How do political connections affect firm dynamics, innovation, and creative destruction? To answer this question, we build a firm dynamics model, where we allow firms to invest in innovation and/or political connection to advance their productivity and to overcome certain market frictions. Our model generates a number of theoretical testable predictions and highlights a new interaction between static gains and dynamic losses from rent-seeking in aggregate productivity. We test the predictions of our model using a brand-new dataset on Italian firms and their workers, spanning the period from 1993 to 2014, where we merge: (i) firm-level balance sheet data; (ii) social security data on the universe of workers; (iii) patent data from the European Patent Office; (iv) the national registry of local politicians; and (v) detailed data on local elections in Italy. We find that firm-level political connections are widespread, especially among large firms, and that industries with a larger share of politically connected firms feature worse firm dynamics. We identify a leadership paradox: when compared to their competitors, market leaders are much more likely to be politically connected, but much less likely to innovate. In addition, political connections relate to a higher rate of survival, as well as growth in employment and revenue, but not in productivity – a result that we also confirm using a regression discontinuity design.

We study the importance of intangible capital (R&D, software, patents) for the measurement of productivity using firm-level panel data from German manufacturing. We first document a number of facts on the evolution of intangible investment over time, and its distribution across firms. Aggregate intangible investment increased over time. However, the distribution of intangible investment, even more so than that of physical investment, is heavily right-skewed, with many firms investing nothing or little, and a few firms having very large intensities. Intangible investment is also lumpy. Firms that invest more intensively in intangibles (per capita or as sales share) also tend to be more productive. In a second step, we estimate production functions with and without intangible capital using recent control function approaches to account for the simultaneity of input choice and unobserved productivity shocks. We find a positive output elasticity for research and development (R&D) and, to a lesser extent, software and patent investment. Moreover, the production function estimates show substantial heterogeneity in the output elasticities across industries and firms. While intangible capital has small effects for firms with low intangible intensity, there are strong positive effects for high-intensity firms. Finally, including intangibles in a gross output production function reduces productivity dispersion (measured by the 90-10 decile range) on average by 3%, in some industries as much as nearly 9%.

This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.

Vor dem Hintergrund sinkender Arbeitslosenzahlen und einer alternden Bevölkerung – vor allem im Osten Deutschlands – ist der immer schwieriger zu deckende Bedarf der Betriebe an Fachkräften in den letzten Jahren zu einem zentralen Thema in der öffentlichen und politischen Arbeitsmarktdebatte geworden. Fachkräfteengpass herrscht, wenn Betriebe Probleme haben bei der Besetzung von Stellen für qualifizierte Tätigkeiten, die eine Berufsausbildung, vergleichbare Berufserfahrung oder einen Hochschulabschluss erfordern. Wie hoch der Anteil der nicht besetzten Stellen an den insgesamt angebotenen Stellen ist, wird durch die Nichtbesetzungsquote angegeben. Sie kann damit als Indikator für einen Fachkräfteengpass interpretiert werden.

Auch 30 Jahre nach dem Mauerfall ist die Produktivität der ostdeutschen Wirtschaft um 20% geringer als die der westdeutschen. Vielfach wird dies dadurch erklärt, dass westdeutsche Betriebe größer sind – denn größere Betriebe sind meist produktiver. Berechnungen auf Basis einzelbetrieblicher Daten bringen jedoch zum Vorschein, dass die Produktivitätslücke sich selbst dann nicht schließt, wenn Betriebe ähnlicher Größe verglichen werden, die zudem noch der gleichen Branche angehören und Ähnlichkeiten in weiteren für die Produktivität relevanten Merkmalen wie der Kapitalintensität, der Exporttätigkeit und dem Anteil qualifizierten Personals aufweisen.