Cet article passe en revue la littérature sur l’allocation de crédit et la création de valeur par les banques. Il se concentre sur l’activité de banque relationnelle, à savoir le fait qu’une banque et un emprunteur se lancent dans de multiples interactions et que chacun des deux agents s’efforce d’obtenir des informations spécifiques sur l’autre. Il montre comment la banque relationnelle génère des coûts et des bénéfices à la fois pour les entreprises et pour les banques, mais qu’en règle générale, elle est source de valeur pour chacun d’eux. Néanmoins, l’incidence de ce type de relation est en grande partie fonction du contexte économique (période normale ou période de crise). Est aussi abordée la manière dont l’allocation de crédit, mesurée par la spécialisation sectorielle, affecte les entreprises et les banques. Enfin, l’examen de la littérature récente en matière de titrisation et de relation bancaire permet de mettre en évidence la manière dont la titrisation affecte les effets de la banque relationnelle.

We study the impact of firm and industry characteristics on small firms’ capital structure, employing a proprietary database containing financial statements of Dutch small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 2003 to 2005. The firm characteristics suggest that the capital structure decision is consistent with the pecking-order theory: Dutch SMEs use profits to reduce their debt level, and growing firms increase their debt position since they need more funds. We further document that profits reduce in particular short-term debt, whereas growth increases long-term debt. We also find that inter- and intra-industry effects are important in explaining small firms’ capital structure. Industries exhibit different average debt levels, which is in line with the trade-off theory. Furthermore, there is substantial intra-industry heterogeneity, showing that the degree of industry competition, the degree of agency conflicts, and the heterogeneity in employed technology are also important drivers of capital structure.

A proportional decrease in switching costs increases competition and social welfare. However, a lump-sum decrease in switching costs softens competition and does not invariably increase social welfare.

Loan rates for seemingly identical borrowers often exhibit substantial dispersion. This paper investigates the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted by banks to small and medium sized enterprises. We associate this dispersion with the loan officers’ use of “discretion” in the loan rate setting process. We find that “discretion” is most important if: (i) loans are small and unsecured; (ii) firms are small and opaque; (iii) the firm operates in a large and highly concentrated banking market; and (iv) the firm is distantly located from the lender. Consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry, we find a decreasing role for “discretion” over time in the provision of small credits to opaque firms. While widely used in the pricing of loans, “discretion” plays only a minor role in the decisions to grant loans.

Assessing the impacts of bank mergers on small firms requires separating borrowers with single versus multiple banking relationships and distinguishing the three alternatives of “staying,” “dropping,” and “switching” of relationships. Single-relationship borrowers who “switch” to another bank following a merger will be less harmed than those whose relationship is “dropped” and not replaced. Using Belgian data, we find that single-relationship borrowers of target banks are more likely than other borrowers to be dropped. We track postmerger performance and show that many dropped target-bank borrowers are harmed by the merger. Multiple-relationship borrowers are less harmed, as they can better hedge against relationship discontinuations.

Does debt overhang distort only investment? This paper analyzes the subsequent effects of debt overhang on firm-level outcomes. Using an event study for German firms from 2004 to 2021, we find that, relative to comparable firms in the same industry and year, highly indebted firms do not merely invest less, which is the classic overhang result. They also hire less, and the two margins together translate into slower sales growth. The composition of the adjustment, however, depends on the firm’s growth regime. Highly indebted firms that keep expanding slow their hiring but raise capital per worker over the long run, substituting capital for labour along a flatter expansion path. Highly indebted firms that contract shed workers with no offsetting change in capital intensity: they scale down rather than restructure. These patterns hold in normal times as well as in crises and are concentrated among small and medium-sized limited-liability firms. Debt overhang is therefore not a pure investment wedge but a persistent drag on firm scale, whose incidence across inputs is determined by whether the firm is growing or shrinking.

Lowering carbon intensity in manufacturing is necessary to transform current production technologies. We test if local agents’ preferences, revealed by vote shares for the Green party during local elections in Germany, relate to the carbon intensity of investments in production technologies. Our sample comprises all investment choices made by manufacturing establishments from 2005-2017. Our results suggest that ecological preferences correlate with significantly fewer carbon-intensive investment projects while investments stimulating growth and reducing carbon emissions increase by 14 percentage points. Both results are more distinct in federal states where the Green Party enjoys political power and local ecological preferences are high.

We investigate how optimal attention allocation of green-motivated investors changes information asymmetry in financial markets and thus affects firms‘ financing costs. To guide our empirical analysis, we propose a model where investors with heterogeneous green preferences endogenously allocate limited attention to learn market-level or firm-specific fundamental shocks. We find that a higher fraction of green investors in the market leads to higher aggregate attention to green firms. This reduces the information asymmetry of green firms, leading to higher price informativeness and lower leverage. Moreover, the information asymmetry of brown firms and the market increases with the share of green investors. Therefore, greater green attention is associated with less market efficiency. We provide empirical evidence to support our model predictions using U.S. data. Our paper shows how the growing demand for sustainable investing shifts investors‘ attention and benefits eco-friendly firms.

Competition in the U.S. appears to have declined. One contributing factor may have been heterogeneity in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. I examine the impact of product market peer credit constraints on long-run competitive outcomes and behavior among non-financial firms. I use measures of lender exposure to the financial crisis to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for product market credit availability. I find that credit constraints of product market peers positively predict growth in sales, market share, profitability, and markups. This is consistent with the notion that firms gained at the expense of their credit constrained peers. The relationship is robust to accounting for other sources of inter-firm spillovers, namely credit access of technology network and supply chain peers. Further, I find evidence of strategic investment, i.e. the idea that firms increase investment in response to peer credit constraints to commit to deter entry mobility. This behavior may explain why temporary heterogeneity in the availability of credit appears to have resulted in a persistent redistribution of output across firms.

This paper shows that local banking market conditions affect mortality rates in the United States. Exploiting the staggered relaxation of branching restrictions in the 1990s across states, we find that banking deregulation decreases local mortality rates. This effect is driven by a decrease in the mortality rate of black residents, implying a decrease in the black-white mortality gap. We further analyze the role of mortgage markets as a transmitter between banking deregulation and mortality and show that households' easier access to finance explains mortality dynamics. We do not find any evidence that our results can be explained by improved labor outcomes.