This letter reports an easy extension of Mitra’s “easily verifiable” sufficient condition for topological chaos in unimodal maps, and offers its application to reduced-form representations of two economic models that have figured prominently in the recent literature in economic dynamics: the check- and the M-map pertaining to the 2-sector Robinson–Solow–Srinivasan (RSS) and Matsuyama models respectively. A consideration of the iterates of these maps establishes the complementarity of the useful 2001 condition with the 1982 (LMPY) theorem of Li–Misiurewicz–Pianigiani–Yorke when supplemented by a geometric construction elaborated in Khan–Piazza (2011).

Recent work of Gardini et al. (2008), building on earlier work of Mitra (2001) and Mukherji (2005), considers the so-called M-map that generates a dynamical system underlying Matsuyama’s (1999) endogenous growth model. We offer proofs of the fact that there do not exist 3- or 5-period cycles in the M-map, and an example (a numerical proof) of the existence of a 7-period cycle. We use the latter, and a construction in Khan and Piazza (2011), to identify a range of parameter values of the M-map that guarantee the existence of cycles of all periods, except 3 and 5. Our argumentation relies on, and reports, the first four iterations of the M-map that may have independent interest.

This paper investigates the effect of cascade of detection, how detection of a criminal triggers detection of his network neighbors, on criminal network formation. We develop a model in which criminals choose both links and actions. We show that the degree of cascade of detection plays an important role in shaping equilibrium criminal networks. Surprisingly, greater cascade of detection could reduce ex ante social welfare. In particular, we prove that full cascade of detection yields a weakly denser criminal network than that under partial cascade of detection. We further characterize the optimal allocation of the detection resource and demonstrate that it should be highly asymmetric among ex ante identical agents.

In this paper, we study the domestic political determinants of military spending. Our conceptual framework suggests that power distribution over local and central governments influences the government provision of national public goods, in our context, military expenditure. Drawing on a large cross-country panel, we demonstrate that having local elections will decrease a country’s military expenditure markedly, controlling for other political and economic variables. According to our preferred estimates, a country’s military expenditure is on average 20% lower if its state government officials are locally elected, which is consistent with our theoretical prediction.

Using provincial data from China, this paper examines the pattern of capital flows in relation to the transition of economic regimes. We show that fast-growing provinces experienced less capital inflows before the large-scale market reform, contrary to the prediction of the neoclassical growth theory. As China transitioned from the central-planning economy to the market economy, the negative correlation between productivity growth and capital inflows became much less pronounced. From a regional perspective, this finding suggests domestic institutional factors play an important role in shaping the pattern of capital flows.