Executive Compensation, Macroeconomic Conditions, and Cash Flow Cyclicality
Stefano Colonnello
Finance Research Letters,
November
2020
Abstract
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial wealth-for-performance sensitivity. The model shows that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. Moreover, this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. These novel, testable predictions provide insights into optimal shareholder responses to agency costs of debt throughout the business cycle.
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Marginal Returns to Talent for Material Risk Takers in Banking
Moritz Stieglitz, Konstantin Wagner
IWH-Diskussionspapiere,
Nr. 20,
2020
Abstract
Economies of scale can explain compensation differentials over time, across firms of different size, different hierarchy-levels, and different industries. Consequently, the most talented individuals tend to match with the largest firms in industries where marginal returns to their talent are greatest. We explore a new dimension of this size-pay nexus by showing that marginal returns also differ across activities within firms and industries. Using hand-collected data on managers in European banks well below the level of executive directors, we find that the size-pay nexus is strongest for investment banking business units and for banks with a market-based business model. Thus, managerial compensation is most sensitive to size increases for activities that can easily be scaled up.
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Stress Tests and Small Business Lending
Kristle R. Cortésa, Yuliya Demyanyk, Lei Li, Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 1,
2020
Abstract
Post-crisis stress tests have altered banks’ credit supply to small business. Banks most affected by stress tests reallocate credit away from riskier markets and toward safer ones. They also raise interest rates on small loans. Quantities fall most in high-risk markets where stress-tested banks own no branches, and prices rise mainly where they do. The results suggest that banks price the stress-test induced increase in capital requirements where they have local knowledge, and exit where they do not. Stress tests do not, however, reduce aggregate credit. Small banks seem to increase their share in geographies formerly reliant on stress-tested lenders.
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IWH-Insolvenzforschung
IWH-Insolvenzforschung Die IWH-Insolvenzforschungsstelle bündelt die...
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Startseite
IWH-Insolvenztrend: Insolvenzen im Januar wieder rückläufig Deutlich schneller als die amtliche Statistik liefert das...
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Faculty
DPE Faculty A B C D E F G H I J...
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On the Risk of a Sovereign Debt Crisis in Italy
Oliver Holtemöller, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Intereconomics,
Nr. 6,
2018
Abstract
The intention for the Italian government to stimulate business activity via large increases in government spending is not in line with the stabilisation of the public debt ratio. Instead, if such policy were implemented, the risk of a sovereign debt crisis would be high. In this article, we analyse the capacity of the Italian economy to shoulder sovereign debt under different scenarios. We conclude that focusing on growth enhancing structural reforms, would allow for moderate increases in public expenditure.
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Das IWH auf der ASSA-Jahrestagung 2020 in San Diego
Das IWH auf der ASSA-Jahrestagung 2020 in San Diego Die American Economic...
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