The Swiss National Bank abolished the exchange rate floor versus the Euro in January 2015. Using a synthetic matching framework, we analyze the impact of this unexpected (and therefore exogenous) policy change on the stock market. The results reveal a significant level shift (decline) in asset prices following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. As a novel finding in the literature, we document that the exchange‐rate elasticity of Swiss asset prices is around −0.75. Differentiating between sectors of the Swiss economy, we find that the industrial, financial and consumer goods sectors are most strongly affected by the abolition of the minimum exchange rate.

Previous research finds market financing is favored over relationship financing in environments of better governance, since the transaction costs to investors of vetting asymmetric information are thereby reduced. For industries supplying public goods, for-profits rely on market financing, while nonprofits rely on relationships with donors. This suggests that for-profits will be more inclined than nonprofits to improve financial transparency. We examine the impact of for-profit versus nonprofit status on the financial transparency of firms engaged with supplying public goods. There are relatively few industries that have large number of both for-profit and nonprofit firms across countries. However, the microfinance industry provides the opportunity of a large number of both for-profit and nonprofit firms in relatively equal numbers, across a wide array of countries. Consistent with our prediction, we find that financial transparency is positively associated with a for-profit status. Results will be of broad interest both to scholars interested in the roles of transparency and transaction costs on market versus relational financing; as well as to policy makers interested in the impact of for-profit on the supply of public goods, and on the microfinance industry in particular.

Previous studies report a robust positive relationship between cash endowments and asset prices in experimental asset markets. Higher cash endowments generally increase the proportion of riskless versus risky wealth at the individual and aggregate level as well as the capacity of market participants to seize investment opportunities, i.e., their transactional liquidity. In this study, we vary the size and composition of riskless endowments in order to analyze the impact of different types of “cash” on trading behavior in experimental asset markets with randomly fluctuating fundamental values. In all treatments except the baseline, we allow subjects to control the liquidity of their cash endowment endogenously by providing some proportion of their riskless endowment in a physical store of value, which can be converted into experimental currency for trading. We observe that most subjects retain a large proportion of their wealth in the physical store of value. Inconsistent with rational choice theory, average trading prices and trading volumes are lower when “cash” is provided in a convertible store of value rather than experimental currency. Surprisingly, the price effect manifests asymmetrically on the buy side but not the sell side. Moreover, we control for potential changes in risk appetite resulting from higher riskless endowments. Our results suggest that transactional liquidity not a risky demand shift drives the relationship between cash endowments and asset prices.

The Swiss National Bank abolished the exchange rate floor versus the Euro in January 2015. Based on a synthetic matching framework, we analyse the impact of this unexpected (and therefore exogenous) shock on the stock market. The results reveal a significant level shift (decline) in asset prices in Switzerland following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. While adjustments in stock market returns were most pronounced directly after the news announcement, the variance was elevated for some weeks, indicating signs of increased uncertainty and potentially negative consequences for the real economy.

Als Reaktion auf die Finanzkrise unterliegt das Finanzsystem zahlreichen neuen regulatorischen Änderungen. Zum einen wurden bestehende mikroprudenzielle Regeln für Eigenkapital und Liquidität verschärft. Zum anderen wurden makroprudenzielle Instrumente eingeführt. Makroprudenzielle Regulierung hat dabei zum Ziel, systemische Risiken im Finanzsystem frühzeitig zu erkennen, zu reduzieren und somit die Finanzmarktstabilität zu erhöhen. Zudem wurde mit der Einführung der Bankenunion die Aufsicht der größten Banken des Euroraums der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) übertragen. Diese Studie untersucht, ob das systemische Risiko von Banken unterschiedlich groß ist, wenn eine europäische im Vergleich zu einer nationalen Perspektive eingenommen wird. Im Anschluss wird die Frage geklärt, welche Faktoren systemisches Risiko beeinflussen und ob sich diese Faktoren zwischen der nationalen und europäischen Ebene unterscheiden. Es zeigt sich, dass Banken auf nationaler Ebene im Durchschnitt etwas mehr zum systemischen Risiko beitragen, wobei es große Unterschiede zwischen Banken und Ländern gibt. Zudem haben größere und profitablere Banken sowie Banken, deren Geschäftsmodell durch eine geringere Kreditvergabe geprägt ist, ein höheres systemisches Risiko.

We explore the sources of household balance sheet adjustment following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use microdata from the Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that banks cumulatively tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a house price boom in the mid-2000s than in non-boom counties. We then use the idea that renters, unlike homeowners, did not experience an adverse wealth shock when the housing market collapsed to examine the relative importance of two explanations for the observed deleveraging and the sluggish pickup in consumption after 2008. First, households may have optimally adjusted to lower wealth by reducing their demand for debt and implicitly, their demand for consumption. Alternatively, banks may have been more reluctant to lend in areas with pronounced real estate declines. Our evidence is consistent with the second explanation. Renters with low risk scores, compared to homeowners in the same markets, reduced their levels of nonmortgage debt and credit card debt more in counties where house prices fell more. The contrast suggests that the observed reductions in aggregate borrowing were more driven by cutbacks in the provision of credit than by a demand-based response to lower housing wealth.