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Firmenpleiten auf höchstem Stand seit mehr als zwei JahrzehntenSteffen MüllerDer Spiegel, 9. April 2026
Takeover bids provide an option right to the target's shareholders; they guarantee the offered price but maintain the chance of higher offers. Using Option Pricing Theory (OPT) we estimate the probability and expected value of higher bids from target stock prices.
During capital control episodes, large price deviations between American Depositary Receipts (ADR) and their underlying stocks signal that a currency crisis is about to occur. We interpret this price spread as the price of a call option. Using option pricing theory we derive detailed information about both the probability of a currency crisis and the expected magnitude of devaluation. Analyzing daily ADR market data preceding the Venezuelan crisis (1996), our approach predicts crisis probabilities of almost 100% and forecasts the exchange rate after floating quite accurately. During the Argentine crisis (2002), the estimated exchange rates are similar to the actual ones.
We develop an indicator for currency crisis risk using price spreads between American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and their underlyings. This risk measure represents the mean exchange rate ADR investors expect after a potential currency crisis or realignment. It makes crisis prediction possible on a daily basis as depreciation expectations are reflected in ADR market prices. Using daily data, we analyze the impact of several risk drivers related to standard currency crisis theories and find that ADR investors perceive higher currency crisis risk when export commodity prices fall, trading partners’ currencies depreciate, sovereign yield spreads increase, or interest rate spreads widen.
We study the smuggling of illegal and legal goods across the U.S.-Mexico border from 1975 to 2004. Using a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model we test the microeconomic determinants of both smuggling types and reveal their trends. We find that illegal goods smuggling decreased from $116 billion in 1984 to $27 billion in 2004 as a result of improved labor market conditions in Mexico and intensified U.S. border enforcement. Smuggling legal goods is motivated by tax and tariff evasion. While export misinvoicing fluctuated at low levels, import misinvoicing switched from underinvoicing to overinvoicing after Mexico's accession to the GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) induced lower tariffs.
