Protektionismus ist schlecht, aber vielleicht nicht ganz so schlecht, wie ihn viele Leute machen. Zölle sind kurzfristig nichts anderes als Umverteilung: von vielen Konsumenten zu einigen wenigen inländischen Produzenten und deren Mitarbeitern. Denken Sie zum Beispiel an Zölle auf Stahl: Die Konsumenten leiden, weil Autos, Maschinen und alles, wofür es sonst noch Stahl braucht, teurer wird. Allerdings profitieren die im Vergleich zu den ausländischen Wettbewerbern ineffizienteren inländischen Stahlhersteller.

A distinctive aspect of the recent financial crises is that they emerged primarily in the industrial world. Since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis emerging countries have been therefore confronted with financial shocks triggered at the core of the international financial system, affecting the volatility of capital flows worldwide. Emerging countries’ dependence on capital and trade flows, combined with a large presence of foreign-owned banks, has been identified as a central driver of the cross-border transmission of these crises (see IMF, 2009). While historical events such as the Latin American debt crisis or the 1997 Asian financial crisis highlighted the importance of sound balance of payments and inflation targeting policies at the macroeconomic level, the global financial crisis has revealed the importance of weighing the costs and benefits of banking globalization. This is foremost important from a policy perspective, since emerging countries faced for the first time in decades an external shock in a context free of large local macroeconomic imbalances, having to adapt their traditional policy framework to new challenges. This has been emphasized, among others, by the former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke. In particular, this changing scenario implied that microeconomic aspects involved in the cross-border transmission of shocks gained increasing momentum in the international policy debate (see for instance Freixas et al., 2015).

We study the smuggling of illegal and legal goods across the U.S.-Mexico border from 1975 to 2004. Using a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model we test the microeconomic determinants of both smuggling types and reveal their trends. We find that illegal goods smuggling decreased from $116 billion in 1984 to $27 billion in 2004 as a result of improved labor market conditions in Mexico and intensified U.S. border enforcement. Smuggling legal goods is motivated by tax and tariff evasion. While export misinvoicing fluctuated at low levels, import misinvoicing switched from underinvoicing to overinvoicing after Mexico's accession to the GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) induced lower tariffs.