This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing. Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.

Based on the sufficient statistics approach developed by Huang and Ottaviano (2024), we show how the state of technology of European industries relative to the rest of the world can be empirically assessed in a way that is simple in terms of computation, parsimonious in terms of data requirements, but still comprehensive in terms of information. The lack of systematic cross-industry correlation between export specialization and technological advantage suggests that standard measures of revealed comparative advantage only imperfectly capture a country’s technological prowess due to the concurrent influences of factor prices, market size, markups, firm selection and market share reallocation.

Based on the sufficient statistics approach developed by Huang and Ottaviano (2024), we show how the state of technology of European industries relative to the rest of the world can be empirically assessed in a way that is simple in terms of computation, parsimonious in terms of data requirements, but still comprehensive in terms of information. The lack of systematic cross-industry correlation between export specialization and technological advantage suggests that standard measures of revealed comparative advantage only imperfectly capture a country’s technological prowess due to the concurrent influences of factor prices, market size, markups, firm selection and market share reallocation.

This study examines why people engage in unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) by focusing on an overlooked mechanism: the mere fact of being a subordinate at the workplace. To establish a causal relationship, we conducted an online experiment with 615 full-time employees. We primed participants with private versus work-related contexts before instructing them to follow a rule that was beneficial for the organization but potentially unethical. We find that individuals high in power distance orientation engage to a greater extent in UPB after being primed on their work-related identity. Our results further emphasize that empowering leadership can mitigate this effect: For participants high in power distance, empowering messages eliminated the priming effect; their UPB levels matched those in the private control group. Thus, our study makes three key contributions: First, we add to the discussion of UPB antecedents. Second, we identify organizations that may be particularly vulnerable. Third, we point to strategies that could reduce UPB.

This paper provides new causal evidence on how patent allowances affect firms and their employees based on quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Exploiting employer-employee records with newly linked German firm data and web-scraped patent documents, we show that patent-induced shocks reduce firm exit, improve productivity, and increase wages, with rent-sharing elasticities between 0.10 and 0.21. Wage gains are broadly observed across occupational tasks, with high heterogeneity: managers benefit disproportionately in publicly traded firms, whereas broader wage increases accrue to workers in non-traded firms. Our findings highlight the role of institutional features and firm organization in shaping how rents are shared.

We examine how connections to German federal parliamentarians influence firm dynamics using a novel dataset linking politicians and election candidates to the universe of firms. To identify the causal effects of political access, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Results reveal that political connections reduce firm exits and gradually increase employment growth, with heterogeneous productivity effects depending on the political mandate. Incorporating data on credit ratings, subsidies, and procurement contracts allows us to identify the mechanisms driving the effects over the politician’s career.