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IWH-Chef: Sachsen-Anhalt ist nicht nur ChemieReint GroppDie Welt, 2. März 2026
Die bundespolitische Maßnahme der Energiewende und das Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) als Teil davon haben in Sachsen-Anhalt Hoffnungen ausgelöst, die insbesondere mit der Förderung grüner Technologien in Verbindung standen. Das vorliegende Papier stellt eine Analyse der Wirkungen von Subventionen im Allgemeinen dar und widmet sich dem EEG und seiner Auswirkungen im Speziellen. Dazu werden auch Ergebnisse einer Befragung herangezogen, welche die Industrie- und Handelskammer (IHK) Halle-Dessau bei Unternehmen im südlichen Sachsen-Anhalt durchgeführt hat.
This paper makes the following original contributions to the literature. (i) We develop a simpler analytical characterization and numerical algorithm for Bayesian inference in structural vector autoregressions (VARs) that can be used for models that are overidentified, just‐identified, or underidentified. (ii) We analyze the asymptotic properties of Bayesian inference and show that in the underidentified case, the asymptotic posterior distribution of contemporaneous coefficients in an n‐variable VAR is confined to the set of values that orthogonalize the population variance–covariance matrix of ordinary least squares residuals, with the height of the posterior proportional to the height of the prior at any point within that set. For example, in a bivariate VAR for supply and demand identified solely by sign restrictions, if the population correlation between the VAR residuals is positive, then even if one has available an infinite sample of data, any inference about the demand elasticity is coming exclusively from the prior distribution. (iii) We provide analytical characterizations of the informative prior distributions for impulse‐response functions that are implicit in the traditional sign‐restriction approach to VARs, and we note, as a special case of result (ii), that the influence of these priors does not vanish asymptotically. (iv) We illustrate how Bayesian inference with informative priors can be both a strict generalization and an unambiguous improvement over frequentist inference in just‐identified models. (v) We propose that researchers need to explicitly acknowledge and defend the role of prior beliefs in influencing structural conclusions and we illustrate how this could be done using a simple model of the U.S. labor market.
The declining importance of money in transactions can explain the well-known fact that US interest rate policy was passive in the pre-Volcker period and active after 1982. We generalise a standard cashless new Keynesian model (Woodford, 2003) by incorporating an explicit transaction role for money. In the pre-Volcker period, we estimate that money did play an important role and determinacy required a passive interest rate policy. However, after 1982, money no longer played an important role in facilitating transactions. Correspondingly, the conventional view prevails and an active policy ensured equilibrium determinacy.
We discuss properties of alternatives or complements to GDP as a measure of welfare at business cycle frequencies. Our results imply that the suggested indicators show practically no cycle at all and their methodologies can be questioned. First, data are not available at an appropriate quality and frequency. Second, the suggested time series sometimes correlate negatively with each other. Third, cross-section and quasi-panel evidence based on different samples of countries reveals no impact of the stance of the business cycle on some suggested welfare measures. Therefore, alternative welfare measures do not show an equal picture on business cycle frequencies compared to GDP-based measures.
After every major financial crisis, the question about the responsibility of the rating agencies resurfaces. Regarding government bonds, the most frequently voiced concern targeted “unreasonably” bad ratings that might trigger capital flights and increasing risk premia which sanction further rating downgrades. In this paper we develop a multivariate, nonparametric version of the Pesaran type cointegration model that allows for nonlinearities, to show that a unique equilibrium between ratings and sovereign yields exists. Therefore, we have to reject the concern that there is an unholy cycle leading to certain default in the long run.
During the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, governments in Europe stabilized their economies by means of fiscal policy. After decades of absence, deficit spending was used to counteract the heavy decline in demand. In Germany, public spending went partially into R&D subsidies in favor of small and medium sized enterprises. Applying the standard open input–output model, the paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of R&D subsidies on employment and production in the business cycle. Findings in the form of backward multipliers suggest that R&D subsidies have stimulated a substantial leverage effect. Almost two thirds of the costs of R&D projects are covered by the enterprises themselves. Overall, a subsidized R&D program results in a production, value added and employment effect that amounts to at least twice the initial financing. Overall, the R&D program counteracts the decline of GDP by 0.5% in the year 2009. In the year 2010 the effects are already procyclical since the German economy recovered quickly. Compared to the strongly discussed alternative uses of subsidies for private consumption, R&D spending is more effective.
We propose a unified identification scheme to identify monetary shocks and track their propagation through the economy. We combine three approaches dealing with the consequences of monetary shocks. First, we adjust a state space version of the P-star type model employing money overhang as the driving force of inflation. Second, we identify the contemporaneous impact of monetary policy shocks by applying a sign restriction identification scheme to the reduced form given by the state space signal equations. Third, to ensure that our results are not distorted by the measurement error exhibited by the official monetary data, we employ the Divisia M4 monetary aggregate provided by the Center for Financial Stability. Our approach overcomes one of the major difficulties of previous models by using a data-driven identification of equilibrium velocity. Thus, we are able to show that a P-star model can fit U.S. data and money did indeed matter in the United States.
This paper investigates the effect of within banking sector competition and competition from financial markets on the dynamics of the transmission from monetary policy rates to retail bank interest rates in the euro area. We use a new dataset that permits analysis for disaggregated bank products. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we test whether development of financial markets and financial innovation speed up the pass through. We find that more developed markets for equity and corporate bonds result in a faster pass-through for those retail bank products directly competing with these markets. More developed markets for securitized assets and for interest rate derivatives also speed up the transmission. Further, we find relatively strong effects of competition within the banking sector across two different measures of competition. Overall, the evidence supports the idea that developed financial markets and competitive banking systems increase the effectiveness of monetary policy.
In this paper, we develop a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach that enables us to quantify the direction, size, and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile). For four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) we show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods. Commercial banks and, especially, hedge funds appear to play a major role in the transmission of shocks to other financial institutions.
The European Commission’s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system. It allows the preferences of the politicians involved to be analysed with regard to the two potential errors of an early warning system – missing a crisis and issuing a false alarm. These preferences might differ with the institutional setting. Such an analysis is done for the first time in this article for early warning systems in general by using a standard signals approach, including a preference-based optimisation approach, to set thresholds. It is shown that, in general, the thresholds of the Commission’s Scoreboard are set low (resulting in more alarm signals), as compared to a neutral stand. Based on political economy considerations the result could have been expected.
