This paper investigates whether state-to-state political ties with the United States affect the pricing of global syndicated loans. We find that a one-standard-deviation improvement in state political ties between the U.S. and the government of a borrower’s home country is associated with a 14.7 basis points lower loan spread, shaving off about 11.8 million USD in interest payments over the duration of the average loan for borrowers. Results also show that the effect of political ties is stronger for narrower and more concentrated loan syndicates, when lead arrangers are U.S. banks, during periods in which the U.S. is engaged in armed conflicts, when the U.S. president belongs to the Republican Party, and for borrowers with better balance sheets and prior lending relationships. Notably, not all firms benefit equally, as cross-listed firms and firms in countries with strong institutional quality and ability to attract institutional investors are much less affected by political ties.

We investigate the relation between political uncertainty and bank loan spreads using a sample of loan contracts for the G20 firms during the period from 1982 to 2015. We find that banks charge firms higher loan spreads and require more covenants during election years when domestic political risks are elevated. Greater differences in the support ratios of opinion polls on candidates lead to the lower cost of bank loans. This political effect also lessens when the government quality of the borrower’s country is better than that of the lender’s country. Better quality government can lower the political risk component of bank loan spreads.

Banks play a unique role in society. They not only maximize profits but also consider the interests of stakeholders. We investigate whether banks consider firms’ pollution records in their lending decisions. The evidence shows that banks offer significantly higher loan spreads, higher total borrowing costs, shorter loan maturities, and greater collateral to firms with higher levels of chemical pollution. The costly effects are stronger for borrowers with greater risk and weaker corporate governance. Further, the results show that banks with higher social responsibility account for their borrowers’ environmental performance and charge higher loan spreads to those with poor performance. These results support the idea that banks with higher social responsibility can promote the practice of business ethics in firms.

This paper provides original evidence from institutional investors that political uncertainty greatly affects investment behavior. Using institutional holdings of common stock, we find that institutions significantly reduce their holdings by 0.8–2.3% points during presidential election years. Such effect holds for gubernatorial elections with cross-state-border difference-in-difference analysis and for tests using a political uncertainty index. The effect is the opposite for American Depository Receipts (ADRs). In addition, we find that institutions benefit financially from the observed strategy, and such strategy is in line with predicted outcomes of presidential election polls.

Recent financial crises have prompted the interest in understanding how banking globalization interacts with domestic institutions in shaping foreign shocks’ transmission. This paper uses regional banking data from Brazil to show that a foreign funding shock to banks negatively affects lending by their regional branches. This effect increases in the presence of frictions in internal capital markets, which affect branches’ capacity to access funding from other regions via intra-bank linkages. These results also matter on an aggregate level, as municipality-level credit and job flows drop in exposed regions. Policies aiming to reduce the fragmented structure of regional banking markets could moderate the propagation of foreign shocks.

In our analysis, we consider the distribution of decision power over financing and investment between MNEs’ headquarters and foreign subsidiaries and its influence on the foreign affiliates’ financial restrictions. Our research results show that headquarters of multinational enterprises have not (yet) moved much decision power to their foreign subsidiaries at all. We use data from the IWH FDI Micro Database which contains information on corporate governance structures and financial restrictions of 609 enterprises with a foreign investor in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and East Germany. We match data from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database on financial characteristics. We find that a high concentration of decision power within the MNE’s headquarter implicates high financial restrictions within the subsidiary. Square term results show, however, that the effect of financial constraints within the subsidiary decreases and finally turns insignificant when decision power moves from headquarter to subsidiary. Thus, economic policy should encourage foreign investors in the case of foreign acquisition of local enterprises to leave decision power within the enterprise and in the case of Greenfield investment to provide the newly established subsidiaries with as much power over corporate governance structures as possible.