Corporate Taxation and Firm Location in Germany
Götz Zeddies
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 2,
2015
Abstract
German Fiscal Federalism is characterized by a high degree of fiscal equalization which lowers the efficiency of local tax administration. Currently, a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme is on the political agenda. One option is to grant federal states the right to raise surtaxes on statutory tax rates set by the central government in order to reduce the equalization rate. In such an environment, especially those federal states with lower economic performance would have to raise comparatively high surtaxes. With capital mobility, this could further lower economic performance and thus tax revenues. Although statutory tax rates are so far identical across German federal states, corporate tax burden differs for several reasons. This paper tries to identify the impact of such differences on firm location. As can be shown, effective corporate taxation did seemingly not have a significant impact on firm location across German federal states.
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Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy
Claudia M. Buch, Björn Hilberg, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German bank restructuring law. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are minimal, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and the head institutes of savings banks and credit unions. Third, the levy had no effect on the volume of loans or interest rates for the average German bank. For the banks affected most by the levy, we find evidence of fewer loans, higher lending rates, and lower deposit rates.
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Toward a Taylor Rule for Fiscal Policy
Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Nr. 2,
2014
Abstract
In DSGE models, fiscal policy is typically described by simple rules in which tax rates respond to the level of output. We show that there is only weak empirical evidence in favor of such specifications in US data. Instead, the cyclical movements of labor and capital income tax rates are better described by a contemporaneous response to hours worked and investment, respectively. We show that conditioning on these variables is also desirable from a normative perspective as it significantly improves welfare relative to output-based rules.
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Fiscal Equalization, Tax Salience, and Tax Competition
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2014
Abstract
Jurisdictions that engage in inter-regional tax competition usually try to attenuate competitive pressures by substituting salient tax instruments with hidden ones. On this effect, we investigate the efficiency consequences of inter-regional tax competition and fiscal equalization in a federal system when taxpayers fail to optimally react on shrouded attributes of local tax policy. If the statuary tax rate is a relatively salient instrument and taxpayers pay low attention to the quality and the frequency of tax enforcement, the underlying substitution of tax instruments with the aim of reducing the perceived tax price may suppress the under-exploitation of tax bases that is typically triggered by fiscal equalization.
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Vertical Grants and Local Public Efficiency
Ivo Bischoff, Peter Bönisch, Peter Haug, Annette Illy
Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of vertical grants on local public sector efficiency. First, we develop a theoretical model in which the bureaucrat sets the tax price while voters choose the quantity of public services. In this model, grants reduce efficiency if voters do not misinterpret the amount of vertical grants the local bureaucrats receive. If voters suffer from fiscal illusion, i.e. overestimate the amount of grants, our model yields an ambiguous effect of grants on efficiency. Second, we use the model to launch a note of caution concerning the inference that can be drawn from the existing cross-sectional studies in this field: Taking into account vertical financial equalization systems that reduce differences in fiscal capacity, empirical studies based on cross-sectional data may yield a positive relationship between grants and efficiency even when the underlying causal effect is negative. Third, we perform an empirical analysis for the German state of Saxony-Anhalt, which has implemented such a fiscal equalization system. We find a positive relationship between grants and efficiency. Our analysis shows that a careful reassessment of existing empirical evidence with regard to this issue seems necessary.
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The Laffer curve revisited
Mathias Trabandt, Harald Uhlig
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Nr. 4,
2011
Abstract
Laffer curves for the US, the EU-14 and individual European countries are compared, using a neoclassical growth model featuring “constant Frisch elasticity” (CFE) preferences. New tax rate data is provided. The US can maximally increase tax revenues by 30% with labor taxes and 6% with capital taxes. We obtain 8% and 1% for the EU-14. There, 54% of a labor tax cut and 79% of a capital tax cut are self-financing. The consumption tax Laffer curve does not peak. Endogenous growth and human capital accumulation affect the results quantitatively. Household heterogeneity may not be important, while transition matters greatly.
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Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
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Keeping the Bubble Alive! The Effects of Urban Renewal and Demolition Subsidies in the East German Housing Market
Dominik Weiß
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 11,
2009
Abstract
German urban renewal programs are favoring the cities in the Eastern part since the re-unification in 1990. This was accompanied additionally by attractive tax incentives, designed as an accelerated declining balance method of depreciation for housing investments during the late 1990s. The accumulated needs for comfortable housing after 40 years of a disastrous housing policy of the GDR era were generally accepted as justification for the subvention policy. But various subsidies and tax incentives caused a construction boom, false allocations, and a price bubble in Eastern Germany. After recognizing that the expansion of housing supply was not in line with the demographic development and that high vacancy rates were jeopardizing housing companies and their financial backers, policy changed in 2001. Up to now, the government provides demolition grants to reduce the vast oversupply. By means of a real option approach, it is ex-plained how different available forms of subsidies and economic incentives for landlords lift real estate values. The option value representing growth expectations and opportunities is calculated as an observable market value less an estimated fundamental value. Empirical results disclose higher option premiums for cities in Eastern Germany and a strong correlation of the option premium with urban renewal spending.
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Zum Zusammenhang zwischen der Verschuldung der Bundesländer und ihren finanziellen Handlungsspielräumen
Sabine Freye
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 12,
2009
Abstract
Die Bundesländer haben sowohl einnahmen- als aus ausgabenseitig nur eng begrenzte finanzielle Handlungsspielräume. Aus dieser Situation heraus resultierte ein seit Jahr¬zehnten zu beobachtender Anstieg der öffentlichen Schulden. Gegenwärtig steht die Verschuldung der Bundesländer aufgrund der Beschlüsse der Föderalismuskommission II vom März 2009 erneut im Mittelpunkt des Interesses. Die Schuldenbremse beinhaltet die schrittweise erfolgende Rückführung der strukturellen Defizite sowie ein strukturelles Netto-neuverschuldungsverbot der Länder ab dem Jahr 2020. Auf kurze Sicht bedeuten diese Regelungen für die Mehrzahl der Länder eine Einschränkung ihrer finanziellen Hand-lungsspielräume. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit diese Spielräume zum gegenwärti¬gen Zeitpunkt in den einzelnen Ländern bestehen. Hierfür werden die Kreditmarkt-schulden je Einwohner sowie die Zins-Steuer- und Zins-Ausgaben-Quoten der Länder betrachtet. Es zeigt sich, dass die fünf Länder, die ab dem Jahr 2010 Konsolidierungs-zahlungen zum Abbau ihrer strukturellen Defizite erhalten werden, im Jahr 2006 im Länder-vergleich zumeist die geringsten finanziellen Handlungsspielräume aus¬wiesen. Die höchsten Belastungen verzeichneten die Stadtstaaten Berlin und Bremen.
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