Die Weltwirtschaft steht im Frühjahr 2025 im Zeichen sich tiefgreifend ändernder geopolitischer und wirtschaftspolitischer Rahmenbedingungen. Vor dem Hintergrund des Politikwechsels in den USA sind insbesondere in Europa, aber nicht nur dort, neue sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen entstanden. Sie haben zunächst zu einer Lockerung fiskalischer Restriktionen beigetragen, machen aber zumindest längerfristig auch eine Überprüfung finanzpolitischer Prioritäten erforderlich. Zudem hat die US-Regierung begonnen, neue Handelshürden aufzubauen und zusätzliche Unsicherheiten für die wirtschaftlichen Akteure zu schaffen. Dies bremst den globalen Warenhandel und die Produktion sowohl weltweit als auch in den USA selbst, wo erste Anzeichen für eine Abkühlung der Konjunktur sichtbar sind.

We study the effects of Tax Authority (IRS) attention on a firm’s financial reporting. We explore whether firms institute a higher degree of accounting conservatism in response to IRS monitoring. Using data on IRS acquisition of public firms’ 10-K financial disclosures to proxy for IRS attention, we find that when firms are under IRS attention, they tend to initiate higher levels of unconditional and, to some extent, conditional accounting conservatism. We alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns by using pre- and post-IRS attention environments between the treated group (firms with IRS attention) and a propensity score that matches the control group of firms (no IRS attention). These results withstand several robustness tests and subsample analyses.

We examine whether liquidity dynamics within banking groups matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using matched bank headquarters-branch data for identification, we find a lending channel of reserve requirements for municipal branches whose headquarters are more exposed to the policy tool. The result is driven by the 2008–2009 crisis and is stronger for state-owned branches, especially when being less profitable and liquidity constrained. These findings suggest the presence of cross-regional distributional effects of macroprudential policies operating via internal capital markets.

I show that rising temperatures can detrimentally affect the sovereign creditworthiness of emerging economies. To this end, I collect long-term monthly temperature data of 54 emerging markets. I calculate a country’s temperature deviation from its historical average, which approximates present-day climate change trends. Running regressions from 1994m1 to 2018m12, I find that higher temperature anomalies lower sovereign bond performances (i.e., increase sovereign risk) significantly for countries that are warmer on average and have lower seasonality. The estimated magnitudes suggest that affected countries likely face significant increases in their sovereign borrowing costs if temperatures continue to rise due to climate change. However, results indicate that stronger institutions can make a country more resilient towards temperature shocks, which holds independent of a country’s climate.

Mit Antrag vom 11. März 2025 fordert die BSW-Fraktion im Sächsischen Landtag, gesetzliche Renten bis zu einer Höhe von 2.000 Euro im Monat steuerlich freizustellen, um die hohen Preissteigerungen der vergangenen Jahre für diese Personengruppe auszugleichen. Ein Blick auf die Einkommenssituation von Rentnern und Arbeitnehmern zeigt allerdings, dass ein Fokus allein auf die gesetzliche Rente zu kurz greift, weil Rentnerhaushalte im Durchschnitt über weitere Einnahmequellen verfügen. Zudem müssten die Einnahmeausfälle gegenfinanziert werden, wodurch andere gesellschaftliche Gruppen zusätzlich belastet würden. Schließlich würde die steuerliche Freistellung von niedrigen und mittleren Renteneinkommen deren Empfänger gegenüber Arbeitnehmern besserstellen. Auch die Arbeitsanreize für Ältere würden gemindert. Mit der Grundsicherung im Alter steht ein zielgenaueres Instrument zur Unterstützung bedürftiger Haushalte zur Verfügung.

Between 2010 and 2012, the European Central Bank absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Detailed security holdings data at the bank level affirms an effective lending stimulus due to the SMP. Exposed banks contract household lending, but increase commercial lending substantially. Holding non-SMP securities from stressed EMU countries amplifies the commercial lending response. The SMP also improved liquidity buffers and profitability without compromising credit quality.

Amiti et al. (2024) seek to answer a very topical and important research question: How much did supply-side disruptions and the tight labor market contribute to the recent surge in inflation? The answer provided by the authors is: about 2 percentage points. To arrive at their answer, the authors use a calibrated two-sector New Keynesian model in which they use three correlated shocks in a perfect-storm type setting. The paper also has an interesting empirical part that provides evidence that the channels emphasized in the theoretical model are at work in the data.

Benmir, Jaccard, and Vermandel (2023, BJV) seek to answer the following set of topical and important research questions: (i) How should monetary policy be conducted during a pandemic?, (ii) How do health considerations affect the conduct of monetary policy?, and (iii) How does the presence of contagion risk affect the main building blocks of the New Keynesian model?

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.