IWH-Alumni Das IWH möchte den Kontakt zu seinen ehemaligen Mitarbeiterinnen und...
IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank Die IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank (FDI = Foreign Direct Investment)...
SSRN Working Papers,
We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.
Extreme Risks in Financial Markets and Monetary Policies of the Euro-candidates
Comparative Economic Studies,
This study investigates extreme tail risks in financial markets of the euro-candidate countries and their implications for monetary policies. Our empirical tests show the prevalence of extreme risks in the conditional volatility series of selected financial variables, that is, interbank rates, equity market indexes and exchange rates. We argue that excessive instability of key target and instrument variables should be mitigated by monetary policies. Central banks in these countries will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy while steering their economies out of the financial crisis and through the euro-convergence process.
The Extreme Risk Problem for Monetary Policies of the Euro-Candidates
We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euroconvergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria.