In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.

In this paper we study the relationship between task complexity and the occupational wage- and employment structure. Complex tasks are defined as those requiring higher-order skills, such as the ability to abstract, solve problems, make decisions, or communicate effectively. We measure the task complexity of an occupation by performing Principal Component Analysis on a broad set of occupational descriptors in the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) data. We establish four main empirical facts for the U.S. over the 1980–2005 time period that are robust to the inclusion of a detailed set of controls, subsamples, and levels of aggregation: (1) There is a positive relationship across occupations between task complexity and wages and wage growth; (2) Conditional on task complexity, routine-intensity of an occupation is not a significant predictor of wage growth and wage levels; (3) Labor has reallocated from less complex to more complex occupations over time; (4) Within groups of occupations with similar task complexity labor has reallocated to non-routine occupations over time. We then formulate a model of Complex-Task Biased Technological Change with heterogeneous skills and show analytically that it can rationalize these facts. We conclude that workers in non-routine occupations with low ability of solving complex tasks are not shielded from the labor market effects of automatization.

We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.

Job creation is one of the most important aspects of entrepreneurship, but we know relatively little about the hiring patterns and decisions of start‐ups. Longitudinal data from the Integrated Longitudinal Business Database (iLBD), Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), and the Growing America through Entrepreneurship (GATE) experiment are used to provide some of the first evidence in the literature on the determinants of taking the leap from a nonemployer to employer firm among start‐ups. Several interesting patterns emerge regarding the dynamics of nonemployer start‐ups hiring their first employee. Hiring rates among the universe of nonemployer start‐ups are very low, but increase when the population of nonemployers is focused on more growth‐oriented businesses such as incorporated and employer identification number businesses. If nonemployer start‐ups hire, the bulk of hiring occurs in the first few years of existence. After this point in time, relatively few nonemployer start‐ups hire an employee. Focusing on more growth‐ and employment‐oriented start‐ups in the KFS, we find that Asian‐owned and Hispanic‐owned start‐ups have higher rates of hiring their first employee than white‐owned start‐ups. Female‐owned start‐ups are roughly 10 percentage points less likely to hire their first employee by the first, second, and seventh years after start‐up. The education level of the owner, however, is not found to be associated with the probability of hiring an employee. Among business characteristics, we find evidence that business assets and intellectual property are associated with hiring the first employee. Using data from the largest random experiment providing entrepreneurship training in the United States ever conducted, we do not find evidence that entrepreneurship training increases the likelihood that nonemployers hire their first employee.

The global financial crisis has again shown that it is important to understand the emergence and measurement of risks in the banking sector. However, there is no consensus in the literature which risk proxy works best at the level of the individual bank. A commonly used measure in applied work is the Z-score, which might suffer from calculation issues given poor data quality. Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk.

Zahlreiche Studien zeigen, dass unfreiwillige Arbeitsplatzverluste zu hohen und langfristigen Einkommensverlusten bei betroffenen Arbeitnehmern führen. Die vorliegende Studie verwendet Befragungsdaten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), um erstmals umfassend zu untersuchen, ob und in welchem Ausmaß Verluste im individuellen Arbeitseinkommen durch alternative Einkommensquellen, Reaktionen anderer Haushaltsmitglieder und durch staatliche Umverteilung ausgeglichen werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Verdienstverluste vor allem durch staatliche Umverteilung kompensiert werden, wohingegen andere Kanäle nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Ein Vergleich internationaler empirischer Evidenz zu den Verdienstausfällen nach Arbeitsplatzverlusten spricht nicht dafür, dass staatliche Umverteilung den Anreiz, Verluste durch eigene Anstrengungen selbst auszugleichen, vermindert.

The global financial crisis of 2007-08 and its adverse effects on economic activity have put financial stability back on the agenda of both researchers and policymakers. The regulatory debate has since then revolved around the question which reforms are needed to effectively reduce the likelihood and costs of future systemic financial crises. By now, the debate has led to an update of regulatory frameworks on the national, European, and global level. This thesis contributes to the empirical research on the risks to financial stability and to the debate on the regulation of international financial markets. It builds on some of the key insights from the recent global financial crisis and the respective policy responses. Chapter 1 of the thesis analyzes the reasons behind the strong co-movements of credit risk in sovereign bond markets during the financial crisis and the subsequent euro area debt crisis. In addition, it investigates to what extent high co-movements might be the outcome of contagion and through which channels contagion occurs. Chapter 2 investigates how uncertainty in banking affects banks’ loan supply, and it analyzes if the lending behavior is heterogeneous across different types of banks. Turning to the analysis of actual policies, Chapter 3 studies the effect of liquidity provided by the Eurosystem on macroeconomic adjustment in European crisis countries. Finally, Chapter 4 of the thesis assesses the effectiveness of a macroprudential policy instrument, caps on banks’ leverage, in stabilizing credit growth during financial downturns.

Im Zuge der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 bis 2009 rückte die Kontroverse um staatliche Notrettungsprogramme für den Bankensektor verstärkt ins Blickfeld. Diese Programme haben das Ziel, den Finanzsektor und somit auch realwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen zu stabilisieren. Dem stehen die finanziellen Kosten zu Lasten des Steuerzahlers, erhöhte Risikoübernahmen durch den Staat sowie mögliche verzerrende Wirkungen auf die Marktstruktur gegenüber. Dieser Artikel diskutiert mögliche Preisverzerrungen durch das Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in den USA aus dem Jahr 2008 vor dem Hintergrund eines aktuellen Forschungsbeitrags, der die langfristigen indirekten Effekte des Programms innerhalb der Gruppe der nicht unterstützten Banken untersucht. Hierbei zeigen sich keine Hinweise dafür, dass das Programm zur Bankenrettung zu nachhaltigen Unterschieden im Bankenwettbewerb nach 2010 geführt hat. Die Zinsmargen von Banken mit einer höheren Rettungswahrscheinlichkeit stiegen nur in der direkten Folgezeit von TARP, d. h. im Jahr 2010 an. Ein signifikanter Anstieg des Kredit- und Depotwachstum der Banken für den Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2013 kann nicht verzeichnet werden.

Die aktuelle Fluchtmigration kann nur durch engere internationale Kooperation auf dem Gebiet der Asylpolitik effizient bewältigt werden. Aus ökonomischer Perspektive wäre es sinnvoll, die ankommenden Flüchtlinge nach einem Verteilungsschlüssel auf alle EU-Länder zu verteilen. Dieser Verteilungsschlüssel sollte widerspiegeln, dass die Integrationskosten in den einzelnen Ländern unterschiedlich ausfallen. Effizient ist eine Verteilung, die die Kosten für die Integration zusätzlicher Flüchtlinge – auch unter Berücksichtigung positiver Effekte etwa auf das Erwerbspersonenpotenzial in alternden und schrumpfenden Gesellschaften – nivelliert. Die Kosten zusätzlicher Integration dürften allerdings nicht automatisch dort am niedrigsten sein, wo die ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit am höchsten ist. Ferner sind die einzelnen Länder gegenwärtig sehr unterschiedlich betroffen. Um eine politische Einigung zu erzielen, ist neben einem Verteilungsschlüssel für die Personen auch ein Verteilungsschlüssel für die Kosten erforderlich, der sich an der Leistungsfähigkeit der Länder und an dem Umfang der positiven externen Effekte orientiert, von denen Länder profitieren, die vergleichsweise wenige Flüchtlinge aufnehmen. Der von der EU-Kommission vorgelegte Verteilungsschlüssel greift prinzipiell die richtigen Faktoren auf, ist jedoch im Detail intransparent und könnte verbessert werden. Die Kompensationszahlungen an Länder, die aus Gründen der Kosteneffizienz relativ viele Flüchtlinge gemäß dem Verteilungsschlüssel aufnehmen, sollten durch Umschichtungen innerhalb des EU-Haushalts finanziert werden.

In this note we document political lending cycles for German savings banks. We find that savings banks on average increase supply of commercial loans by €7.6 million in the year of a local election in their respective county or municipality (Kommunalwahl). For all savings banks combined this amounts to €3.4 billion (0.4% of total credit supply in Germany in a complete electoral cycle) more credit in election years. Credit growth at savings banks increases by 0.7 percentage points, which corresponds to a 40% increase relative to non-election years. Consistent with this result, we also find that the performance of the savings banks follows the same electoral cycle. The loans that the savings banks generate during election years perform worse in the first three years of maturity and loan losses tend to be realized in the middle of the election cycle.