Tournament Incentives and Acquisition Performance
Iftekhar Hasan, Marco Navone, Thomas To, Eliza Wu
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
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Ten Facts on Declining Business Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory
Ufuk Akcigit, Sina T. Ates
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
In this paper, we review the literature on declining business dynamism and its implications in the United States and propose a unifying theory to analyze the symptoms and the potential causes of this decline. We first highlight 10 pronounced stylized facts related to declining business dynamism documented in the literature and discuss some of the existing attempts to explain them. We then describe a theoretical framework of endogenous markups, innovation, and competition that can potentially speak to all of these facts jointly. We next explore some theoretical predictions of this framework, which are shaped by two interacting forces: a composition effect that determines the market concentration and an incentive effect that determines how firms respond to a given concentration in the economy. The results highlight that a decline in knowledge diffusion between frontier and laggard firms could be a significant driver of empirical trends observed in the data. This study emphasizes the potential of growth theory for the analysis of factors behind declining business dynamism and the need for further investigation in this direction.
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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
P. Behr, A. H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.
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To Securitise or to Price Credit Default Risk?
Huyen Nguyen, Danny McGowan
IWH-Diskussionspapiere,
Nr. 10,
2020
Abstract
We evaluate lenders‘ incentives to mitigate credit default risk through pricing or securitisation. Exploiting exogenous variation in credit default risk created by differences in foreclosure law along US state borders, we find that lenders in the mortgage market respond to the law in heterogeneous ways. In the agency market where the GSEs mandate a common interest rate policy, foreclosure law provokes a 4.5% increase in securitisation rates but does not affect interest rates. For nonagency loans where market participants demand risk premium, foreclosure law does not incentivise lenders to transfer the risk through the use of securitisation but causes a 625 basis point increase in interest rates. The results highlight how the GSEs‘ common interest rate policy inhibits lenders‘ risk-based pricing incentives, increases the GSEs‘ debt holdings by $70 billion per annum, and exposes taxpayers to preventable losses in the housing market.
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Interactions between Bank Levies and Corporate Taxes: How is the Bank Leverage Affected?
F. Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
ESRB Working Paper Series,
Nr. 103,
2019
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, F. Zucchi
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2019
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders’ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. If creditors would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation, firms are more likely to face the empty creditor problem. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
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Import Competition and Firm Productivity: Evidence from German Manufacturing
Richard Bräuer, Matthias Mertens, Viktor Slavtchev
IWH-Diskussionspapiere,
Nr. 20,
2019
Abstract
This study analyses empirically the effects of import competition on firm productivity (TFPQ) using administrative firm-level panel data from German manufacturing. We find that only import competition from high-income countries is associated with positive incentives for firms to invest in productivity improvement, whereas import competition from middle- and low-income countries is not. To rationalise these findings, we further look at the characteristics of imports from the two types of countries and the effects on R&D, employment and sales. We provide evidence that imports from high-income countries are relatively capital-intensive and technologically more sophisticated goods, at which German firms tend to be relatively good. Costly investment in productivity appears feasible reaction to such type of competition and we find no evidence for downscaling. Imports from middle- and low-wage countries are relatively labour-intensive and technologically less sophisticated goods, at which German firms tend to generally be at disadvantage. In this case, there are no incentives to invest in innovation and productivity and firms tend to decline in sales and employment.
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Do Conventional Monetary Policy Instruments Matter in Unconventional Times?
Manuel Buchholz, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper,
Nr. 27,
2019
Abstract
This paper investigates how declines in the deposit facility rate set by the ECB affect euro area banks’ incentives to hold reserves at the central bank. We find that, in the face of lower deposit rates, banks with a more interest-sensitive business model are more likely to reduce reserve holdings and allocate freed-up liquidity to loans. The result is driven by well-capitalized banks in the non-GIIPS countries of the euro area. This reveals that conventional monetary policy instruments have limited effects in restoring monetary policy transmission during times of crisis.
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CEO Investment of Deferred Compensation Plans and Firm Performance
Domenico Rocco Cambrea, Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Giulia Fantini
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,
Nr. 7,
2019
Abstract
We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably reflects CEOs' incentive to abandon the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.
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