Do Affiliated Bankers on Board Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility? US Evidence
Iftekhar Hasan, Hui Li, Haizhi Wang, Yun Zhu
Sustainability,
Nr. 6,
2021
Abstract
In this study, we examine whether and to what extent affiliated bankers on board may affect firms’ corporate social performance. Using a propensity score-matched sample from 2002 to 2016, we find that board directors from affiliated banks exert significantly positive influence on firms’ corporate social performance. Furthermore, board of directors from affiliated banks are negatively associated with firm investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities when firms experience financial distress. Finally, we find that the effect of affiliated bankers on board on firms’ CSR performance depends on the affiliated banks’ CSR orientation, as affiliated banker directors from banks with higher CSR orientation have a stronger influence on firms’ investments in CSR activities. The results suggest that improving firm’s CSR performance is consistent with the affiliated banks’ interests.
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The Influence of Bondholder Concentration and Temporal Orientation on Investments in R&D
Pengfei Ye, Jonathan O’Brien, Christina Matz Carnes, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Management,
Nr. 3,
2021
Abstract
Although innovation can be a critical source of competitive advantage, research has found that debt can erode management’s willingness to invest in R&D. In this article, we employ a stakeholder bargaining power perspective to argue that this effect is most pronounced when the firm’s bonds are concentrated in the hands of bond blockholders. Furthermore, we contend that the temporal orientation of bondholders influences this relationship. Specifically, while it is commonly assumed that bondholders have a limited temporal orientation that induces them to focus on short-term value appropriation, we argue that some bond blockholders adopt a long-term temporal orientation. This orientation, in turn, makes them more inclined to support long-term value creation for the firm in the form of enhanced investments in R&D. Moreover, while agency theory suggests that there is an inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, our results suggest that the temporal orientation of investors (i.e., both shareholders and bondholders) matters much more than whether they invested in the firm’s equity or its debt.
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11.02.2021 • 6/2021
Presseeinladung zur IWH-Konferenz „Investieren – aber richtig!“ am 16. Februar 2021
Deutschland steht seit langem in der Kritik, zu wenig zu investieren, um das Wirtschaftswachstum in der langen Frist und so den Wohlstand für kommende Generationen zu sichern. Wie der Staat sinnvoll in die Zukunft investieren kann, ist Thema einer Online-Tagung, organisiert vom Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH). Zur Eröffnung spricht Otto Fricke, haushaltspolitischer Sprecher der FDP-Bundestagsfraktion.
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A Note of Caution on Quantifying Banks' Recapitalization Effects
Felix Noth, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Unconventional monetary policy measures like asset purchase programs aim to reduce certain securities' yield and alter financial institutions' investment behavior. These measures increase the institutions' market value of securities and add to their equity positions. We show that the extent of this recapitalization effect crucially depends on the securities' accounting and valuation methods, country-level regulation, and maturity structure. We argue that future research needs to consider these factors when quantifying banks' recapitalization effects and consequent changes in banks' lending decisions to the real sector.
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The Real Impact of Ratings-based Capital Rules on the Finance-Growth Nexus
Iftekhar Hasan, Gazi Hassan, Suk-Joong Kim, Eliza Wu
International Review of Financial Analysis,
January
2021
Abstract
We investigate whether ratings-based capital regulation has affected the finance-growth nexus via a foreign credit channel. Using quarterly data on short to medium term real GDP growth and cross-border bank lending flows from G-10 countries to 67 recipient countries, we find that since the implementation of Basel 2 capital rules, risk weight reductions mapped to sovereign credit rating upgrades have stimulated short-term economic growth in investment grade recipients but hampered growth in non-investment grade recipients. The impact of these rating upgrades is strongest in the first year and then reverses from the third year and onwards. On the other hand, there is a consistent and lasting negative impact of risk weight increases due to rating downgrades across all recipient countries. The adverse effects of ratings-based capital regulation on foreign bank credit supply and economic growth are compounded in countries with more corruption and less competitive banking sectors and are attenuated with greater political stability.
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Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Moritz Stieglitz
Economic Inquiry,
Nr. 1,
2021
Abstract
Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank‐firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalized banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands‐off approach is associated with improved borrowers' performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.
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14.12.2020 • 25/2020
Deutsche Lebensversicherer investieren nicht ausreichend in Start-ups
Die deutschen Lebensversicherer legen ihr Kapital bislang zu wenig in Aktien an und hemmen so die wirtschaftliche Dynamik. Eine Studie des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) legt nahe, dass der Gründerszene Risikokapital fehlt, um erfolgreiche Start-ups zu finanzieren. Grund dafür ist das Anlageverhalten potenzieller Investoren. IWH-Präsident Reint Gropp fordert Reformen, die die Finanzierung innovativer Ideen fördern.
Reint E. Gropp
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Marginal Returns to Talent for Material Risk Takers in Banking
Moritz Stieglitz, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 20,
2020
Abstract
Economies of scale can explain compensation differentials over time, across firms of different size, different hierarchy-levels, and different industries. Consequently, the most talented individuals tend to match with the largest firms in industries where marginal returns to their talent are greatest. We explore a new dimension of this size-pay nexus by showing that marginal returns also differ across activities within firms and industries. Using hand-collected data on managers in European banks well below the level of executive directors, we find that the size-pay nexus is strongest for investment banking business units and for banks with a market-based business model. Thus, managerial compensation is most sensitive to size increases for activities that can easily be scaled up.
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Role of the Community Reinvestment Act in Mortgage Supply and the U.S. Housing Boom
Vahid Saadi
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 11,
2020
Abstract
This paper studies the role of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in the U.S. housing boom-bust cycle. I find that enhanced CRA enforcement in 1998 increased the growth rate of mortgage lending by CRA-regulated banks to CRA-eligible census tracts. I show that during the boom period house price growth was higher in the eligible census tracts because of the shift in mortgage supply of regulated banks. Consequently, these census tracts experienced a worse housing bust. I find that CRA-induced mortgages were awarded to borrowers with lower FICO scores and were more frequently delinquent.
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Epidemics in the Neoclassical and New Keynesian Models
Martin S. Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo, Mathias Trabandt
Abstract
We analyze the effects of an epidemic in three standard macroeconomic models. We find that the neoclassical model does not rationalize the positive comovement of consumption and investment observed in recessions associated with an epidemic. Introducing monopolistic competition into the neoclassical model remedies this shortcoming even when prices are completely flexible. Finally, sticky prices lead to a larger recession but do not fundamentally alter the predictions of the monopolistic competition model.
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