presse@iwh-halle.de
So viele Firmenpleiten wie seit Jahrzehnten nicht
Steffen Müller
Handelsblatt, 10. April 2024
The recent Global Financial Crisis has highlighted the importance of financial cycles for macroeconomic and financial stability.
Bei einer zweitägigen Forschungskonferenz von Bundesbank, dem Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle und dem Centre for Economic Policy Research diskutierten Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler die Chancen und Herausforderungen, die regulatorische Reformen und neue Technologien für die Zukunft der Finanzintermediation darstellen.
Das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) veranstaltet seinen ersten IWH Policy Talk am Donnerstag, dem 2. Februar 2017. Mit den IWH Policy Talks etabliert das Institut ein neues After‐Work‐Format mit dem Ziel, namhafte Ökonomen und Ökonominnen mit einem Publikum zusammenzubringen, das sich für ökonomische Fragestellungen begeistert.
The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association and the International Network for Economic Research (INFER) were organising a workshop on unconventional monetary policy, international monetary policy spillovers, financial stability and monetary policy.
A bank in poor financial shape may have incentives to maintain a lending relationship with a "zombie" firm in order to avoid or delay the recognition of credit losses.
This paper provides a detailed description of an extended version of the ECB's New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) of the euro area (cf. Christoffel, Coenen and Warne, 2008).
This paper analyzes the effects of policy rates on financial intermediaries' risk-taking decisions. We consider an economy where (i) intermediaries have market power in granting loans, (ii) intermediaries monitor borrowers which lowers their probability of default, and (iii) monitoring is not observable which creates a moral hazard problem.
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the transmission of macroprudential policies aimed at limiting bank risk-taking in residential real estate.
We use a quasi-natural experiment to identify the effects of supervision on bank behavior. Under the decentralized structure of U.S. bank supervision, banks in the same geographic area may be supervised by different regulatory offices.
Uncertainty shocks cause economic activity to contract and more so, if monetary policy is constrained by an effective lower bound on interest rates.