In this paper, we use granular trading data from Taiwan between 2012 and 2016 to examine how local social capital influences retail investor behavior during corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR) events. Therefore, we are responding to longstanding calls in the international finance literature to explore investor behavior in non-US markets with distinct institutional and cultural characteristics. We find that investors residing in cities with higher social capital are less likely to purchase underpriced stocks following the announcements of negative events despite the potential for positive abnormal returns. This norm-driven restraint reflects a form of socially responsible investing motivated by community-based values rather than economic rationality. By documenting this behavior in an East Asian market, we extend the external validity of social norm theories developed in Western settings and contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how localized social preferences can influence asset pricing and capital allocation in a global context.

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.

This study examines the institutional demand for mispriced stocks with incongruent expectations implied by the book-to-market (BM) ratio and financial strength. Institutional trading (or institutional demand) is calculated by both changes in institutional ownership (percentage of shares held) and the number of institutional investors from the previous to the current quarter. Market mispricing and expectation errors in value/glamour stocks can be identified by analysing firms’ recent financial strength (measured by FSCORE). Firms are sorted into value stocks (top 30%), middle stocks (between 30% and 70%) and glamour stocks (bottom 30%) by distribution of BM ratios at the end of the previous fiscal year. Firms in the sample are then double sorted by FSCORE and BM: in each BM portfolio, firms are further classified into high-, mid- and low-FSCORE groups. Consistent with the argument of expectation errors in value/glamour stocks (Piotroski and So, 2012), institutional investors buy value stocks with strong fundamentals (underpriced) and sell glamour stocks with weak fundamentals (overpriced). Independent institutions are more likely to take advantage of the mispricing in value/glamour firms than passive institutions. Institutional trading on expectation errors could reduce the abnormal returns to mispriced stocks. Institutional trading patterns on mispriced value/glamour stocks are also documented in global markets. Our research provides new evidence that the institutional investors do exploit the BM anomalies if the mispricing can be identified by both the BM and the recent financial strength. Our study differs from Caglayan, Celiker and Sonaer (2018) as we emphasise that financial institutions, in addition to relying on only the BM values, process information from financial statements to infer firms’ financial strength. This study is also the first to document that institutional demand on mispricing could attenuate the BM anomaly.

DThe interactions between supply chains and sustainable finance have become a key area of research in financial markets, driven by growing global awareness of environmental and social challenges. Article 1 examines how lenders use sustainability clauses to monitor borrowers with negative environmental incidents and compares the use of this unique loan agreement design with conventional loan terms, financial and balance sheet-related clauses. We show that lenders are less inclined to include sustainability clauses in the loan agreement if a borrower has a history of negative environmental incidents. In contrast, lenders use sustainability clauses to attract institutional investors to participate in syndication rather than as monitoring tools for borrowers' environmental performance. Article 2 examines whether banks associated with biodiversity loss in the Amazon region experience a withdrawal of deposits when depositors become aware of their financing activities. I find empirical evidence that so-called ‘Amazon carbon banks’ experience slower growth in deposits once depositors learn about their financing activities. This effect is particularly pronounced when Amazon carbon banks have branches in counties that experience greater biodiversity loss compared to other branches. Article 3, how European companies that are heavily integrated into global supply chains (GSC) are affected by a supply chain disruption (Covid-19). We show that Covid-19 negatively affects the revenue growth of companies that are heavily dependent on GSC in their home country. Crucially, we uncover the role of banking relationships in mitigating the disruptive effects.

We investigate whether lenders employ sustainability pricing provisions to manage borrowers’ environmental risk. Using unexpected negative environmental incidents of borrowers as exogenous shocks that reveal information on environmental risk, we find that lenders manage borrowers’ environmental risk by conventional tools such as imposing higher interest rates, utilizing financial and net worth covenants, showing reluctance to refinance, and demanding increased collateral. In contrast, the inclusion of sustainability pricing provisions in loan agreements for high environmental risk borrowers is reduced by 11 percentage points. Our study suggests that sustainability pricing provisions may not primarily serve as risk management tools but rather as instruments to attract demand from institutional investors and facilitate secondary market transactions.