Mergers, Spinoffs, and Employee Incentives
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 7,
2011
Abstract
This article studies mergers between competing firms and shows that while such mergers reduce the level of product market competition, they may have an adverse effect on employee incentives to innovate. In industries where value creation depends on innovation and development of new products, mergers are likely to be inefficient even though they increase the market power of the post-merger firm. In such industries, a stand-alone structure where independent firms compete both in the product market and in the market for employee human capital leads to a greater profitability. Furthermore, our analysis shows that multidivisional firms can improve employee incentives and increase firm value by reducing firm size through a spinoff transaction, although doing so eliminates the economies of scale advantage of being a larger firm and the benefits of operating an internal capital market within the firm. Finally, our article suggests that established firms can benefit from creating their own competition in the product and labor markets by accommodating new firm entry, and the desire to do so is greater at the intermediate stages of industry/product development.
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Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
Reint E. Gropp, H. Hakenes, Isabel Schnabel
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 6,
2011
Abstract
This article empirically investigates the competitive effects of government bail-out policies. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks' risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.
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Regional Entrepreneurial Opportunities in the Biotech Industry: Exploring the Transition from Award-winning Nascent Entrepreneurs to Real Start-ups
H. Wolf, Claus Michelsen, Michael Schwartz
Abstract
Knowledge of factors that determine the transition from nascent entrepreneurship into real entrepreneurship is of major importance for policies aiming to effectively stimulate start-ups. Whereas scholars concentrated on person-specific factors to explain transition probabilities, environmental characteristics have been fairly neglected. Given that entrepreneurship is a strongly localized phenomenon, this paper argues that regional entrepreneurial opportunities are a driving force behind the transition from nascent entrepreneurship to new venture creation. Based on unique data on 103 nascent entrepreneurs in the German biotechnology industry, we empirically assess the importance of regional entrepreneurial opportunities on transition probabilities. Further, we introduce a new
approach to measure nascent entrepreneurship by capturing individuals that actively participate in start-up competitions and have won at least one competition. Controlling for technology and individual characteristics, we find strong support for our hypotheses relating to the significant impact of general regional opportunities, specific regional opportunities and the entrepreneurial environment for the probability of transition from award-winning nascent entrepreneurs to real start-ups.
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect
Christian Growitsch, Nicole Nulsch, Margarethe Rammerstorfer
European Journal of Law and Economics,
Nr. 1,
2012
Abstract
In 2004, European competition law had been considerable changed by the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform and its arising uncertainty on the agreements firms implement, especially on innovative agreements like vertical R&D agreements. By means of a decision theoretic approach, we show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached but innovating cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended side effect, fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased.
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Specialization, Diversity, Competition and their Impact on Local Economic Growth in Germany
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, Annette Illy, Michael Schwartz, Christoph Hornych
Abstract
This study systematically examines the impact of fundamental elements of urban economic structure on urban growth in Germany from 2003 to 2007. We test four elements simultaneously, that is sectoral specialization, diversification of economic activities, urban size as well as the impact of local competition. To account for the effect of varying spatial delimitations in the analysis of urban growth, we further differentiate between cities and planning regions as geographical units. The analysis covers manufacturing industries as well as service sectors. Most previous work produces inconsistent results and concentrates on localization economies and/or diversification, while urban size and the effect of local competition are widely ignored. Our regression results show a U-shaped relationship between localization economies and urban growth and positive effects of local competition on urban growth. With respect to diversification, we find positive effects on urban growth on the city-level, but insignificant results on the level of the planning regions. The impact of urban size also differs between free cities and planning regions; in the former a U-shaped relationship is found whereas the effect is inversely U-shaped for the latter.
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A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, A. K. Kashyap
Europe and the Euro,
2010
Abstract
Most observers have concluded that while money markets and government bond markets are rapidly integrating following the introduction of the common currency in the euro area, there is little evidence that a similar integration process is taking place for retail banking. Data on cross-border retail bank flows, cross-border bank mergers and the law of one price reveal no evidence of integration in retail banking. This paper shows that the previous tests of bank integration are weak in that they are not based on an equilibrium concept and are neither necessary nor sufficient statistics for bank integration. The paper proposes a new test of integration based on convergence in banks' profitability. The new test emphasises the role of an active market for corporate control and of competition in banking integration. European listed banks profitability appears to converge to a common level. There is weak evidence that competition eliminates high profits for these banks, and underperforming banks tend to show improved profitability. Unlisted European banks differ markedly. Their profits show no tendency to revert to a common target rate of profitability. Overall, the banking market in Europe appears far from being integrated. In contrast, in the U.S. both listed and unlisted commercial banks profits converge to the same target, and high profit banks see their profits driven down quickly.
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Market Concentration and Innovation in Transnational Corporations: Evidence from Foreign Affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe
Liviu Voinea, Johannes Stephan
Research on Knowledge, Innovation and Internationalization (Progress in International Business Research, Volume 4),
2009
Abstract
Purpose – The main research question of this contribution is whether local market concentration influences R&D and innovation activities of foreign affiliates of transnational companies.
Methodology/approach – We focus on transition economies and use discriminant function analysis to investigate differences in the innovation activity of foreign affiliates operating in concentrated markets, compared to firms operating in nonconcentrated markets. The database consists of the results of a questionnaire administered to a representative sample of foreign affiliates in a selection of five transition economies.
Findings – We find that foreign affiliates in more concentrated markets, when compared to foreign affiliates in less concentrated markets, export more to their own foreign investor's network, do more basic and applied research, use more of the existing technology already incorporated in the products of their own foreign investor's network, do less process innovation, and acquire less knowledge from abroad.
Research limitations/implications – The results may be specific to transition economies only.
Practical implications – The main implications of these results are that host country market concentration stimulates intranetwork knowledge diffusion (with a risk of transfer pricing), while more intense competition stimulates knowledge creation (at least as far as process innovation is concerned) and knowledge absorption from outside the affiliates' own network. Policy makers should focus their support policies on companies in more competitive sectors, as they are more likely to transfer new technologies.
Originality/value – It contributes to the literature on the relationship between market concentration and innovation, based on a unique survey database of foreign affiliates of transnational corporations operating in Eastern Europe.
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Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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Competition and Antitrust Policy in the Enlarged European Union: A Level Playing Field?
Jens Hölscher, Johannes Stephan
Journal of Common Market Studies,
2009
Abstract
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