Professorin Merih Sevilir, Ph.D.

Professorin Merih Sevilir, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 6/22

Leiterin der Abteilung Gesetzgebung, Regulierung und Faktormärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 6/22

Professorin

European School of Management and Technology Berlin (ESMT)

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Finanzwissenschaft
  • Arbeitsmarktökonomik
  • Unternehmensführung

Merih Sevilir ist Professorin für Finance an der European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) in Berlin und leitet seit Juni 2022 die Abteilung Gesetzgebung, Regulierung und Faktormärkte am IWH.

Merih Sevilir hat an der Bogazici University, der University of Warwick und der INSEAD studiert. Im Jahr 2003 schloss sie ihre Promotion in Finance ab. Bevor sie zum IWH kam, war sie Professorin an der Indiana University.

Ihr Kontakt

Professorin Merih Sevilir, Ph.D.
Professorin Merih Sevilir, Ph.D.
Leiter - Abteilung Gesetzgebung, Regulierung und Faktormärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-808

Publikationen

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Access to Public Capital Markets and Employment Growth

Alexander Borisov Andrew Ellul Merih Sevilir

in: Journal of Financial Economics, Nr. 3, 2021

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of going public on firm-level employment. To establish a causal effect, we employ a novel data set of private firms to investigate employment growth in IPO firms relative to a group of firms that file for an IPO but subsequently withdraw their offering. We find that employment increases significantly after going public, and the increase is more pronounced in industries with requirements for highly skilled labor and greater dependence on external finance. Improved ability to undertake acquisitions and a strategic shift toward commercialization, rather than agency problems, explain employment growth. Overall, these results highlight the importance of going public for firms' employment policies.

Publikation lesen

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Activism and Empire Building

Nickolay Gantchev Merih Sevilir Anil Shivdasani

in: Journal of Financial Economics, Nr. 2, 2020

Abstract

Hedge fund activists target firms engaging in empire building and improve their future acquisition and divestiture strategy. Following intervention, activist targets make fewer acquisitions but obtain substantially higher returns by avoiding large and diversifying deals and refraining from acquisitions during merger waves. Activist targets also increase the pace of divestitures and achieve higher divestiture returns than matched non-targets. Activists curtail empire building through the removal of empire building chief executive officers (CEOs), compensation based incentives, and appointment of new board members. Our findings highlight an important channel through which activists improve efficiency and create shareholder value.

Publikation lesen

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Venture Capitalists on Boards of Mature Public Firms

Ugur Celikyurt Merih Sevilir Anil Shivdasani

in: Review of Financial Studies, Nr. 1, 2014

Abstract

Venture capitalists (VCs) often serve on the board of mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO), even for companies that were not VC-backed at the IPO. Board appointments of VC directors are followed by increases in research and development intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Hence, in addition to providing finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms and have a broader influence in promoting innovation than has been established in the literature.

Publikation lesen
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