.

On September 25th, financial economists from all over the world travelled for the 11th time to Halle (Saale) to attend the annual FIN-FIRE Workshop at IWH. During two days, authors of ten papers covered a comprehensive overview of contemporary issues that pose potential challenges to the financial system, including data privacy in mortgage markets, climate risks in bond markets, synthetic risk transfers, the effects of geopolitical risks for lending, as well as granular perspectives on the transmission of monetary policy. An intense exchange of thoughts between authors, discussants, and the audience yielded genuinely new insights into the resilience and fragility of financial systems. 

Das Klimaschutzgesetz (KSG) sieht eine Reduktion der deutschen Treibhausgasemissionen bis zum Jahr 2030 um 65% gegenüber den Emissionen im Jahr 1990 vor. Der Ausstieg aus der thermischen Verwertung der Kohle (vor allem der Braunkohle) leistet einen substanziellen Beitrag zum Erreichen dieser Ziele. Der Kohleausstieg stellt die Braunkohlereviere (und die Standorte der Steinkohlekraftwerke) jedoch vor strukturpolitische Herausforderungen. Um den Strukturwandel in diesen Regionen aktiv zu gestalten, hat der Bundestag im August 2020 mit Zustimmung des Bundesrats das Strukturstärkungsgesetz Kohleregionen (StStG) beschlossen. Über dieses Gesetz stellt der Bund bis zum Jahr 2038 Finanzhilfen in Höhe von 41,09 Mrd. Euro zur Verfügung. Im Fokus der Politikmaßnahmen stehen verschiedene Ziele, vor allem gesamtwirtschaftliche (Wertschöpfung, Wachstum, Steueraufkommen), wettbewerbliche (Produktivität), arbeitsmarktpolitische (Beschäftigung, Beschäftigungsstrukturen), verteilungspolitische (regionale Disparitäten) sowie klimapolitische (Treibhausgasreduzierung, Nachhaltigkeit). 

Die im StStG vorgesehenen strukturpolitischen Interventionen umfassen ein breites Maßnahmenbündel. Das Gesetz fordert eine begleitende wissenschaftliche Evaluierung des Gesetzes. Bei dem vorliegenden Bericht handelt es sich um das dritte Dokument in diesem Evaluierungszyklus. Der erste Bericht (Brachert u.a., 2023) präsentierte ein erstes Lagebild nach dem Start der im Rahmen des Investitionsgesetzes Kohleregionen (InvKG) und des STARK-Bundesprogramms geplanten Maßnahmen. Der zweite Bericht (Brachert u.a., 2025) enthielt eine Aktualisierung und erweiterte Aussagen zu den möglichen Effekten der Maßnahmen aus dem InvKG. An diesem Punkt setzt der vorliegende Zwischenbericht 2025 an. Es gehen immer mehr Maßnahmen in die Umsetzung, wodurch der Strukturwandel an Fahrt aufnimmt. Jedoch bleibt auch für diesen Bericht zu berücksichtigen, dass viele der geplanten Maßnahmen noch nicht oder gerade erst begonnen haben, was bei einer fast zwanzigjährigen Laufzeit des Programms naheliegend ist. Die in diesem Bericht vorgelegten empirischen Analysen basieren auf dem Datenstand vom 31.12.2024, also rund viereinhalb Jahre nachdem das InvKG in Kraft getreten ist.

Zwischenbericht 2025 zur begleitenden Evaluierung des Investitionsgesetzes Kohleregionen (InvKG) und des STARK-Bundesprogramms 

Am 5. November 2025 wurde der Zwischenbericht 2025 zur begleitenden Evaluierung des Investitionsgesetzes Kohleregionen (InvKG) und des STARK‑Bundesprogramms von den Wirtschaftsforschungsinstituten IWH und RWI veröffentlicht. Die Evaluierung, die im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie durchgeführt wird, analysiert die Fortschritte der Programme, identifiziert die Wirkungen der Förderung und gibt konkrete Handlungsempfehlungen, wie die Maßnahmen optimiert werden können, um die Transformation der vom Kohleausstieg betroffenen Regionen in Deutschland erfolgreich zu gestalten.

This paper examines how supplier IPO events affect their key customers’ cost of debt. The evidence reveals that average loan spreads for customers increase by roughly 20% (23.7 basis points) following suppliers’ IPO events. This negative spillover effect is more pronounced when suppliers make significant relationship-specific investments (high switching cost), when suppliers face less concentrated customer bases, or when customers face more concentrated supplier bases. Our results show that customers receive less favourable trade terms and are forced to pay more for inputs after their suppliers go public, all of which increase customers’ operational costs, risk and subsequent borrowing costs. Furthermore, we document that customer loan contracts become significantly more restrictive after a supplier's IPO. Finally, we find that the observed negative spillover effect is also present in customers’ access to the public bond market.

We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect of house price changes on mortgage credit supply. Based on approximately 33 million real estate online listings, we construct a quarterly hedonic house price index (HPI) between 2008:q1 and 2017:q4, which we instrument with state-specific RETT changes to isolate the effect on mortgage credit supply by all local German banks. First, a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces HPI by 1.2%. This effect is driven by listings in rural regions. Second, a 1% contraction of HPI induced by an increase in the RETT leads to a 1.4% decline in mortgage lending. This transmission of fiscal policy to mortgage credit supply is effective across almost the entire bank capitalization distribution.