Recht und Finanzen
Diese Forschungsgruppe untersucht die Bedeutung der Corporate Governance für den Unternehmenswert und die Unternehmenspolitik. Von besonderem Interesse sind dabei die Beziehungen zwischen Unternehmen und Gläubigern bzw. Gläubigerinnen sowie rechtliche Regelungen. Untersucht wird insbesondere, wie finanzielle und rechtliche Innovationen die Beziehung zwischen Firmen und ihren Gläubigern bzw. Gläubigerinnen beeinflussen, sowie die Rolle des Rechtssystems für die Unternehmensentwicklung.
Forschungscluster
Institutionen und soziale NormenIhr Kontakt
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Referierte Publikationen
CEO Investment of Deferred Compensation Plans and Firm Performance
in: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, im Erscheinen
Abstract
We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably reflects CEOs' incentive to abandon the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.
Entrenchment through Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from CEO Network Centrality
in: International Review of Financial Analysis, im Erscheinen
Abstract
This paper investigates whether CEOs with high network centrality entrench themselves when taking CSR decisions and how that affects firm value. Evidence portrays that CSR in firms with more central CEOs is negatively associated with firm-value, and this association is mitigated by better corporate governance mechanisms and by geographic areas of higher social capital. This negative association is lower during disasters which reflect periods of positive exogenous shocks to the societal demand for CSR. Furthermore, CSR by more central CEOs is positively associated with future increases in CEO compensation and future improvement in a CEO's network position. The findings reveal that, in general, central CEOs use CSR to entrench themselves and gain private benefits rather than increase shareholder value.
Investor Relations and IPO Performance
in: Review of Accounting Studies, im Erscheinen
Publikation lesen
Executive Compensation and Labor Expenses
in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, im Erscheinen
Publikation lesen
Foreign Bank Ownership and Income Inequality: Empirical Evidence
in: Applied Economics, im Erscheinen
Publikation lesenArbeitspapiere
Firm-level Employment, Labour Market Reforms, and Bank Distress
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 15, 2019
Abstract
We explore the interaction between labour market reforms and financial frictions. Our study combines a new cross-country reform database on labour market reforms with matched firm-bank data for nine euro area countries over the period 1999 to 2013. While we find that labour market reforms are overall effective in increasing employment, restricted access to bank credit can undo up to half of long-term employment gains at the firm-level. Entrepreneurs without sufficient access to credit cannot reap the full benefits of more flexible employment regulation.
Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring?
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 3, 2019
Abstract
Theoretically, bank‘s loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers‘ investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalised banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers‘ performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.
Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 7, 2018
Abstract
We study if the regulation of bank executive compensation has unintended consequences. Based on novel data on CEO and non-CEO executives in EU banking, we show that capping the variable-to-fixed compensation ratio did not induce executives to abandon the industry. Banks indemnified executives sufficiently for the shock to retain them by raising fixed and lowering variable compensation while complying with the cap. At the same time, banks‘ risk-adjusted performance deteriorated due to increased idiosyncratic risk. Collateral damage for the financial system as a whole appears modest though, as average co-movement of banks with the market declined under the cap.
Internal Governance and Creditor Governance: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 6, 2017
Abstract
I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.
Executive Compensation, Macroeconomic Conditions, and Cash Flow Cyclicality
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 6, 2016
Abstract
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. I show that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. I also show that this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, I provide evidence supportive of the model’s predictions. First, I find that equity-based incentives are reduced during recessions. Second, I show that the magnitude of this effect is increasing in a firm’s cash flow cyclicality.
