Anpassungsfähigkeit und Resilienz des Finanzsystems

Diese Forschungsgruppe untersucht kritische Aspekte der Anpassungsfähigkeit und Widerstandsfähigkeit von Finanzsystemen. Sie analysiert die Auswirkungen von Naturkatastrophen auf Finanzsysteme, die Auswirkungen politischer Präferenzen für die grüne Transformation und die Bedeutung von Kultur in den Volkswirtschaften.

Finanzresilienz und Regulierung

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Professor Dr. Felix Noth
Professor Dr. Felix Noth
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07.2016 ‐ 12.2018

Relationship Lenders and Unorthodox Monetary Policy: Investment, Employment, and Resource Reallocation Effects


We combine a number of unique and proprietary data sources to measure the impact of relationship lenders and unconventional monetary policy during and after the European sovereign debt crisis on the real economy. Establishing systematic links between different research data centers (Forschungsdatenzentren, FDZ) and central banks with detailed micro-level information on both financial and real activity is the stand-alone proposition of our proposal. The main objective is to permit the identification of causal effects, or their absence, regarding which policies were conducive to mitigate financial shocks and stimulate real economic activities, such as employment, investment, or the closure of plants.

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Professor Dr. Steffen Müller

01.2015 ‐ 12.2019

Interactions between Bank-specific Risk and Macroeconomic Performance

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)

Professor Dr. Felix Noth

Referierte Publikationen


Productivity, Managers’ Social Connections and the Financial Crisis

Iftekhar Hasan Stefano Manfredonia

in: Journal of Banking and Finance, August 2022


This paper investigates whether managers’ personal connections help corporate productivity to recover after a negative economic shock. Leveraging the heterogeneity in the severity of the financial crisis across different sectors, the paper reports that (i) the financial crisis had a negative effect on within-firm productivity, (ii) the effect was long-lasting and persistent, supporting a productivity-hysteresis hypothesis, and (iii) managers’ personal connections allowed corporations to recover from this productivity slowdown. Among the possible mechanisms, we show that connected managers operating in affected sectors foster productivity recovery through higher input cost efficiency and better access to the credit market, as well as more efficient use of labour and capital.

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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises

Reint E. Gropp Steven Ongena Jörg Rocholl Vahid Saadi

in: Economic Inquiry, Nr. 3, 2022


We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.

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Firm Social Networks, Trust, and Security Issuances

Ming Fang Iftekhar Hasan Zenu Sharma An Yan

in: European Journal of Finance, Nr. 4, 2022


We observe that public firms are more likely to issue seasoned stocks rather than bonds when theirs boards are more socially-connected. These connected issuers experience better announcement-period stock returns and attract more institutional investors. This social-connection effect is stronger for firms with severe information asymmetry, higher risk of being undersubscribed, and more visible to investors. Our conjecture is this social-network effect is driven by trust in issuing firms. Given stocks are more sensitive to trust, these trusted firms are more likely to issue stocks than bonds. Trustworthiness plays an important role in firms’ security issuances in capital markets.

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Social Capital, Trusting, and Trustworthiness: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending

Iftekhar Hasan Qing He Haitian Lu

in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Nr. 4, 2022


How does social capital affect trust? Evidence from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform shows regional social capital affects the trustee’s trustworthiness and the trustor’s trust propensity. Ceteris paribus, borrowers from higher social capital regions receive larger bid from individual lenders, have higher funding success, larger loan size, and lower default rates, especially for low-quality borrowers. Lenders from higher social capital regions take higher risks and have higher default rates, especially for inexperienced lenders. Cross-regional transactions are most (least) likely to be realized between parties from high (low) social capital regions.

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Political Ties and Raising Capital in Global Markets: Evidence from Yankee Bonds

Gene Ambrocio Xian Gu Iftekhar Hasan

in: Journal of Corporate Finance, June 2022


This paper examines whether state-to-state political ties help firms obtain better terms when raising funds in global capital markets. Focusing on the Yankee bonds market, we find that issuances by firms from countries with close political ties with the US feature lower yield spreads, higher issuance amounts, and longer maturities. Such an association is more pronounced for firms located in low income and highly indebted countries as well as firms in government-related industries, first-time issuers, and relatively smaller firms. Our study provides evidence supporting the notion that country-level political relationship is an important factor when raising capital in international markets.

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Green Investing, Information Asymmetry, and Capital Structure

Shasha Li Biao Yang

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 20, 2023


We investigate how optimal attention allocation of green-motivated investors changes information asymmetry in financial markets and thus affects firms‘ financing costs. To guide our empirical analysis, we propose a model where investors with heterogeneous green preferences endogenously allocate limited attention to learn market-level or firm-specific fundamental shocks. We find that a higher fraction of green investors in the market leads to higher aggregate attention to green firms. This reduces the information asymmetry of green firms, leading to higher price informativeness and lower leverage. Moreover, the information asymmetry of brown firms and the market increases with the share of green investors. Therefore, greater green attention is associated with less market efficiency. We provide empirical evidence to support our model predictions using U.S. data. Our paper shows how the growing demand for sustainable investing shifts investors‘ attention and benefits eco-friendly firms.

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Long-run Competitive Spillovers of the Credit Crunch

William McShane

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 10, 2023


Competition in the U.S. appears to have declined. One contributing factor may have been heterogeneity in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. I examine the impact of product market peer credit constraints on long-run competitive outcomes and behavior among non-financial firms. I use measures of lender exposure to the financial crisis to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for product market credit availability. I find that credit constraints of product market peers positively predict growth in sales, market share, profitability, and markups. This is consistent with the notion that firms gained at the expense of their credit constrained peers. The relationship is robust to accounting for other sources of inter-firm spillovers, namely credit access of technology network and supply chain peers. Further, I find evidence of strategic investment, i.e. the idea that firms increase investment in response to peer credit constraints to commit to deter entry mobility. This behavior may explain why temporary heterogeneity in the availability of credit appears to have resulted in a persistent redistribution of output across firms.

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Banking Market Deregulation and Mortality Inequality

Iftekhar Hasan Thomas Krause Stefano Manfredonia Felix Noth

in: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, Nr. 14, 2022


This paper shows that local banking market conditions affect mortality rates in the United States. Exploiting the staggered relaxation of branching restrictions in the 1990s across states, we find that banking deregulation decreases local mortality rates. This effect is driven by a decrease in the mortality rate of black residents, implying a decrease in the black-white mortality gap. We further analyze the role of mortgage markets as a transmitter between banking deregulation and mortality and show that households' easier access to finance explains mortality dynamics. We do not find any evidence that our results can be explained by improved labor outcomes.

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A Note on the Use of Syndicated Loan Data

Isabella Müller Felix Noth Lena Tonzer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 17, 2022


Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan has become an essential input in banking research over recent years. This data is rich enough to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial shocks or climate change. However, many data options raise the question of how to choose the estimation sample. We employ a standard regression framework analyzing bank lending during the financial crisis to study how conventional but varying usages of DealScan affect the estimates. The key finding is that the direction of coefficients remains relatively robust. However, statistical significance seems to depend on the data and sampling choice.

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Capital Requirements, Market Structure, and Heterogeneous Banks

Carola Müller

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 15, 2022


Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.

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