In Deutschland besteht ein enormer Bedarf an evidenzbasierter Politikberatung. Viele wirtschaftspolitische Interventionen werden bislang nicht umfassend evaluiert, und falls doch, wenden die wenigsten Untersuchungen geeignete Verfahren der Kausalanalyse an, um einen ursächlichen Zusammenhang zwischen der Intervention und dem Erreichen von wirtschaftspolitischen Zielen zu identifizieren. Das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle hat für diese Aufgabe das Zentrum für evidenzbasierte Politikberatung (IWH-CEP) eingerichtet. Eine Pilotstudie zu den Wirkungen der betrieblichen Investitionsförderung ist bereits angelaufen.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich in einem verhaltenen Aufschwung. Die Kapazitätsauslastung hat im Frühjahr zugenommen, und im dritten Quartal 2015 dürfte die Veränderungsrate des Bruttoinlandsprodukts mit 0,5% leicht überdurchschnittlich ausfallen. Im weiteren Verlauf werden die Produktionskapazitäten wohl etwa normalausgelastet sein. Während die schwächere Nachfrage der Schwellenländer auf ein leichtes Abflachen der Exporte im späteren Jahresverlauf hindeutet, dürfte die inländische Nachfrage wieder stärker zulegen. Alles in allem wird das Bruttoinlandsprodukt im Jahr 2015 wohl um 1,8% zunehmen (66%-Prognoseintervall: 1,6% bis 2,0%).

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.

In this paper we study the effect of television exposure on fertility. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in Germany after WWII. For topographical reasons, Western TV programs, which promoted one/no child families, could not be received in certain parts of East Germany. Using an IV approach, we find robust evidence that watching West German TV results in lower fertility. This conclusion is robust to alternative model specifications and data sets. Our results imply that individual fertility decisions are affected by role models or information about other ways of life promoted by media.

Zur Analyse von Risiken im Bankensystem und möglichen Ausfallrisiken von Banken werden verschiedene Maße verwendet, die sowohl auf Bankbilanzdaten als auch auf der Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung von Banken beruhen. Diese Studie vergleicht häufig verwendete Risikomaße für Geschäftsbanken in den USA im Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2013. Es zeigt sich, dass alle getesteten Maße in der Lage sind, das während der Finanzkrise von 2007 bis 2009 stark angestiegene Risiko im US-Bankensystem abzubilden. Zur Prognose einer Bankinsolvenz erweist sich der einfach zu berechnende Anteil an notleidenden Vermögenswerten in der Bilanz als eine gute Ergänzung zu komplexeren Risikomaßen wie dem Z-score.

This paper provides causal evidence on the impact of succession taxes on firm investment decisions and transfer of control. Using a 2002 policy change in Greece that substantially reduced the tax on intrafamily transfers of businesses, I show that succession taxes lead to a more than 40% decline in investment around family successions, slow sales growth, and a depletion of cash reserves. Furthermore, succession taxes strongly affect the decision to sell or retain the firm within the family. I conclude by discussing implications of my findings for firms in the United States and Europe.

Since the 1990s, local governments in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have been confronted by completely new structures and developments. This came after more than 40 years (or even longer in the case of the former Soviet Union) under a socialist regime and behind an iron curtain which isolated them from the non-socialist world. A lack of resources had led to an underinvestment in the refurbishment of older buildings, while relatively cheap ‘prefabricated’ housing had been built, not only in the outskirts of cities, but also within city centres. A lack of resources had also resulted in the fact that the socialist regimes were generally unable to replace old buildings with ‘modern’ ones; hence, there is a very rich heritage of historical monuments in many of these cities today. The centrally planned economies and the development of urban structures (including the shifts of population between cities and regions) were determined by ideology, political rationality and the integration of all CEE countries into the production schemes of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and its division of labour by location. The sudden introduction of a market economy, private property, democratic rules, local autonomy for cities and municipalities and access to the global economy and society may be seen as a kind of ‘natural experiment’. How would these new conditions shape the national systems of cities and municipalities? Which cities would shrink and which would grow? How would the relationship between core cities and their surrounding municipalities develop? And what would happen within these cities and with their built environment?

Während Prognosefehler bei kurzfristigen Wetterprognosen in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten deutlich reduziert werden konnten, hat sich der durchschnittliche absolute Prognosefehler ökonomischer Prognosen für die jährliche Veränderung des Bruttoinlandsprodukts in den vergangenen 45 Jahren kaum geändert. Dies liegt vor allem daran, dass sowohl in Bezug auf die tatsächlichen ökonomischen Wirkungszusammenhänge als auch in Bezug auf die relevanten zukünftigen ökonomischen Schocks eine fundamentale Unsicherheit besteht, die auch mit besseren Methoden und mehr Daten grundsätzlich nicht aufgehoben werden kann. Die Prognosen der Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute sind allerdings unverzerrt und stellen daher eine solide Grundlage für die wirtschaftspolitische Planung dar. Trotz ihrer Unvollkommenheit sind wissenschaftlich fundierte Prognosen eine wichtige Grundlage rationaler Wirtschaftspolitik.

In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on bank risk-taking. The results suggest that banks whose government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk by cutting off the riskiest borrowers from credit. Using a difference-in-differences approach we show that none of these effects are present in a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not applicable. Furthermore, savings banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments after the removal of the guarantee, while we do not observe this for the control group. We also document that yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased significantly right after the announcement of the decision to remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group remained unchanged. The evidence implies that public guarantees may be associated with substantial moral hazard effects.

In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced new ratings for banks that account for the potential of government support. The rating changes are not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks’ credit fundamentals. We use this natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of bail out expectations for bank behavior using a difference in differences approach. The results suggest a striking difference between the effects of bail out probabilities during calm times (“ex ante”) versus during crisis times (“ex post”). During calm times, higher bail-out probabilities result in higher risk taking, consistent with the moral hazard view and much of the empirical literature. However, in crisis times, we find that banks with higher bail out probabilities tend to increase their risk taking less compared to banks that were ex ante unlikely to be bailed-out. Charter values are one part of the explanation: Supported banks may have a funding advantage relative to non-supported banks during the crisis. However, we cannot rule out that other factors also may be playing a role, including tighter supervision of supported banks in crisis times.