The three papers reprinted in chapters 3 to 5 of this cumulative dissertation thesis investigate the effectiveness of European competition law and whether its main objective – to ensure a fair competition between companies – can be reached. Yet, competition is expected to maximize welfare as it forces companies to reduce prices or to improve their quality or service. However, competition can be distorted if companies agree with each other to fix prices, or if a company with a dominant market position uses its dominance to distort competition. Another possible threat to competition might come to the fore if a merger among large companies reduces competition or if governmental support to a specific company leads to an advantage over its competitors. Therefore, in order to ensure a fair competition among companies governments normally do not intervene in the process but set only the framework in which businesses operate. European competition policy as part of this regulatory policy includes all measures aimed at preserving competition and comprises four main pillars: Cartel law, Antitrust law, Mergers and Acquisitions and State Aid. The papers of this thesis focus on two of these four areas: Cartels and State Aid.

The paper accounts for the determinants of inward foreign direct investment in business services across the EU-27 regions. Together with the traditional variables considered in the literature (market size, market quality, agglomeration economies, labour cost, technology, human capital), we focus on the role of forward linkages with manufacturing sectors and other service sectors as

attractors of business services FDI at the regional level. This hypothesis is based on the evidence that the growth of business services is mostly due to increasing intermediate demand by other services industries and by manufacturing industries and on the importance of geographical proximity for forward linkages in services.

To our knowledge, there are no studies investigating the role of forward linkages for the location of FDI. This paper aims therefore to fill this gap and add to the FDI literature by providing a picture of the specificities of the determinants of FDI in business services at the regional level. The empirical analysis draws upon the database fDi Markets, from which we selected projects having as a destination NUTS 2 European regions in the sectors of Business services over the period 2003-2008. Data on FDI have been matched with data drawn from the Eurostat Regio

database. Forward linkages have been constructed using the OECD Input/Output database. By estimating a negative binomial model, we find that regions specialised in those (manufacturing) sectors that are high potential users of business services attract more FDI than other regions. This confirms the role of forward linkages for the localisation of business service FDI, particularly in the case of manufacturing.

Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.