Real estate is a capstone connection between various economic agents and markets. It is the main store of household wealth, serves as collateral for mortgage loans in the banking system, aids the transmission of monetary policy, and can propagate financial crises when overvalued. Yet comparable house-price data across the European Union (EU) and the euro area is unavailable, which hinders the design and evaluation of common monetary and economic policy that operates across heterogeneous housing markets. We derive monthly subnational European Real Estate Indicators (EREI) from online residential property advertisements in 16 European countries. The release covers April 2024 to June 2026 and contains 48,168 region-month-segment observations for 1,154 NUTS 3 regions, aggregating more than 43 million listing observations across the monthly sale and rental cross-sections. Each region-month segment reports the number of advertisements and summary statistics for asking prices per square meter and listing durations. The release also includes sale-segment indices for Europe, the euro area, and individual countries. Thirteen covered countries are EU members, which represented 85% of EU-27 gross domestic product in 2024. EREI data support research on a wide range of socio-economic phenomena associated with real estate dynamics, such as the evaluation of monetary policy or macroprudential policy effects on financial stability.

Using a market-indicator-based approach, this paper empirically examines whether the stability of the US and EU financial systems is affected by the digital finance revolution driven by BigTechs, FinTechs, and crypto-assets. These three sectors display different downside volatility profiles, with financial intermediaries being particularly sensitive to shocks from the crypto ecosystem only under extremely severe downturns, which are prevented in regulated equity markets. In that vein, we provide evidence that the Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation reduced financial systemic risk in EU. Overall, our empirical analysis shows that markets perceive the performance and riskiness of tech-driven companies and assets in differentiated ways, and that the transmission of shocks from digital finance ecosystems operates uniquely under varying conditions of systemic stress. Finally, we also document asymmetric spillover effects between advanced and emerging economies, with shock transmission from the US and EU to emerging markets being systematically stronger than in the reverse direction.

Im September 2025 reisten Finanzökonomen aus aller Welt zum elften Mal nach Halle, um am jährlichen FIN-FIRE-Workshop am IWH teilzunehmen. Zwei Tage lang gaben die Autoren von zehn Beiträgen einen umfassenden Überblick über aktuelle Themen, die potenzielle Herausforderungen für das Finanzsystem darstellen, z. B. mangelnden Datenschutz bei der Vergabe von Immobilienkrediten, Unsicherheiten in Anleihemärkten aufgrund von Klimarisiken, Intransparenz bei synthetischen Risikotransferprodukten, die Auswirkungen geopolitischer Risiken auf die Kreditvergabe sowie granulare Friktionen bei der Transmission geldpolitischer Maßnahmen. Ein intensiver Gedankenaustausch zwischen Autoren, Ko-Referenten und Plenum führte zu neuen Erkenntnissen über die Widerstandsfähigkeit und Fragilität unserer Finanzsysteme.

The establishment of the European Banking Union constitutes a major change in the regulatory framework of the banking system. Main parts are implemented via directives that show staggered transposition timing across EU member states. Based on the newly compiled Banking Union Directives Database, we assess how banks’ funding costs responded to the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV). Our findings show an upward trend in funding costs which is driven by an increase in cost of equity and partially offset by a decline in cost of debt. The diverging trends are most present in countries with an ex-ante lower regulatory capital stringency, which is in line with banks’ short-run adjustment needs but longer-run benefits from increased financial stability.

This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.