Ökonomische Unterschiede zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland
Die Gruppe untersucht mit innovativen Methoden, warum die Wirtschaft in Ostdeutschland bis heute hinter der westdeutschen zurückbleibt und welche Rolle die Treuhandanstalt dabei spielt.
In ihrem Hauptprojekt untersucht die Gruppe den Prozess der Privatisierung der DDR-Wirtschaft durch die Treuhandanstalt. Inwiefern spielte die Qualifizierung der ausgewählten Managerinnen und Manager und deren Netzwerk zu anderen Entscheidern eine Rolle? In Form eines Benchmark-Modells soll auf Basis von Mikrodaten (Firmen, Manager, Patente, Ideen) herausgefunden werden, wie die ostdeutschen Betriebe heute daständen, wenn sie ausschließlich von talentierten Unternehmerpersönlichkeiten übernommen worden wären. Das zweite Projekt analysiert, warum besonders innovative Firmen seltener in Ost- als in Westdeutschland entstehen und welche Rolle Migrantinnen und Migranten für das Wirtschaftswachstum und die Wissensproduktion in Deutschland spielen. Das dritte Projekt verwendet CompNet-Daten, um nach Gründen für die schwindende Produktivitätsdynamik in Europa zu suchen.
ForschungsclusterGesamtwirtschaftliche Dynamik und Stabilität
Taxation, Corruption, and Growth
in: European Economic Review, 2016
We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.
Buy, Keep, or Sell: Economic Growth and the Market for Ideas
in: Econometrica, Nr. 3, 2016
An endogenous growth model is developed where each period firms invest in researching and developing new ideas. An idea increases a firm's productivity. By how much depends on the technological propinquity between an idea and the firm's line of business. Ideas can be bought and sold on a market for patents. A firm can sell an idea that is not relevant to its business or buy one if it fails to innovate. The developed model is matched up with stylized facts about the market for patents in the United States. The analysis gauges how efficiency in the patent market affects growth.
Transition to Clean Technology
in: Journal of Political Economy, Nr. 1, 2016
We develop an endogenous growth model in which clean and dirty technologies compete in production. Research can be directed to either technology. If dirty technologies are more advanced, the transition to clean technology can be difficult. Carbon taxes and research subsidies may encourage production and innovation in clean technologies, though the transition will typically be slow. We estimate the model using microdata from the US energy sector. We then characterize the optimal policy path that heavily relies on both subsidies and taxes. Finally, we evaluate various alternative policies. Relying only on carbon taxes or delaying intervention has significant welfare costs.
Networks and the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Exploration
in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2015
How small shocks are amplified and propagated through the economy to cause sizable fluctuations is at the heart of much macroeconomic research. Potential mechanisms that have been proposed range from investment and capital accumulation responses in real business-cycle models (e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1982) to Keynesian multipliers (e.g., Diamond 1982; Kiyotaki 1988; Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987; Hall 2009; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011); to credit market frictions facing firms, households, or banks (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Guerrieri and Lorenzoni 2012; Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013); to the role of real and nominal rigidities and their interplay (Ball and Romer 1990); and to the consequences of (potentially inappropriate or constrained) monetary policy (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1971; Eggertsson and Woodford 2003; Farhi and Werning 2013).
The Schumpeterian Growth Paradigm
in: Annual Review of Economics, 2015
In this review, we argue that the Schumpeterian growth paradigm, which models growth as resulting from innovations involving creative destruction, sheds light on several aspects of the growth process that cannot be properly addressed by alternative theories. We focus on three important aspects for which Schumpeterian growth theory delivers predictions that distinguish it from other growth models, namely, (a) the role of competition and market structure, (b) firm dynamics, and (c) the relationship between growth and development.
Police Reorganization and Crime: Evidence from Police Station Closures
in: German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper, Nr. 7, 2019
Does the administrative organization of police affect crime? In answering this question, we focus on the reorganization of local police agencies. Specifically, we study the effects police force reallocation via station closures has on local crime. We do this by exploiting a quasi-experiment where a reform substantially reduced the number of police stations. Combining a matching strategy with an event-study design, we find no effects on total theft. Police station closures, however, open up tempting opportunities for criminals in car theft and burglary in residential properties. We can rule out that our effects arise from incapacitation, crime displacement, or changes in employment of local police forces. Our results suggest that criminals are less deterred after police station closures and use the opportunity to steal more costly goods.