Environmental Incidents and Sustainability Pricing Provisions
Huyen Nguyen, Sochima Uzonwanne
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
We investigate whether lenders use sustainability pricing provisions (SPPs) to manage borrower environmental risk. Using unexpected negative environmental incidents as shocks to environmental risk, we find that lenders are 10 percentage points less likely to include SPPs in loans to environmentally risky borrowers. Instead, they rely on conventional tools, including higher interest rates, stricter covenants, and collateral requirements. The effect weakens under strong institutional investor demand or when lenders can sell loans in secondary markets. Our study suggests that SPPs primarily help attract institutional investors rather than manage risk, with implications for the design and regulation of sustainability-linked financial instruments.
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Environmental Incidents and Sustainability Pricing
Huyen Nguyen, Sochima Uzonwanne
Abstract
We investigate whether lenders employ sustainability pricing provisions to manage borrowers’ environmental risk. Using unexpected negative environmental incidents of borrowers as exogenous shocks that reveal information on environmental risk, we find that lenders manage borrowers’ environmental risk by conventional tools such as imposing higher interest rates, utilizing financial and net worth covenants, showing reluctance to refinance, and demanding increased collateral. In contrast, the inclusion of sustainability pricing provisions in loan agreements for high environmental risk borrowers is reduced by 11 percentage points. Our study suggests that sustainability pricing provisions may not primarily serve as risk management tools but rather as instruments to attract demand from institutional investors and facilitate secondary market transactions.
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