We study the interaction of expansionary rate-based monetary policy and quantitative easing, despite their concurrent implementation, by exploiting heterogeneous banks and the introduction of negative monetary-policy rates in a fragmented euro area. Quantitative easing increases credit supply less, translating into weaker employment growth, when banks’ funding costs do not decrease. Using administrative data from Germany, we uncover that among banks selling their securities, central-bank reserves remain disproportionately with high-deposit banks that are constrained due to sticky customer deposits at the zero lower bound. Affected German banks lend relatively less to firms while increasing their interbank exposure in the euro area.

Using lenders who become members of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as an exogenous shock, we examine whether and how lenders’ commitment to transparent climate-related disclosures affects borrowers’ environmental performance. We find that borrowers of TCFD-member lenders, relative to control firms, significantly improve their environmental performance after the TCFD launch. Lenders’ disclosure commitments influence borrowers through credit rationing and monitoring. Specifically, polluting borrowers face higher borrowing costs, reduced access to credit, and greater incorporation of environmental action covenants in loan agreements. Additionally, polluting borrowers of TCFD-member lenders experience heightened financial constraints. Finally, borrowers of TCFD-member lenders are more likely to adopt the TCFD framework for climate-related disclosure after the TCFD establishment. Together, these findings illuminate the role of lenders in driving corporate environmental performance improvement through their commitment to transparent climate-related disclosures.

We study the corporate-loan pricing decisions of a major, systemic bank during the Greek financial crisis. A unique aspect of our data set is that we observe both the actual interest rate and the “break-even rate” (BE rate) of each loan, as computed by the bank’s own loan-pricing department (in effect, the loan’s marginal cost). We document that low-BE-rate (safer) borrowers are charged significant markups, whereas high-BE-rate (riskier) borrowers are charged smaller and even negative markups. We rationalize this de facto cross-subsidization through the lens of a dynamic model featuring depressed collateral values, impaired capital-market access, and limit pricing.

We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.

Abstract This paper examines the effect of dislocations in foreign currency (FX) swap markets ("CIP deviations") on bank lending. Using data from UK banks we show that when the cost of obtaining swap-based funds in a particular foreign currency increases, banks reduce the supply of cross-border credit in that currency. This effect is increasing in the degree of banks' reliance on swap-based FX funding. Access to foreign relatives matters as banks employ internal capital markets to shield their cross-border FX lending supply from the described channel. Partial substitution occurs from banks outside the UK not affected by changes in synthetic funding costs.